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“e Mischiefs of Foreign Intrigue”
F rance’s revolutionary war against Britain could not have occurred at a worse time for President George Washington. In late March 1793, when the news reached Philadelphia, Washington had begun his 
second term in a job he was not sure he wanted anymore.1 e growing parti-
sanship among voters and within his cabinet, along with the increasingly per-
sonal attacks appearing in the nation’s newspapers, had soured Washington on 
his presidential duties.2 Nonetheless, he recognized the dangers a European war 
posed for the young nation, particularly one involving America’s principal allies. 
Amid these international and partisan challenges, Washington achieved the near 
impossible when he forged a consensus neutrality policy in his deeply divided 
cabinet and then utilized the authorities contained in the Constitution to imple-
ment American neutrality at home and abroad to keep the nation at peace.
e United States’ commitment to neutrality began on April 22, 1793, when 
Washington and his cabinet issued the Neutrality Proclamation to shield the 
young nation from the latest round of warfare between France and Great Brit-
ain. Recognizing the signi	cant risks that this conict posed for the recently 
independent United States, the proclamation announced America’s desire to 
pursue friendly commercial and diplomatic relations with all nations, includ-
ing its two principal trading partners, while avoiding hostilities. Amid a cen-
tury of 	ghting on the high seas in which ship seizures and privateering were 
the norm, this proclamation boldly declared America’s right of free trade even 
during wartime. Proclaiming neutrality, however, proved easier than maintain-
ing it, and enforcing neutrality contributed to America’s transformation from 
a paper republic into an autonomous nation fully embracing its constitutional 
responsibilities.
Neutrality stands as a familiar theme in American foreign policy, inuencing 
diplomatic decisions well into the nineteenth century.3 e term “neutrality” 
also enjoyed a revival in the twentieth century during the debates over Amer-
ican involvement in the two world wars, although this had more to do with 
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isolationism than free trade.4 Historical treatments of the 1793 proclamation 
have either focused on the diplomatic crises associated with this policy or have 
exaggerated the partisan disagreements surrounding it.5 While diplomatic chal-
lenges did arise in the 1790s, these studies would be stronger if they situated the 
resulting agreements, such as Jay’s Treaty and Pinckney’s Treaty (both 1795), 
within the nation’s overriding ambition to remain neutral.6 Two older works 
dealing with the policy’s formulation in Washington’s cabinet emphasize the 
partisan 	reworks and policy disagreements between Treasury Secretary Al-
exander Hamilton and Secretary of State omas Jeerson while overlooking 
the compromises they and others reached that resulted in a successful procla-
mation.7 Despite the concept’s ubiquity in American politics and diplomacy, in 
other words, no book has looked at the systematic implementation of neutrality 
across the government or overseas. rough a comprehensive examination of its 
origins, formulation, and implementation, Navigating Neutrality demonstrates 
this policy’s far-reaching eects in building an economically independent, insti-
tutionally strong, and politically sovereign nation.
e concept of neutrality did not originate on American shores, nor was the 
United States the 	rst nation to adopt this policy, of course.8 is idea emerged 
from Enlightenment philosophers, who saw neutral trade as a rational practice 
that could foster harmony among nations.9 Additionally, many smaller Euro-
pean nations pursued neutrality to protect their maritime economies from the 
incessant continental warfare of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Den-
mark, Sweden, and the Netherlands had declared themselves neutral in treaties 
and alliances in the hope of pursuing free trade without interference from war-
ring powers.10 Even the American Revolution provoked a neutrality agreement, 
with Russia organizing its European neighbors into the League of Armed Neu-
trality in 1780 to avoid taking sides in this increasingly global conict.11 Most of 
these neutrality agreements inevitably fell victim to wartime realities. With the 
Atlantic Ocean serving as a watery battleground during European hostilities, 
most nations relied on state-sponsored “privateers” to harass enemy merchant 
ships and to capture their cargoes. Privateering provided a cost-eective way for 
nations to undercut their opponents while enriching themselves and the autho-
rized ship captains. Merchantmen claiming to be neutral frequently fell victim 
to wartime privateering since nations at war viewed all vessels as potential carri-
ers of supplies for their enemies.12
For America to achieve its goal of wartime neutrality, the federal government 
needed to develop the capacity to enforce this policy among its citizens and 
across diplomatic channels or risk sinking into irrelevance at home and abroad.13
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Proclaiming and enforcing neutrality forced the U.S. government to leave its 
safe constitutional moorings and exercise its responsibilities in the Atlantic’s 
tumultuous waters. Navigating Neutrality tells this story through an examina-
tion of the historical circumstances and precedents, the political decisions, and 
the governing authorities that de	ned and ultimately led to the enforcement of 
American neutrality.
e 1793 proclamation announced the international and economic role 
the United States sought in its founding decades. Yet violations of this policy 
quickly washed up on U.S. shores as France’s new minister, Citizen Genet, com-
missioned American ships and sailors as privateers, with many eagerly accept-
ing these lucrative opportunities. Remaining neutral during the 1790s required 
the constant vigilance of all three federal branches as the national government 
craed policies and exercised its authorities to prevent these infringements. In its 
quest to avoid entanglements in European warfare, the enforcement of this bold 
and far-reaching statement helped build the national government.
Neutrality’s international and commercial components, as well as its enforce-
ment requirements, explain its outsized role in the federal government’s develop-
ment. Since diplomacy is the exclusive responsibility of the national government, 
the neutrality policy energized federal institutions, authorities, and constitu-
tional responsibilities.14 Additionally, its implementation required the expansion 
of the government’s diplomatic and commercial presence across all three federal 
branches.15 e executive branch, possessing authority over foreign aairs, for-
mulated this policy and then implemented it in U.S. ports and among foreign 
diplomats.16 e other two branches also assumed their institutional responsibil-
ities, with Congress regulating commerce and the courts adjudicating violations.
Other policies of the 1790s also built the federal government’s authority, of 
course. e national government in its founding decade tackled such challenges 
as the Revolutionary War debt, Indian warfare, westward expansion, the Whis-
key Rebellion (1794), and the codi	cation of chattel slavery. Yet none of these 
issues built the government as extensively as neutrality did. e latter cut an 
unusually wide swath across all three branches and also required a permanent 
institutional presence to be successful: diplomatic envoys, custom o­cers, dis-
trict attorneys, federal judges, naval o­cers and sailors, and state militias. In 
contrast, the Indian wars of the 1790s, for example, required a military presence 
in the West but did not lead to a permanent standing army.17
e one program that equaled the scale and reach of the neutrality proclama-
tion was Hamilton’s landmark “Report on the Public Credit.” Issued in 1790, 
this ambitious economic proposal included a sweeping plan to pay o the war 
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debt, including those of the states; establish a Bank of the United States; and 
institute taris to protect nascent American manufacturing. In building federal 
institutions and establishing the scope of the government’s role and authority, 
Hamilton’s report (and resulting initiatives) matched the inuence of the neu-
trality proclamation, but in the domestic realm.18
With its emphasis on the United States’ international role, Navigating Neu-
trality joins a growing collection of histories that recognize the importance of 
state building in implementing the Constitution and in establishing the new 
government in the 1790s and beyond.19 As the popular biographies of John 
Adams and Hamilton (and a resulting television show and Broadway musical, 
respectively) have demonstrated, the reading public is fascinated by the lives and 
careers of the founding generation.20 But personalities alone did not build the 
U.S. government or energize the Constitution. With the renewed focus on polit-
ical, diplomatic, and even military histories, scholars have turned their attention 
to the national institutions that supported these endeavors in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, including the relationship of war and money, 
the work of the custom houses in regulating American commerce, and the pres-
ident’s cabinet as a governing entity.21 Navigating Neutrality expands this 	eld 
by focusing on the practical rami	cations of enforcing a key policy across the 
entire government, not just in one agency or department. is interdisciplinary 
study also engages the 	elds of politics, diplomacy, law, philosophy, and the At-
lantic world and beyond as well as the role of American citizens in negotiating 
commerce and warfare.
Washington’s leadership in guiding the formulation and implementation of 
this proclamation demonstrates his underappreciated skills as a savvy political 
negotiator and his enduring presidential legacy as a statesman. is book joins 
others that have increasingly recognized Washington as more than a symbol of 
republican government but as an active and engaged champion of its successful 
launching. Additionally, his presidential accomplishments have emerged from 
the long ideological and partisan shadows cast by his sparring cabinet members 
Hamilton and Jeerson.22
As Washington and his cabinet discussed neutrality, no one, including Ham-
ilton and Jeerson, wanted to become involved in a European war. Where they 
disagreed was how to translate this stance into a viable policy.23 e president 
held the strong belief that the United States needed to explicitly distance it-
self from a European conict that would only harm the young nation. Unlike 
Hamilton and Jeerson, who viewed Britain and France through ideological and 
philosophical prisms, Washington understood the activities of these two nations 
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more pragmatically. As a military o­cer in the Seven Years’ War (1756–63) and 
later the American Revolution, Washington had encountered the British and 
the French as both enemies and allies. For him, the Anglo-French war of 1793 
was just another chapter in a longstanding imperial rivalry that had nothing to 
do with the United States. is battle	eld perspective explains Washington’s 
steadfast commitment to American neutrality throughout his presidency, con-
cluding with the advice contained in his Farewell Address to avoid “the mis-
chiefs of foreign intrigue” and “to steer clear of permanent alliances.”24
To produce a successful statement on neutrality, Washington recognized the 
need to gain the support of Jeerson and Hamilton as well as their cabinet al-
lies, Attorney General Edmund Randolph and Secretary of War Henry Knox, 
respectively. e president did not bully or cajole his cabinet, nor did he force his 
views on them. Instead, he solicited the opinions of all four cabinet members, 
sought common ground among their ideas, and then craed their suggestions 
into a 	nal proclamation that epitomized compromise and consensus. Each cab-
inet member could point to crucial provisions that reected their concerns and 
suggestions, even if the statement contained elements they did not favor. (For 
example, Jeerson successfully pushed for the omission of the word “neutrality,” 
preferring “impartial” instead.)25 In the 1793 proclamation, Washington and his 
cabinet spoke in a single voice to announce America’s intention to remain at 
peace and to prohibit its citizens from becoming involved in European warfare.
reats to U.S. neutrality were not limited to the Atlantic. In 1794, Washing-
ton’s administration issued a second neutrality proclamation to ban the nation’s 
citizens from participating in a French-led invasion of Spanish Louisiana. is 
western proclamation underscored the volatility of the nation’s trans-Mississippi 
boundary as Indigenous peoples, Americans, and other Europeans fought for 
land and navigation rights.26 Rather than seeing the porous boundaries of the 
Atlantic, the South, and the West as mutually exclusive, this book acknowledges 
that some neutrality violations also occurred along the nation’s territorial bor-
der with Spanish Louisiana. Just as the original proclamation and the cotton 
gin came into existence the same year, the cotton crops this machine processed 
required unfettered passage in transatlantic ships headed to textile mills in Liv-
erpool and Manchester.27 Many studies have emphasized the turmoil along the 
nation’s western and southern boundaries in explaining early American history. 
is book argues for the continued relevance of America’s disputed Atlantic 
coastline as well.28
If the formulation of neutrality demonstrated Washington’s skills as a polit-
ical leader, its implementation, both at home and abroad, revealed his equally 
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underappreciated role as a statesman. With violations of this policy occurring 
with impunity, Washington led his administration, including Hamilton and 
Jeerson, through a series of enforcement decisions intended to prevent Amer-
icans from privateering or otherwise aiding the European war.29 e president 
and his cabinet directed the Treasury Department’s collectors of the customs, 
located in port cities, to serve as the 	rst line of defense in reporting neutrality 
violations. e U.S. attorneys, under the secretary of state’s supervision, were 
instructed to prosecute these transgressions in the newly established federal 
court system.
While the neutrality proclamation established the executive branch as the 
leading voice of foreign policy, rampant privateering made Washington real-
ize he needed the assistance of the entire government to enforce this policy.30
e district courts and the Supreme Court struggled the most to de	ne their 
legal and constitutional duties but eventually embraced their responsibilities.31
Congress, which possessed the constitutional mandate for regulating commerce, 
codi	ed the two neutrality proclamations into law and sought ways to protect 
American trade and port cities. Without a standing army or navy, state militias, 
under the command of the governors, policed U.S. waters for illegal privateering 
activities. During a long summer of privateering violations in 1793, Washington 
came to realize a bold proclamation did not necessarily mean an eective one. 
In response, he employed his considerable political skills to encourage all three 
branches of government to embrace their constitutional duties in order to suc-
cessfully enforce federal policy.
On the diplomatic front, Washington and his cabinet dealt with a litany of vi-
olations caused by Genet and a growing list of complaints from the British min-
ister about assaults on his nation’s vessels. With these transgressions occurring 
on an almost daily basis, Secretary of State Jeerson assumed primary respon-
sibility for diplomatic communications and negotiations with foreign nations, 
particularly France and Britain. At the same time, Washington sought a more 
permanent solution to resolve these assaults on U.S. sovereignty. With America’s 
transatlantic commerce increasingly under siege, the president posted envoys (in 
addition to U.S. ministers) to Britain, Spain, the West Indies, and the Barbary 
Coast to secure free-trade agreements and to recover captured American ships 
from foreign ports. In keeping the nation at peace during the international tur-
moil of the 1790s, Washington achieved his most enduring legacy as president 
as a pragmatic diplomat and prescient statesman.
In recognizing Washington’s substantial achievements as president in at-
taining peace over war, this book also engages the new diplomatic history. is 
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previously moribund 	eld has enjoyed a revival thanks to the globalization of 
U.S. history and the expansion of “diplomacy” to include not just the o­cial 
government functions of treaties and ambassadors, but also the activities of or-
dinary citizens living and working throughout the world. is revival has also 
sought to broaden the chronological reach of this 	eld beyond the twentieth cen-
tury and into the neglected foreign aairs of the early republic, a period dating 
from 1789 to 1861.32 e ship captains and seamen discussed in this book found 
themselves immersed in international politics and commerce in the Caribbean 
Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and, of course, the Atlantic Ocean, sometimes at 
their own peril.33 But they were not the only ones. Along with o­cial diplo-
mats, uno­cial American consuls, and the maritime community, Americans 
permeated global aairs as merchants, missionaries, and even scientists.34 Mix-
ing the old with the new, this book shows that during the 1790s, the Washington 
administration’s o­cial stance of neutrality not only bene	ted the new nation 
internationally but also aided U.S. citizens who ran into di­culties overseas.
As Washington led his cabinet through the issues surrounding the formu-
lation and implementation of neutrality, all 	ve men brought a professional-
ism to these discussions as well as a strong awareness of their institutional and 
constitutional duties, despite their personal and partisan dierences. While the 
president employed meetings to resolve the major issues surrounding neutrality, 
he also encouraged the cabinet to submit their ideas in writing in order to elicit 
their insights and forge a consensus.35 anks to Washington’s desire to build a 
common ground on neutrality, written documents, particularly letters, emerged 
as an essential tool of early American governance.36 Additionally, with an eye 
to posterity, Hamilton, Jeerson, Randolph, and even Knox eagerly provided 
detailed responses to the president’s queries about the best ways to formulate 
and implement U.S. neutrality. Jeerson, who increasingly found himself in the 
minority, kept detailed notes on the debates and decisions from the numerous 
cabinet meetings. ese summaries provided a venue for him to record what was 
said in order to highlight his own disagreements for future partisan purposes. As 
the enforcement of neutrality spread across the government, each cabinet mem-
ber contributed dras for Washington’s annual addresses to Congress announc-
ing this policy and also submitted suggestions for the letter to France that would 
lead to Citizen Genet’s recall. Early in his presidency, Washington famously said 
that he “walked on untrodden ground.”37 As he and his cabinet formulated and 
enacted the nation’s 	rst major statement on foreign policy, with its domestic 
and institutional rami	cations, they followed in his footsteps and established 
precedents for the new government on an almost daily basis.
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America’s declaration of neutrality in 1793 represented a desire to avoid Euro-
pean warfare; it also served as a manifesto of the young nation’s quest to abandon 
its colonial status and to be recognized as an independent country. Neither Brit-
ain nor France respected U.S. neutrality, with Britain still regarding American 
ports and ships as colonial holdings and France possessing unrealistic expecta-
tions about America’s support for its own revolutionary war against monarchy. 
As both an Enlightenment idea and a policy goal, neutrality de	ned America’s 
stance in the transatlantic disputes that roiled the 1790s. rough an explora-
tion of this concept’s legal origins, its political formulation, and its domestic and 
international enforcement, this book explains neutrality’s profound and endur-
ing consequences in the 1790s and beyond. Beginning in 1789, the government 
found multiple arenas in which to assert its authority: in 	scal matters, in the 
West, among Indigenous peoples, and with U.S. citizens. Neutrality provided 
an additional area for the government to exercise its constitutional responsibil-
ities. is policy also stands as a testament to Washington’s skills as a political 
leader in forging and implementing this policy and his enduring presidential 
legacy as a visionary statesman who kept the United States at peace. Because of 
the far-reaching scope of this policy domestically and internationally, its lon-
gevity into the nineteenth century, and its engagement with all three branches, 
neutrality played an unexpectedly large and underappreciated role in launching 
the U.S. government. Becoming neutral represented one of America’s earliest 
domestic and international aspirations. Creating a government capable of sup-
porting these ambitions resulted in neutrality contributing to the building of 
the American nation.
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Ch a pter 1
“Highway Robbery under the Protection of the Law”
American Privateers in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic
T he establishment of the British North American colonies along the Atlantic coastline in the seventeenth century ensured the central role this dynamic and turbulent ocean would play in America’s economic 
development. While the colonies derived tremendous commercial benets from 
the transatlantic trade, these advantages could quickly evaporate depending on 
the controversies and conicts occurring 3,000 miles away in Europe. Britain’s 
involvement in a series of continental wars during the eighteenth century dis-
rupted maritime commerce, forcing American ship captains, merchants, and 
seamen to consider alternative ways of remaining at sea. With the British gov-
ernment encouraging its colonial subjects to serve as privateers to supplement 
the Royal Navy’s strength, war provided additional economic opportunities for 
America’s seafaring community. During the American Revolution, the maritime 
community employed its privateering skills to assist the tiny Continental Navy. 
Once the United States became an independent nation, reconciling the long-
standing practices of America’s seafaring citizens with the government’s desire 
to remain neutral in international a
airs and to pursue free trade challenged 
both groups. Until then, the turbulent Atlantic o
ered the promise of jobs and 
adventure, along with an ironclad guarantee of dangers, for anyone seeking a 
livelihood there.
With their prime location along the Atlantic, the British North Amer-
ican colonies entered the world economy as seafaring communities. Small port 
cities sprung up along the coast to negotiate the transfer of raw materials from 
forests and elds into ships headed to Europe and the Caribbean. e exports 
emerging from these towns reected what was grown and harvested in the sur-
rounding area. Northern cities like Boston, with a more limited growing season, 
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tended to ship items harvested from its natural environment: sh and whale 
oil. Colonies to Boston’s south, with more extensive agricultural production, 
exported their leading commodities such as wheat, pork, and beef from New 
York City and Philadelphia; tobacco from the Chesapeake region of Maryland 
and Virginia; and rice and indigo from Charleston, South Carolina. (Cotton 
would not become a signicant southern export until the nineteenth century, 
following the cotton gin’s invention in 1793.)1
In exchange for these items, nished goods arrived from Europe, raw mate-
rials came from the West Indies, and enslaved men, women, and children invol-
untarily emigrated from Africa through a horric journey known as the “middle 
passage.”2 While all thirteen colonies participated in transatlantic commerce 
to ensure their economic livelihood, northern port cities such as Boston, New 
York, and Philadelphia provided the shipbuilding and seamen that permitted 
the American side of this trade to ourish.3
As hubs of America’s maritime trade, Boston, New York, and Philadelphia 
evolved from tightly knit villages into centers of commercial exchange. Func-
tioning as seafaring “company towns,” these port cities o
ered inhabitants a 
wide range of employment options related to the transatlantic trade, most of 
which did not require leaving the harbor. Before ships and crews could trans-
port goods across the Atlantic, vessels had to be constructed, loaded, and sta
ed 
with experienced seamen. Each waterfront city possessed a range of artisans 
engaged in shipbuilding and repair, including riggers, sailmakers, shipwrights, 
and coopers. Merchants and ship captains, many of whom co-owned the vessels, 
regularly and closely worked together to arrange the transport of goods. For 
those men too young, too old, or too inexperienced to serve on vessels, jobs were 
available loading and unloading cargo, with very few ships leaving American 
harbors with empty holds.4 Residents of New England port cities also utilized 
the shipbuilding services to engage in commercial shing or whaling operations 
in northern Atlantic waters.5
e artisans, seamen, and ship captains who made a port city’s maritime 
economy hum came together in waterfront neighborhoods nicknamed “sailor 
towns.” Co
eehouses, taverns, boardinghouses, stores, and private homes and 
tenements fed, housed, and supplied the mariners who entered, departed, and 
inhabited the port. Taverns played a particularly important role as centers of 
entertainment, information, and business transactions for ship captains, sailors, 
and artisans in need of food, drink, lodging, socializing, lines of credit, and job 
opportunities. New York City and its taverns emerged as the hub of transatlan-
tic information for the North American colonists because it was the port that 
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received the English packet boats carrying news, mail, and gossip.6 In general, 
these colonial port cities functioned as single-industry maritime communities 
that thrived during times of peaceful transoceanic trade but struggled to adapt 
to the disruptive warfare increasingly permeating North Atlantic trade routes.
A vibrant shipping industry could not exist on land alone, and the experi-
enced seamen and ship captains who sta
ed these vessels provided the essential 
element to keep America’s transatlantic trade aoat. Most sailors came from 
port cities (or the surrounding towns), the Atlantic Ocean having been in their 
sights since boyhood. While some sought adventure, riches, and freedom, many 
went to sea simply because “it was there,” following family and community 
traditions.7 Added enticements included wage payments in cash, a rarity at the 
time, and short stints on the water (ranging from three weeks to three months) 
combined with long respites onshore.8 Alongside these perks were the physical 
demands of sailing that made it a young man’s profession, with apprenticeships 
beginning at the age of twelve or thirteen and retirements occurring in a sail-
or’s early thirties. John Paul Jones, a naval hero of the American Revolution, 
embarked on his rst transatlantic voyage when he was thirteen, a seemingly 
youthful age that reected the maritime norm.9 With ships at the mercy of 
wind power to travel, too much weather in the form of storms could damage 
vessels, while too little wind could render a ship vulnerable to attack or inca-
pacitate it and risk spoiling its fragile cargo of raw materials.10 e risks ac-
companying sailing, including drowning or sinking, as well as the long appren-
ticeship meant that experienced sailors remained a small but desirable group 
in America’s transatlantic economy.11 Indeed, their abilities as “able seamen” 
made them vulnerable to impressment by a British navy in need of skilled men 
to support its imperial ambitions.12 For those seamen who avoided death or 
capture at sea, their post-Atlantic retirement brought them home to port cities 
where they might open a maritime-related business or even return to the sea as 
ship captains.13
Ship captains occupied a seminal space in North America’s transatlantic 
economy, serving as the conduits between the coastal merchants, who hired 
them to ship goods, and as commanders of the seamen who made these jour-
neys possible. Before embarking on a new voyage, experienced sailors enjoyed 
a certain amount of onshore autonomy due to their cash wages and their skills. 
Once men signed the “articles of a ship”—a contract establishing wages and 
rules for the voyage—they relinquished their freedoms to the ship captain. He 
then became the sailor’s legal guardian and fully controlled the sailor’s work 
and his physical body, including punishments.14 Commercial ships maintained 
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small crews, typically four to ve men, in addition to the captain and the rst 
mate, and the work required to keep a schooner or sloop aoat was hard and 
constant.15 A ship’s cargo determined its nal destination, another decision that 
resided with the captain rather than the crew. As European warfare increasingly 
encroached on transatlantic shipping, the ship’s captains and its owners might 
choose to prot from these tensions through the legal practice of privateering.
As Britain’s economic inuence and political power increased in the late sev-
enteenth and early eighteenth centuries, rivals sought to challenge its emerging 
hegemony on the European continent, in the Atlantic and the Caribbean, and 
in North America. Further intensifying these conicts was the concept of mer-
cantilism, which provided the accelerant needed to fuel a succession of ercely 
competitive European trade wars at this time. Mercantilism posited that the 
world contained a limited amount of wealth, with warfare o
ering the pathway 
to controlling more of it.16 With the expansion of empires beyond Europe, the 
raw materials transported in the Atlantic trade provided a convenient target to 
increase a nation’s riches and its political standing. In the seventeenth century, 
Britain engaged in a series of “blue water” (or oceanic) trading wars with the 
Dutch Republic, and by the eighteenth century, France’s growing commercial 
presence in the Atlantic and Caribbean made that nation Britain’s chief mari-
time rival and antagonist.17 ese imperial and economic wars, disrupting the 
Atlantic trade, transformed the relationship between seafaring North American 
colonists and their mother country, Britain.
Originating in twel h-century Europe, “privateering” referred to the legally 
sanctioned practice of seizing enemy ships, including their crews and cargoes, 
during times of war. Unlike its illegitimate sibling “piracy,” privateering pos-
sessed the legal backing of the state. (In fact, privateersmen resented being as-
sociated with the unsavory world of piracy, a practice that had largely ended by 
the 1730s.)18 Nations issued “letters of marque” or “commissions” to ship cap-
tains authorizing them to engage in this practice. In Britain, where the High 
Court of the Admiralty enforced and regulated privateering, ship captains were 
also required to post surety bonds as a guarantee that they would obey British 
maritime laws and regulations once they le  port. When an authorized priva-
teer captured an enemy vessel, that “prize” would be transported to the nearest 
British admiralty court to be “condemned,” that is, redeemed for money. If the 
court determined that the prize had been legally obtained, including belonging 
to Britain’s enemy, the privateer would receive a portion of the ship’s value and 
would return to the Atlantic to attempt additional captures.19 Other European 
nations that engaged in privateering followed a process similar to Britain’s. In 
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France, consuls, stationed in busy ports, issued letters of marque and adjudicated 
the prize claims of their nation’s privateers, known as “corsairs.”20
Privateering proved to be a “win-win” situation for warring states and their 
maritime subjects, although less so for neutral nations. Prior to the eighteenth 
century, most nations had small or nonexistent navies.21 Privateering, essen-
tially “privatized warfare,” gave European countries greater coverage over At-
lantic shipping lanes without the cost and logistical challenges of launching a 
state-supported navy. Also engaging in privateering were the English and Dutch 
East India Companies, which preemptively attacked hostile ships to prevent the 
seizure of their own valuable shipments.22 With warring nation’s embracing the 
mercantilist concept of limited wealth, seizing an enemy’s cargo deprived it of 
valuable supplies while enriching the privateer and the state, which split the 
proceeds of the condemned prize.23 Many ship captains invested these windfalls 
into protable trading companies of their own.24 e nancial benets associ-
ated with privateering helped balance its dangers, including the capture of one’s 
ship, the impressment of sailors, or even death.25 Privateering remained popular 
into the nineteenth century, when signatories to the Congress of Paris (which 
did not include the United States) nally agreed to ban this practice in 1856 in 
the a ermath of the Crimean War (1853–56).26
Adding to the intensity and aggressiveness of privateering was a collection of 
maritime rules and laws emanating from medieval Europe known as the Con-
solato del mare (“the code of sea laws”).27 Originating in thirteenth-century 
Spain and rst practiced on the Mediterranean, this compendium contained the 
provision that a ship’s cargo, not its ag or its registry, determined its wartime 
aliation.28 Under these guidelines, for example, France’s enemies could seize a 
neutral Portuguese ship carrying French cargo because these items could be used 
to support France’s war e
ort. While neutral cargo on either warring or peaceful 
ships was not subject to seizure, privateers considered neutral vessels fair game 
as potential carriers of enemy goods. e Consolato del mare became expressed 
in diplomatic agreements as “enemy goods make enemy ships”; its converse was 
the phrase “free ships make free goods,” with the exception of contraband used 
for war, such as gunpowder and weapons. Beginning in the mid-seventeenth 
century, Britain and France increasingly embraced the notion of freedom of 
shipping, at least diplomatically, although what happened to neutral vessels in 
open waters remained another matter.29
Enlightenment ideas on free trade brought temporary relief to those Euro-
pean nations hoping to pursue maritime commerce without combat. e rec-
ognition of neutral rights made its rst diplomatic appearance in 1650, with the 
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insertion of the phrase “free ships make free goods” in a treaty between Holland 
and Spain.30 Longtime combatants France and Britain abandoned the Conso-
lato del mare in several seventeenth-century treaties and then rearmed this 
stance in the inuential Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, declaring “that free ships shall 
also give a freedom to goods,” except for specically dened contraband.31 is 
change in policy o
ered relief to Portugal, the Netherlands, and other smaller 
nations, who hoped to maintain friendly commercial relations with all nations 
but whose ships had been vulnerable to wartime seizure. is free-trade détente 
would come to an abrupt end in the 1750s, when the global Seven Years’ War 
triggered the resumption of Anglo-French ghting. Due to wartime exigencies, 
Britain and France returned to the aggressive practice of attacking any ship and 
seizing any cargo it perceived as aiding its enemy, regardless of a vessel’s nation-
ality or its captain’s desire for neutrality.32 While a diplomatic precedent for 
honoring neutrality had been established, powerful nations such as Britain and 
France still controlled maritime rules through treaties and warfare.
Privateering originally spread to the North American side of the Atlantic in 
the a ermath of Columbus’s successful journey in 1492 and emerged as a legit-
imate and enduring way to negotiate economic and imperial power in this vast, 
lucrative, and contested ocean. Although England staked its territorial claim in 
the Americas later than Spain or Portugal, its ship captains and explorers such 
as Walter Raleigh and Francis Drake wasted no time in embracing transatlantic 
privateering during the sixteenth century.33 English privateers attacked Spanish 
ships carrying valuable cargoes of gold and silver, enriching themselves and their 
patron, Queen Elizabeth I.34 As England became a wealthier and more powerful 
nation in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it found itself increasingly 
ghting wars to defend its position and to expand into new markets.35 In need 
of naval reinforcements to harass its Spanish, Dutch, and (most importantly) 
French enemies, the British government looked to the maritime inhabitants of 
its North American colonies.36
Prior to 1689, most North American warfare occurred largely on land and 
involved territorial disputes between English colonists and Native American 
nations. While some colonists had engaged in wartime privateering in the seven-
teenth century, this practice had occurred on a small scale, with the British gov-
ernment and some colonies occasionally issuing commissions to ship captains.37
During the early rounds of European warfare—the Nine Years’ War (1688–97) 
and the War of Spanish Succession (1702–13)—the North American maritime 
economy experienced more disruptions than benets.38 Following the Treaty 
of Utrecht in 1713, the seafaring colonists enjoyed a twenty-six-year hiatus from 
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Anglo-French hostilities. During this period, North American port cities grew 
into vibrant maritime communities without the disturbances and damages as-
sociated with warfare. In 1739, when hostilities resumed, the British government 
discovered an untapped pool of ship captains and sailors who could support its 
imperial ambitions as privateers.39
e War of Jenkins’s Ear, beginning in 1739, marked the North American col-
onists’ full-scale immersion into British privateering.40 is conict concerned 
Britain’s desire to access the Spanish-controlled Caribbean trade, and North 
America’s vibrant maritime communities proved ideally situated to support 
these ambitions.41 Aspiring American privateers followed the same procedures 
established in England, with colonial governors deputized as vice admirals and 
placed in charge of their own admiralty courts. ese vice-admiralty courts, op-
erating in eleven colonies since 1689, had the authority to issue letters of marque 
to American ship captains, collect surety bonds, and condemn any prizes that 
American privateers might bring to port.42 Not surprisingly, the cities with the 
most active maritime communities also hosted the busiest vice-admiralty courts: 
Boston, Newport, New York City, Philadelphia, and Charleston.43 Privateer-
ing’s inuence on these ports could also be seen in the growing importance of 
taverns as informal spaces for these transactions to occur. British ocials and 
naval ocers relaxed in these establishments, where some of the work involved 
in enlisting privateers—recruiting ships, raising crews, inspecting ship articles, 
and auctioning prize ships and cargoes—also took place.44 During the transat-
lantic warfare of the eighteenth century, privateering provided a way for Britain’s 
seafaring subjects to stay in business, and to even prot, from these conicts.45
e colonial privateering boom that began in the 1740s li ed the economic 
fortunes of North American port cities, at least as long as the wars lasted.46 Un-
like peaceful merchant ships, privateers required larger crews to function and 
also needed to be faster and armed. Both of these changes resulted in increased 
employment for artisans, who built new ships and transformed existing ones, 
and for seamen, who served on them. Port-city artisans such as shipwrights, 
blacksmiths, sailmakers, mast makers, and caulkers added gunsmiths to their 
ranks in order to retrot and construct larger and faster warships capable of 
outrunning and capturing enemy vessels.47 e privateering boom resulted in 
164 ships being constructed in Boston in 1741 alone, compared with an annual 
peacetime total of about 40–50 ships in the late 1730s.48 A well-armed privateer 
required 100 seamen to function, in contrast to the 5–10 sailors needed on a 
merchant ship. With more ships needing larger crews to perform its military 
functions, demand increased for seamen in the 1740s.49 Between 1750 and 1850, 
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wartime demand raised pay as high as  y dollars a month, with peacetime re-
ducing this amount to four dollars.50 While seamen might also receive a share of 
the prize money for a captured ship, the amount would be small or nonexistent. 
Instead, steady employment and higher wages provided the real reward for sail-
ors who served on privateers.51 e overall rise in wages and demand for workers 
beneted port-city businesses, particularly taverns, because artisans, ship cap-
tains, and sailors would have more money to spend on “drinking, gambling, 
whoring, and carousing.”52
Ship captains enjoyed the most immediate rewards of privateering by splitting 
a larger share of the captured goods with the British government. is practice 
encouraged risky behavior—the more ships they seized, the wealthier these cap-
tains became. Merchants also beneted from privateering as war contractors. 
omas Hancock, uncle of John Hancock (whose prominent signature adorns 
the Declaration of Independence), recongured a vigorous trading business into 
an even more successful privateering enterprise by sending ships out to claim 
prizes and by supplying military expeditions. ese wartime activities yielded 
the elder Hancock wartime prots of 12,000 pounds sterling, making him one 
of the wealthiest men in Boston.53
e symbiotic relationship between Britain’s imperial ambitions and colonial 
Americans’ willingness to serve as privateers reached its pinnacle in size, scope, 
and autonomy during the global Seven Years’ War, which began in the North 
American frontier in 1754 and expanded to the Atlantic, Europe, India, and 
the Caribbean.54 Soon a er the war’s North American start, colonial governors 
issued letters of marque to American ship captains to encourage privateering 
against French (and later Spanish) ships in the lucrative West Indian trade.55
Recognizing the important role neutral countries played in transporting French 
colonial commerce out of the West Indies, Britain established the “Rule of 1756” 
to deny free-trade status to noncombatants such as the Netherlands.56
With Britain and France now abandoning their earlier understanding that 
“free ships make free goods,” the number of potential prizes multiplied.57 As 
a result, the legal privateering and illegal trading that accompanied this war 
produced another economic boom in American port cities, particularly in New 
York and Philadelphia, with seamen and shipbuilding in high demand.58 Young 
men ocked to the coastal cities to work in the maritime trades, and the in-
creased need for sailors resulted in wage increases. As many as 10,000 men served 
on privateers from Newport, Rhode Island, with another 3,000 men coming 
from New York City.59 American ship captains proved so e
ective at seizing 
French naval ships that by 1759 none remained to be captured.60
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Despite the economic li  privateering o
ered, dangers still persisted, such as 
capture by enemy ships, economic downturns, and the risks of a crew’s impress-
ment. In response, American colonists employed a variety of strategies onshore 
and at sea to cope with these challenges. Although privateers possessed the legal 
backing of the state, these vessels entered legally murky waters once they began 
attacking and capturing enemy ships. Even the most law-abiding captain quickly 
adapted to the realities of life on the sea to ensure a vessel’s survival and its suc-
cess, regardless of the legal promises he had made in port.61 e experiences of 
Captain George Walker, a British privateer during King George’s War (1744–
48) and its European counterpart, the War of Austrian Succession (1740–48), 
demonstrated the excitement and uncertainty involved in raiding enemy ships. 
Initially assigned to transport cargo from South Carolina, Walker spent four 
months in 1740 pursuing two Spanish privateers that had docked on the Caro-
lina coast. His e
orts resulted in the successful retrieval of a captured British ves-
sel, the Neptune. His next mission took him to Barbados, where his ship sprung 
a leak and sunk. He waited over a year in the Caribbean before British ocials 
entrusted him with a new vessel to command. Even during a string of success-
ful privateering campaigns that resulted in prize money amounting to 220,000 
pounds sterling, Walker had to contend with a mutiny among his crew.62
Aside from the personal risks and physical challenges involved in privateer-
ing, episodic European wars resulted in “boom and bust” cycles in maritime 
cities, teaching savvy ship captains to place prot before patriotism to stay in 
business.63 Many embraced trading opportunities with Britain’s Spanish and 
French opponents in neutral Caribbean waters.64 At sea, ship captains disguised 
themselves as “neutrals” through fabricated paperwork and the hoisting of “un-
threatening” ags in the hopes of escaping capture.65 In port they might bribe or 
threaten British customhouse ocials to avoid punishment or seek to exploit the 
inconsistent enforcement of laws in the various colonial vice-admiralty courts.66
And when all else failed, American ship captains sought to outrun other priva-
teers to avoid the long and expensive ordeal of being captured and held in port.67
e willingness of these captains to defy British laws in favor of maritime prots 
made disregarding government authority an acceptable business practice in the 
eighteenth-century Atlantic.68
No group was more susceptible to the lawlessness of the open water than the 
“able seamen,” whose highly demanded skills made them vulnerable to impress-
ment by British naval ships. American sailors, desirous of controlling their labor 
and their wages, employed numerous strategies to avoid capture, including “hid-
ing, running (or swimming), wearing disguises, pretending to be employed in 
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another occupation, deserting to another ship, or jumping overboard.”69 Amid 
these small and individual acts of resistance, colonial waterfront communities, 
which depended on skilled sailors and unencumbered shipping for their sur-
vival, responded en masse to particularly aggressive or egregious examples of 
impressment. Such was the case in Boston’s Knowles Riot of 1747. British com-
modore Charles Knowles and his crew brazenly impressed forty-seven men from 
the city’s harbor, including an outbound ship’s entire crew, as well as several 
waterfront apprentices. In response, Bostonians rioted for three days, burnt a 
barge, and took several of Knowles’s crewmembers hostage until the commodore 
agreed to release most of the impressed men.70 Additional press riots occurred 
in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in 1757 and in New York City, where three 
occurred in 1760 alone.71 e vibrant Atlantic trade o
ered both opportunities 
and risks, and American maritime communities embraced acts both small and 
large, legal and illegal, to protect their livelihood in these turbulent waters.
In the a ermath of the Seven Years’ War, tightly knit port cities rallied to-
gether to protest the onerous taxes and duties the British government attempted 
to impose. Even before the 1760s, American colonists had taken a lax approach 
to complying with British trade laws and regarded those royal custom ocials 
who attempted to enforce them with disdain.72 With the introduction of a series 
of postwar revenue measures intended to o
set the cost of the recent ghting, 
colonists devised new strategies to elude British ocials. Waterfront residents 
in Boston and elsewhere took to loading and unloading their ships at night to 
avoid paying duties, while smuggling became widespread throughout the colo-
nies.73 Regarding these revenue measures as a threat to their economic survival, 
maritime communities publicly punished those who too eagerly complied with 
these British laws by tarring and feathering captains and burning their boats.74
While the Boston Tea Party of 1773 stands as the most famous example of these 
waterfront protests, it represented just one of many throughout the colonies, 
each of which showed the interdependence and coordination among port-city 
residents who relied on the Atlantic trade for their survival.
ese waterfront protests, of course, contributed to the outbreak of the 
American Revolution, which itself provided an opportunity for interested ship 
captains and able seamen to apply their maritime talents to the cause of Amer-
ican independence. Decades of privateering had prepared ship captains for this 
latest round of warfare, and northern states quickly authorized this practice to 
protect maritime commerce. e trade-dependent state of Massachusetts led the 
way on November 1, 1775, when its legislature passed “An Act for Encouraging 
the Fixing out of Armed Vessels to defend the Sea Coast of America, and for 
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erecting a court to try and condemn all vessels that shall be found infesting the 
same.”75 e Continental Congress (the national government during the Rev-
olutionary War) followed suit in December 1775 when it established the Con-
tinental Navy by purchasing and converting frigates into warships. When Brit-
ain issued the Prohibitory Act in December 1775, which banned all trade with 
the rebellious American colonies, Congress was forced to take more aggressive 
actions to protect American shipping. On March 23, 1776, delegates approved 
authorizing privateers but envisioned them as a water-based militia, delegating 
the implementation of this program to the participating states. During the war, 
Congress authorized an estimated 2,000 letters of marque, but the individual 
states assumed the responsibility for issuing commissions and collecting the 
$5,000 (in continental dollars) for surety bonds from ship captains.76 States also 
established their own admiralty courts to deal with captured prizes, including 
“condemning” the vessel and its cargo.77 Eventually joining Massachusetts in 
sanctioning privateers were other states with strong maritime economies: New 
Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 
Maryland, and Virginia.78
e resulting American naval presence consisted of the Continental Navy, 
with 57 vessels, supplemented by 2,000–3,000 state-sponsored privateers em-
ploying approximately 200,000 sailors.79 Just as an earlier generation of colonial 
ship captains had harassed Britain’s enemies to undercut their ability to ght, 
revolutionary privateers now employed these tactics against British commercial 
ships. Most of the seizures occurred in the Atlantic’s open waters near the busy 
(and British-occupied) port cities of New York and Philadelphia.80 e success 
of American privateers in capturing enemy commercial ships demonstrated that 
nancial rewards continued to be an essential motivation, even amid revolution-
ary sentiment. For example, the British insurer Lloyd’s of London estimated 
that American privateers seized about 2,200 British vessels during the war, with 
Massachusetts alone claiming 1,200 ships.81 Privateering, already a longstand-
ing colonial practice, became embedded in America’s struggle for independence, 
sanctioned by the newly established state and national governments.
While numerous American seamen supported revolutionary politics through 
the Sons of Neptune, the water-based counterpart to the Sons of Liberty, many 
served on privateers, motivated as much by self-interest as patriotism.82 Despite 
the risk of impressment or capture, privateering o
ered many advantages over 
enlisting in the Continental Army, including a shorter term of service and the 
possibility of enrichment. A broadside from the port city of Beverly, Massachu-
setts, declared: “Any seamen or landmen that have an inclination to make their 
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fortunes in a few months, may have an opportunity” by applying to serve on 
the brigantine Washington.83 Many Continental soldiers nished their military 
service and joined British and American privateers, lured by pay advances of up 
to $100.84 In addition, sailors from the French and British navies deserted during 
the war in hopes of serving on more lucrative and less authoritarian American 
merchant ships.85 Even as many Americans fought to become an independent 
nation, the lure of riches o en trumped patriotism for those who made their 
living on the Atlantic.86
Despite the relative advantages associated with privateering, ships continued 
to encounter signicant risks once they reached the open waters of the Atlan-
tic. e wartime experiences of Captain Christopher Prince of New London, 
Connecticut, best illustrate the opportunities and perils associated with pri-
vateering. From 1777 to 1783, Prince captained at least seven American pri-
vateers, sailed repeatedly into lucrative Caribbean waters, and successfully ac-
quired several enemy prizes. e British captured him in 1779 and again in 1782, 
holding the captain for several months in a London prison until his eventual 
release.87 Less fortunate than Prince was American seaman Nathaniel Fanning, 
who embarked on the American privateer Angelica, “a new vessel, mounting 
sixteen carriage guns, and carrying 98 men and boys, on a six month cruise.” 
Within weeks of his departure, a British ship seized Fanning and his fellow 
crewmembers, installing them on a British privateer. Subsequently captured 
by the French, Fanning became a lieutenant in their navy before eventually 
returning home to New York.88 Another American, omas Painter, briey 
served on a privateer, but the British caught him and placed him on a prison 
ship. He escaped by jumping overboard and swimming to safety in New York 
harbor. is experience soured Painter on a career as a privateersman: “I came 
to the conclusion, that privateering, was nothing better than Highway Robbery 
under the protection of law.”89
Reecting the ubiquity of eighteenth-century American privateering, even 
George Washington participated in a practice he would eventually attempt to 
curtail. Upon his arrival in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to assume command of 
the Continental Army, Washington realized British ships could sail into Bos-
ton’s harbor with little resistance. Tapping into the experienced maritime com-
munities of Gloucester, Marblehead, and Plymouth, he organized a otilla of six 
privateering vessels to patrol the entire Massachusetts coastline, from Cape Ann 
to Cape Cod, in order to intercept enemy supply ships coming from Canada and 
across the Atlantic. From 1775 to 1777, Washington’s so-called “navy” captured 
 y-ve British vessels.90 Privately, he also owned a share of one privateer, aptly 
Figure 1. A 1776 directive from the Continental Congress authorizing  
the use of privateers against the British during the American Revolution.  
(Library of Congress, Rare Book and Special Collections Division,  
Continental Congress & Constitutional Convention Broadsides Collection)
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named the General Washington, with his twenty-two-year-old stepson, John 
Parke Custis, and two other men, including his distant cousin Lund Wash-
ington.91 As president, Washington would attempt to prevent Americans from 
serving as privateers for warring nations. But his own earlier involvement, how-
ever small that enterprise might have been, demonstrated how deeply embedded 
privateering was in the Atlantic economy.
During the eighteenth century, North America’s maritime communities 
became immersed in the practice of privateering, both as British colonists and 
as American revolutionaries. e prospect of independence, however, o
ered 
Americans the possibility of engaging in the transatlantic trade without the 
burden of its previous colonial obligations. Britain’s imperial rivalries would no 
longer concern the newly independent American nation (or at least that was the 
hope). Instead, the United States could assume an international role that better 
reected its status as a young and relatively weak country.
For eighteenth-century Americans, the Atlantic provided an essential eco-
nomic lifeline in a watery environment teeming with personal risks. Working 
on the sea not only could bring a sailor adventure and wealth but also could re-
sult in drowning, sinking, disease, or capture. Nearly constant warfare between 
America’s mother country, Great Britain, and its European enemies magnied 
the promises and the perils of the eighteenth-century Atlantic. During the co-
lonial period, residents of American port cities embraced privateering as a way 
to survive in a maritime economy o en dened by war. Privateering emerged 
as a widespread and acceptable practice ingrained not only in ship captains and 
seamen but also in trade-dependent coastal communities. As America contem-
plated a future free from British laws, obligations, and expectations, the oppor-
tunity to trade freely without the burdens of imperial rivalries and wartime 
exigencies emerged as a priority. But as the United States embraced its political 
independence, would its maritime citizens be willing to abandon the familiar 
economic practices from the colonial period and to pursue neutral commerce as 
newly minted U.S. citizens? Reconciling the longstanding American practice of 
privateering with the national government’s desire to remain neutral and pursue 
free trade signicantly challenged the new government as it exercised its author-
ity over its sovereign citizens.
While the Continental Congress endorsed privateering as a wartime 
necessity, this governing body also envisioned a postrevolutionary world of peace-
ful Atlantic commerce when it proposed the Plan of Treaties (or Model Treaty) 
in 1776. John Adams, a congressional delegate from the maritime-dependent 
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state of Massachusetts, dra ed this document for the committee charged with 
establishing diplomatic relations and military alliances with Europe.92 Inspired 
by Enlightenment ideas, he incorporated the concept that “free ships make free 
goods” into the Model Treaty. Adams envisioned the newly independent United 
States enjoying peaceful relations and free trade with other nations. As a neu-
tral nation uninvolved in warfare, the United States would not need to engage 
in privateering or worry about warring states seizing its ships or blockading its 
ports. Congress’s two-handed approach of authorizing privateering and endors-
ing the Model Treaty illustrated America’s idealistic vision of its future clashing 
with the commercial and military realities of not only winning the American 
Revolution but also doing business on the Atlantic.
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“Free Ships Make Free Goods”
Revolutionary Experiments in Neutrality
T he Enlightenment ideas that inspired the American Revolu-tion encouraged many Americans to think boldly and broadly about the transformations they hoped to institute in the newly established 
nation. Having engaged in wartime privateering as colonists and revolutionaries, 
they now sought less combative ways to participate in maritime commerce. Free 
trade emerged as a top priority of the Continental Congress, with John Adams 
spearheading the eort to translate these Enlightenment concepts into prac-
tical diplomacy. His dra Plan of Treaties of 1776, more commonly known as 
the Model Treaty, represented America’s blueprint for interacting with other 
nations: commercial agreements would replace burdensome military alliances. 
Yet winning a war with free trade alone proved to be a losing proposition. Most 
European nations had no interest in alienating Britain by recognizing its rebel-
lious colonies, preferring to pursue their own neutrality instead. Even Britain’s 
archenemy, France, required more than the promise of American commerce to 
enter the con	ict. e realities of winning the war forced the Continental Con-
gress to secure the entangling alliances they had hoped to avoid. With American 
diplomats scattered across Europe, Congress rst pursed an international path 
to independence, with the prospect of free trade on the horizon.
The origins of the 1793 Neutrality Proclamation can be found within the 
ideas of Enlightenment philosophers and the resulting treaties that embraced 
these concepts. Most European nations subscribed to the reigning economic 
concept of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—mercantilism. As a result, 
warfare and trade became closely intertwined as these countries sought to gain 
a greater share of nite commerce. e Atlantic became a dangerous place to do 
business, particularly for neutral nations. To gain advantage over their maritime 
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enemies, warring adversaries employed privateers encouraged to operate under 
the concept that “enemy goods make enemy vessels.”1
Relief from this cutthroat approach came from Enlightenment philosophers, 
who viewed trade through the more benign prism of reason and balance. In 
contrast to European monarchs who regarded trade as a combative enterprise, 
writers such as Montesquieu and Adam Smith saw free trade as a positive good 
that could elevate people and societies. Montesquieu argued that “the spirit of 
republics is peace and moderation,” in contrast with warring monarchies. Smith 
believed “free and open trade between nations” would oer the “greatest good 
for all mankind.”2 A seventeenth-century Dutch legal scholar, Hugo Grotius, 
had inspired these philosophical conceptions by declaring in his book Mare Li-
berum (e free sea) that the oceans should be open to all, not just a few pow-
erful nations such as Spain and Portugal.3 If trade had previously functioned as 
a tool of war, free trade imagined a world of neutral commerce in which ships 
traded without regard to nationality and without risk of entangling warfare.
As European nations experimented with free trade in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, the resulting diplomatic agreements and the Enlighten-
ment ideas that inspired them traversed the Atlantic and entered the homes, 
minds, and colleges of Americans living in the thirteen English colonies.4 As 
the political situation in America heated up aer the Seven Years’ War, revo-
lutionary leaders looked to a wide range of historical and philosophical sources 
from ancient Greece and Rome and from Europe, specically Renaissance and 
Enlightenment scholars, for inspiration.5 Amid this vast collection of writings, 
one emerged as an indispensable guidebook for revolutionary Americans con-
templating the nascent country’s diplomatic future: Emer de Vattel’s e Law 
of Nations. Vattel, a Swiss philosopher, published this four-volume work in 1758, 
oering a comprehensive understanding of the role a nation should take in state 
building and international relations.6 For an eighteenth-century audience al-
ready steeped in natural rights and free trade, Vattel’s chapter on neutrality (con-
tained in the third book, Of War), served as the denitive handbook for nations 
wishing to purse a neutral diplomatic path.
Following in the tradition of other Enlightenment philosophers, Vattel pro-
claimed that the laws of nature applied to nations, making them “free, inde-
pendent and equal.”7 He then demonstrated the specic ways a nation’s free-
dom, independence, and equality found expression in trade and diplomacy. 
Like Grotius, Vattel believed in the freedom of the seas: “No nation, therefore, 
has a right to take possession of the open sea, or claim the sole use of it, to the 
exclusion of other nations.”8 Freedom of the seas also meant free trade. Vattel 
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armed, “Every nation, in virtue of her natural liberty, has a right to trade with 
those who are willing to correspond with such intentions,” chiding those who 
might “injure” this right.9 While advocating treaties and diplomacy among na-
tions, he also recognized that wars might occur. In his chapter “Of Neutrality,” 
Vattel armed the right of a nation to remain neutral during wartime as long 
as unbound by treaty to participate. He also oered other rules of neutrality, 
including the need to adhere strictly to this status and to treat all combatants 
equally. He encouraged nations to make their neutral status explicit through 
formal treaties with the warring parties so there were no misunderstandings. 
Most importantly, Vattel reiterated the importance of neutral nations being able 
to trade without interference, writing, “An attempt to interrupt or put a stop to 
this trade would be a violation of the rights of neutral nations, a 	agrant injury 
to them.” In other words, neutrality was a meaningless concept if ships could 
not trade freely without risk of capture. Vattel made an exception for speci-
cally dened contraband needed for war, such as “arms, ammunition, timber 
for ship-building, every kind of naval stores, [and] horses,” recognizing too that 
searching neutral vessels would be inevitable. Nonetheless, he urged respect for 
a ship’s bill of lading to avoid unnecessary seizures and captures.10
With the convening of the First Continental Congress in 1774, Law of Na-
tions served as an indispensable guidebook for America’s early diplomats and 
political leaders as they contemplated an independent nation. e delegates 
made use of Philadelphia’s public library to obtain works by Vattel and Mon-
tesquieu.11 Later, when Congress established its own library, Vattel’s four-vol-
ume work appeared among the collection’s 300 books. Benjamin Franklin, who 
relied on a donated copy, wrote to the book’s donor to describe its popularity 
among the delegates: “It came to us in good season, when the circumstances 
of a rising state make it necessary frequently to consult the law of nations.”12
Even aer the revolution, Vattel’s ideas continued to permeate political discus-
sions. During the lively debates on the dra Neutrality Proclamation in 1793, 
Washington’s cabinet members—Jeerson, Hamilton, Randolph, and Knox—
resembled sparring graduate students as they vied to demonstrate their superior 
mastery of Vattel’s ideas.13 One historian succinctly summarized Law of Nations 
as providing the “textbook for the State Department and the federal courts” in 
the 1790s.14
Illustrating the book’s importance in the education of a future generation 
of political leaders, Vattel’s writings (along with those of Grotius, John Locke, 
Montesquieu, and other Enlightenment scholars) infused the curriculums and 
libraries of the colonies’ colleges.15 Having earlier beneted from a loaned copy 
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of Vattel, Franklin returned the favor by donating copies of Law of Nations
to Harvard College, the Boston Public Library, and the Library Company of 
Philadelphia.16 Washington ordered this book, along with many others, for his 
stepson John Parke Custis, who was a student at King’s College (present-day 
Columbia University).17 Hamilton, then also at King’s College, studied Vattel, 
as did future secretary of state and president John Quincy Adams, who read his 
father’s copy while at Harvard.18 Jeerson, who trained law students while also 
serving in public oce, included Vattel (as well as law books, historical studies, 
and the writings of other Enlightenment philosophers) on the extensive reading 
list he prepared for his students.19
e most immediate and direct eect of Vattel’s and other Enlightenment 
writers’ ideas on free trade appeared in the Plan of Treaties, adopted by the Con-
tinental Congress in September 1776. American diplomacy formally began in 
1775, when Congress established the “Secret Committee” to initiate negotia-
tions with potential European allies, particularly France, which eagerly sought 
ways to undercut Britain’s economic and political hegemony.20 A year later Rich-
ard Henry Lee’s resolution on independence made America’s diplomatic needs 
explicit when it stated “that measures should be immediately taken for procuring 
the assistance of foreign powers.”21 e 	edging nation’s Declaration of Inde-
pendence would be meaningless unless foreign countries recognized the United 
States as a sovereign nation. In the busy summer of 1776, Congress appointed 
a committee “to prepare a plan of treaties to be proposed to foreign powers” to 
attain international recognition, to cultivate wartime alliances, and to develop 
transatlantic trading relations.22
As newcomers to international diplomacy, many in Congress naively believed 
that unrestricted commercial treaties would oer European nations so many 
benets that they would happily support American independence and even 
contribute resources to the war eort.23 John Adams emerged as the leading 
advocate of this approach.24 As he sat down to dra what would become the 
Model Treaty in 1776, Adams’s diplomatic experiences were more academic than 
practical. In keeping with the college curriculums of the eighteenth century, 
he had studied Enlightenment philosophers while at Harvard. As an attorney 
in Boston during the revenue crises, he had participated in the debates on the 
Stamp, Townshend, and Tea Acts. ese practical experiences, combined with 
his thoughtful writings on republican government, made him an in	uential g-
ure in both the First and Second Continental Congresses. Despite his leading 
role in writing America’s rst diplomatic statement, the Model Treaty, his post-
ing to France in 1778 marked his rst journey outside the American colonies. 
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is idealistic approach to international relations might explain Adams’s over-
condence in the power of free trade to attract European allies.
During the intellectually fertile summer of 1776, Adams sketched out his 
thoughts on “a model of a treaty” in his diary. In an initial entry, he outlined 
the very specic provisions he sought in a treaty with France: “1st. No Political 
Connection. 2nd. No military connection. Receive no Troops from her. 3rd. 
Only a commercial connection, i.e. make a Treaty, to receive her ships in our 
Ports. Let her engage to receive our Ships into her Ports—furnish us with Arms, 
Cannon, Salt Petre [sic], Powder, Duck, Steel.”25 In subsequent writings, he ex-
panded on the importance of American autonomy: “at we should avoid all 
alliance, which might embarrass us in aer times and involve us in future Euro-
pean Wars.” Instead, Adams saw a nonbinding commercial treaty as the pathway 
to American independence because it would liberate the colonies from exist-
ing trading restrictions with Britain while opening up additional commercial 
markets across Europe.26 As the following list suggests, he believed the benets 
to France of a Franco-American alliance would be substantial and endless: it 
would “encourage her manufactures, increase her exports of the produce of her 
soil and agriculture, extend her navigation and trade, augment her resources of 
naval power, raise her from her present deep humiliation, distress and decay, and 
place her on a more equal footing with England, for the protection of her foreign 
possessions, and maintaining her independence at sea.” At the same, these sig-
nicant political and economic advantages “would be an ample compensation 
to France for acknowledging our independence, and for furnishing us for our 
money or upon credit for a time, with such supplies of necessaries as we should 
want, even if this conduct should involve her in a war.”27 As a major proponent 
of commercial diplomacy, Adams emerged as the obvious choice to write the 
dra treaty.28
With the right of free trade being increasingly armed in European di-
plomacy, Adams had numerous examples to choose from as he composed the 
Model Treaty. His challenge was nding the versions that best suited American 
needs and aspirations. Relying on several books on European diplomacy that 
Franklin, a one-man lending library, had shared with him, Adams focused on 
Anglo-French treaties from the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. 
He liberally copied the free-trade provisions from these agreements, including 
navigation rights, the denition of contraband, and limits on privateering, into 
Articles XIV–XXX of his dra agreement.29 Adams’s decision to model his 
treaty on these Anglo-French eorts made sense. He wanted to create a success-
ful document that would include language and provisions familiar to European 
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diplomats. While several Anglo-Dutch and Anglo-Spanish agreements also pro-
vided potential templates, Adams wanted to incorporate language on free trade 
from treaties that France had already endorsed.30 By substituting “America” for 
“Britain” in his version, he also placed the revolutionary nation on equal sover-
eign footing with France and Britain.31
When completed several weeks later, the Model Treaty consisted of thirty 
articles and envisioned a friendly commercial relationship with Louis XVI, “the 
most Christian king,” in the hope that France would return the favor by de-
claring war on Britain.32 The treaty’s economic provisions promised commercial 
reciprocity between the United States and France, with French ships enjoying 
the same privileges as American ones, including the same rate of duties and free-
dom of navigation in U.S. waters. The nascent country also requested French 
protection from the Algerian pirates in the Mediterranean. Most importantly, 
the agreement affirmed the concept “that free ships shall also give a freedom to 
goods, and that everything shall be deemed to be free and exempt . . . , contra-
band goods being always excepted.” At the same time, the Model Treaty implied 
the possibility of war between Great Britain and France, even a wartime alli-
ance between America and France. In the event of an Anglo-French conflict, 
the treaty offered several self-serving provisions for the American cause. First, 
the United States agreed to remain neutral but requested that France not pri-
vateer against America or invade Canada. Second, France should not expect to 
acquire Canada or Florida as a prerequisite for an American alliance. In its defi-
nition of contraband, the treaty listed sixty-eight items, primarily weapons and 
ammunition but also tobacco, salted fish, cheese, butter, beer, wine, sugar, and 
salt while excluding cloth, shipbuilding materials, and most other food items.33 
Adams nonetheless had crafted a treaty that demonstrated a strong adherence 
to Enlightenment ideas on free trade. While some critics in Congress wanted it 
to acknowledge the political situation, Adams and Franklin, his diplomatic col-
league, believed its commercial provisions provided enough incentives to attract 
France’s military assistance without sacrificing American sovereignty.34
Free trade as a wartime strategy proved to be a short-lived policy, despite Con-
gress’s adoption of the Model Treaty in September 1776. (Congress had also 
authorized the competing policy of wartime privateering.)35 France would not 
enter the conflict without an explicit military alliance, and the struggling Amer-
ican war effort needed more than free trade to be successful. America would 
need to win its independence on the battlefield before it could attain its dream 
of political and commercial neutrality. In December 1776, Congress abandoned 
the Model Treaty and instructed its commissioners in Paris—Franklin, Silas 
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Deane, and Arthur Lee—to make more tangible concessions to France in the 
hopes of securing military help. Aer more than a year of slow and delicate ne-
gotiations, Franklin and Deane secured two treaties with France: the Treaty of 
Alliance and the Treaty of Amity and Commerce. (Adams had replaced Lee 
as the third envoy, but by the time he arrived in Paris, most of the work on the 
two treaties had been completed.)36 e thirty-one-article Treaty of Amity and 
Commerce borrowed liberally from the thirty-article Model Treaty’s vision of 
commercial agreements, including its armation of the right of free trade in 
Article XXIII: “And it is hereby stipulated that free Ships shall also give a free-
dom to Goods.”37 A month aer Congress accepted these treaties, Great Britain 
declared war on France on June 14, 1778. e American Revolution had become 
a global con	ict.38
e Franco-American alliance (which would also include Spain) had the 
ironic eect of encouraging less powerful nations such as Russia and Sweden to 
form the League of Armed Neutrality to attain the political neutrality and free-
dom of trade that the 	edgling United States had sought in its Model Treaty.39
Spearheading this eort was Empress Catherine II of Russia (Catherine the 
Great), who had grown frustrated with Britain’s previous neutrality violations 
and wanted to signal Russia’s unwillingness to ally with that kingdom to ght 
France, Spain, and the Americans. As an added bonus, an alliance of neutral na-
tions could bolster Russia’s naval power and its in	uence over European aairs.40
e roots of Armed Neutrality can be found in the delicate maritime rela-
tionship that made Russia dependent on Britain. Possessing only 17 merchant 
ships compared with Britain’s 414, the transport of Russian goods relied on 
the kindness of foreign captains. Further complicating this relationship was 
Britain’s continued reliance on the Consolato del mare as a wartime strat-
egy against enemy shipping during its eighteenth-century wars. British (and 
Spanish) warships captured and seized Russian cargoes and vessels (and those 
of other nations) despite the desire of these smaller countries to avoid involve-
ment in these con	icts.41 Amid these oenses, Britain arrogantly assumed that 
Russia would join forces with them to counter the Americans’ alliance with 
the Bourbon powers of France and Spain. Aside from political considerations, 
Britain desired this alliance because Russian forests produced valuable raw 
materials useful in building and repairing ships.42 Catherine the Great, how-
ever, had other plans. Steeped in the Enlightenment ideas of free trade and 
understanding the realities of her weak navy, the empress sought to unite the 
other neutral nations that had fallen victim to the aggressive practices of Brit-
ain and the other great powers. Spain’s seizure of a Russian ship (rather than a 
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British transgression) provided the violation Catherine needed to launch her 
diplomatic oensive on neutrality.43
On March 11, 1780, Russia issued the Declaration of Armed Neutrality to 
the warring nations of Britain, France, and Spain to announce its intention to 
remain neutral. Demonstrating the continued in	uence of Enlightenment ideas 
on free trade, the statement’s preamble declared Russia’s high regard “for the 
rights of neutrality and the liberty of universal commerce.” e statement added 
that Catherine’s “subjects would peaceably enjoy the fruits of their industry and 
Figure 2. Catherine the Great, who organized the League of Armed Neutrality 
in 1780 to shield Russia and other smaller nations from belligerent actions during 
the American Revolution. (Wikipedia.com; painted by J. B. Lampi, ca. 1780)
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the advantages belonging to a neutral nation.” e declaration then announced 
to these belligerents the ve principles of neutrality Russia intended to follow 
during the current war. e rst item declared the right of neutral vessels “to 
navigate freely from port to port and along the coasts of nations at war.” e sec-
ond provision armed the principle that “free ships make free goods.” e third 
article made exceptions for contraband amid a list of “free goods” but permitted 
each nation to dene what specically qualied. e fourth item dened a block-
aded port and the potential dangers in entering a heavily fortied harbor. e 
last provision established the rules for dealing with the disposition of prizes.44
e Declaration of Armed Neutrality prompted swi diplomatic reactions 
across Europe, with most nations responding favorably to its provisions.45 e 
Bourbon powers of France and Spain eagerly embraced this statement because 
it enabled them to trade freely with participating nations. On April 18, Spain, 
by way of its foreign minister, armed its support for Russia’s declaration: “To 
show to all the neutral powers how much Spain is desirous of observing the 
same rules in time of war as she was directed by whilst neuter, His Majesty con-
forms to the other points contained in the declaration of Russia.” A week later 
France also oered its backing for the rights of neutral nations during wartime: 
“e King has been desirous, not only to procure a freedom of navigation to the 
subjects of the Empress of Russia, but to those of all the States who hold their 
neutrality, and that upon the same conditions as are announced in the treaty to 
which His Majesty this day answers.”46
e strength of these responses encouraged other neutrals to join Russia. By 
the summer of 1780, Denmark and Norway had signed the Armed Neutrality 
Conventions, with Sweden and the Netherlands coming aboard by the end of 
the year. To enforce the provisions of the declaration, Russia, Sweden, Denmark, 
and Norway increased funding for their navies to defend their commercial ships, 
while Russia’s tiny merchant navy sought to decrease its reliance on British ships 
by expanding its 	eet to 141 vessels by 1787.47 e emerging league also owed its 
success to “strength in numbers”: as additional nations embraced neutral trade, 
the agreement grew in symbolic and strategic signicance.48 By the end of 1782, 
the Holy Roman Empire, Prussia, Austria, and Portugal had become members 
of the League of Armed Neutrality as well. When the Two Sicilies joined in 1783, 
this agreement consisted of ten member nations.49
e outlier amid this diplomatic enthusiasm for neutrality was, not surpris-
ingly, the chief practitioner of aggressive trading practices: Great Britain. In-
creasingly isolated, it bristled at this agreement, regarding assertions of neutral-
ity as a blow to its economic reputation and its commercial in	uence. In its April 
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23 response to Russia’s declaration, Britain complained that it had become the 
victim of “the unprovoked aggression of France and Spain.” Instead of oering a 
sweeping armation of neutral rights, as its two European antagonists had, it re-
iterated that “the king, from the commencement of these troubles, gave the most 
precise orders respecting the 	ag of Her Imperial Majesty, and the commerce 
of her subjects, agreeable to the law of nations.” Taking a “business as usual” 
approach to maritime violations, Britain reiterated, “in case any infringements, 
contrary to these repeated orders, take place, the courts of admiralty  .  .  . are 
established to take cognizance of such matters.”50 Despite the league’s desire to 
trade freely during the current con	ict, Britain intended to employ the full range 
of wartime tactics available to it, including seizing the cargoes of neutral vessels.
Britain demonstrated further disregard for Russia’s neutral status when 
it made a second attempt to secure a military alliance with Empress Cather-
ine, despite her stated desire to avoid involvement in the American con	ict. 
In retaliation for Russia spurning its proposal and to weaken the league’s 
enforcement powers, Britain declared war on the Netherlands in December 
1780, the strongest maritime member of the Armed Neutrality Convention.51
Many Americans, including Washington, Adams, and members of Congress, 
believed Russia and its neutral allies would oer military support to the Dutch 
since its membership in the league had triggered the declaration of war.52 But 
Catherine remained steadfast in her commitment to Russian neutrality and 
declined to aid her erstwhile Dutch ally, then demonstrated her expanding in-
	uence in European aairs by oering to broker an Anglo-Dutch peace treaty 
instead.53
For the Americans in Paris, Franklin and Adams, the Declaration of Armed 
Neutrality exposed the revolutionary nation’s precarious diplomatic standing 
across Europe. Despite America’s role as a leading participant in the current 
war (and also as a supporter of privateers against Russian ships), most European 
nations perceived the United States, not as a sovereign entity, but as thirteen 
British colonies in rebellion against their powerful mother country. Because of 
its dependent political status, America did not warrant ocial acknowledge-
ment in Russia’s plans.54 Stuck in an international “no man’s land,” Adams and 
Franklin oered Congress competing advice on the best way to respond to the 
Armed Neutrality Convention.
Adams, who maintained a sanguine view of European diplomacy, interpreted 
the declaration as a favorable philosophical and strategic development for the 
American cause.55 He saw the obvious intellectual connections between his 
Model Treaty and the emerging League of Armed Neutrality, believing that its 
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members’ shared commitment to free trade made these nations natural allies 
for the American cause. Adams also regarded the league as a powerful bulwark 
against the British war eort, equivalent to a declaration of war by these nations. 
He wrote to the Continental Congress, “e Improvement in the Law of Na-
tions which the Empress aims at, and will undoubtedly establish, is hurtful to 
England, it is true, to a very great degree: but it is benecial to all other Nations, 
and to none more than the United States of America, who will be Carriers, and 
I hope forever Neuters.”56 With Russia and other nations rejecting British hege-
mony, Adams believed the time was ripe for expanded European recognition of 
American independence as well as additional military alliances.57 Once again, 
his idealism blinded him to international realities. Russia had formed the league 
in order to avoid participating in the Anglo-American war. If a powerful country 
like Britain could not cajole it into an alliance, thirteen American colonies stood 
little chance of being more successful.
Nonetheless, in subsequent letters to Congress, Adams advocated a return to 
the “militia diplomacy”—the American practice of sending ministers to Euro-
pean capitals even if they had not been invited—to capitalize on the common 
cause with Europe that Armed Neutrality revealed.58 He wrote, “I could wish 
that the United States had a Minister at each of the Maritime Courts, I mean 
Holland, Russia, Sweden and Denmark,” a reference to the participants in the 
convention.59 A month later Adams lamented the lack of information about 
America’s revolutionary eorts in European capitals: “Neither the Cause, nor 
the Country of America are understood in any Part of Europe, which gives Op-
portunity to the English to represent ings as they choose.”60 With American 
diplomats promoting the 	edgling nation’s interests in these neutral capitals, 
he hoped that the United States would be invited to join the League of Armed 
Neutrality and also receive acknowledgment of its independence.61
Franklin, more experienced in the rules and mores of European diplomacy, 
oered a more tempered response to Armed Neutrality.62 In Franklin’s capacity 
as America’s only recognized minister in Europe, his dispatches ocially noti-
ed Congress of the dramatic change to international law: “For whatever may 
formerly have been the Law of Nations, all the Neutral Powers at the Instance of 
Russia, seem at present disposed to change it.”63 Underscoring America’s ambig-
uous status as an unrecognized combatant, he nonetheless recommended that 
Congress acknowledge the changing maritime law and alert American priva-
teers to its implications: “As it is likely to become the Law of Nations that free 
Ships should make free Goods, I wish the Congress to consider whether it may 
not be proper to give Orders to their Cruizers [sic] not to molest Foreign Ships, 
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but conform to the Spirit of that Treaty of Neutrality.”64 Franklin, a stickler for 
diplomatic protocol, stopped short of endorsing Adams’s enthusiasm for militia 
diplomacy, having long dismissed this approach as “suitoring for Alliances.” In-
stead, he advocated what he considered the more eective approach of waiting 
for nations to choose to ally with the Americans.65
From the battleeld, General Washington also oered his assessment of the 
new policy of the Armed Neutrality Convention. Writing to the president of 
the Continental Congress, he agreed with Franklin and Adams’s views that “the 
accession of Holland and Portugal to the Northern League of Neutrality will 
be undoubtedly very embarrassing to Great Britain.” While Adams saw diplo-
matic opportunity in Britain’s diculties, Washington oered a more realistic 
interpretation of the situation. He concluded, “But this, I think, may be relied 
upon, that the more she is insulted and oppressed by the European Powers, the 
more she will endeavor to revenge herself upon us.”66 Later Washington praised 
the military benets of the league’s agreement because its enforcement greatly 
weakened “the naval pride and power of Great Britain.”67 A career ocer who 
had fought alongside and now against the British, Washington viewed the com-
plexities of European rivalries from a battleeld perspective.
In its ocial response to the Declaration of Armed Neutrality, the Continen-
tal Congress embraced pragmatism over protocol by adopting the competing 
recommendations of its two diplomats. Advancing the stalled American war 
eort proved more important than resolving a philosophical debate occurring 
3,000 miles away. In deference to Franklin, Congress ocially responded to 
Russia’s statement on October 5, 1780. Acknowledging that “their most Chris-
tian and Catholic Majesties and most of the neutral maritime powers of Europe 
have declared their approbation” of the Russian declaration, the delegates also 
armed their “regard to the rights of commerce, and their respect for the sov-
ereign.” Additionally, they instructed the Board of Admiralty to “prepare and 
report instructions for the commander of armed vessels commissioned by the 
United States” to respect “the principles contained in the Declaration of the 
Empress of all Russia, on the rights of neutral vessels.” In that same statement, 
Congress also entertained hopes that Russia might include the United States in 
the League of Armed Neutrality when delegates “empowered” the American 
ministers in Europe “to accede to such regulations . . . of the said declaration” if 
invited to do so by “Her Imperial Majesty.”68 Although this statement stressed 
Russia’s role in oering America an “invitation” to the agreement, Congress also 
embraced Adams’s recommendation that its diplomats preemptively pursue Eu-
ropean alliances.
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Despite Franklin’s misgivings, Congress revived the practice of militia di-
plomacy in October 1780 by authorizing unsolicited missions to Russia and 
the Netherlands. American leaders hoped that diplomatic recognition or even 
a commercial or military alliance would bolster America’s sagging cause.69 In a 
cost-saving move, Congress appointed diplomats who were already in Europe, 
with Adams posted to the Netherlands, and his secretary, Francis Dana, dis-
patched to Russia.70 With Britain now at war with the Netherlands, Adams’s 
instructions had been expanded to include securing a treaty of amity and com-
merce with the Dutch, modeled on the French agreement of 1778.71 In addition 
to seeking inclusion in the League of Armed Neutrality, Congress authorized 
Dana to pursue a similar treaty with Russia that acknowledged American inde-
pendence.72 While the Declaration of Armed Neutrality oered the immediate 
incentive for these missions, the emissaries brought America’s signature calling 
card to these negotiations: free trade and friendship with the United States in 
exchange for recognition and nancial assistance.
Contrary to American hopes, militia diplomacy quickly ran afoul of the secre-
tive rules and protocols of the royal courts and the complex entanglements that 
dened Europe’s geopolitical arrangements. Adams complained to Congress, 
“It is very dicult to discover, with Certainty the secret springs which actuate 
the Courts of Europe, but whatever I can nd with any degree of Probability, 
I Shall transmit to Congress, at one Time or another.”73 As Dana embarked 
for Russia, Franklin warned him of the pitfalls of militia diplomacy because it 
“lessens our reputation and makes other[s] less willing to form a connection with 
us.” Instead, Franklin believed that America should focus its diplomatic energies 
on the country that had already chosen to be its ally: France.74
Despite their summertime arrival, Dana and his youthful secretary, John 
Quincy Adams, encountered an icy silence as they set foot in the Russian capital 
of Saint Petersburg.75 Catherine II and her ministers refused to meet with the 
American, an unrecognized diplomat from rebellious British colonies. Instead, 
Dana and young Adams lived in virtual seclusion at the Hotel Paris, isolated 
from the other diplomats attending court at the Hermitage Palace. Further mar-
ginalizing his eorts was France’s minister to Russia, the marquis de Verac, who 
believed that the Franco-American alliance authorized him to represent Amer-
ica’s diplomatic interests in the empress’s court. Dana also found the favoritism, 
blackmail, and bribery that regulated diplomacy in Catherine’s court unseemly. 
During his two long years in Russia, he received an unsolicited tutorial on the 
limits of both militia diplomacy and the Armed Neutrality Convention.76 De-
spite Catherine’s boldness in challenging British aggressiveness, she nonetheless 
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carefully avoided antagonizing Britain and becoming an unwilling participant 
in the American con	ict. For starters, Russia had cited a Spanish transgression, 
rather than a British one, as the impetus for pursuing and declaring Armed Neu-
trality. Similarly, recognizing American independence remained out of the ques-
tion as long as Britain still claimed the colonies as its own.77 In the end, Ameri-
can victories on the battleeld, which led to progress at the negotiating table in 
Paris, ultimately obviated the need for Russian diplomatic recognition, permit-
ting a disheartened Dana to nally leave Saint Petersburg in September 1783.78
Meanwhile in Amsterdam, John Adams’s eorts at militia diplomacy also 
ran afoul of a nation’s political priorities. While the outbreak of hostilities be-
tween Britain and the Netherlands had signaled an opening for the Americans, 
the Dutch preferred peace over war. roughout 1781 and 1782, Adams, lacking 
proper diplomatic credentials, looked on helplessly as a series of negotiations 
ensued between these two nations, with a nonaligned Russia serving as media-
tor.79 Adams’s situation became even more precarious when his own government 
turned on him. On July 10, 1781, he received word that Congress was revoking 
his commission, then Franklin found a way to tangibly oppose militia diplomacy 
by eliminating funding for the mission.80 Despite these monumental setbacks, 
Adams remained in Amsterdam. His diplomatic fortunes nally improved when 
news of the British surrender at Yorktown reached the Continent in November 
1781. e Dutch had failed in their eorts to negotiate a peace treaty, and in the 
meantime Britain was preparing to recognize American independence. With 
these obstacles cleared away, Adams belatedly achieved the diplomatic successes 
he had sought from the Dutch, including recognition of the United States and 
a treaty of amity and commerce.81 Yet these pyrrhic victories had more to do 
with America’s decisive military triumph on the battleeld (aided by the French 
alliance) than with the colonies’ ragtag eorts at militia diplomacy in European 
capitals.82
Neutrality assumed one other guise during the Revolution as Native Ameri-
can nations unsuccessfully attempted to avoid taking sides in this con	ict. e 
Oneida Nation spoke for many Natives when they declared their friendship to 
“old and new England” as well as their neutrality toward a con	ict between “two 
brothers of the same blood.”83 Despite these eorts, Indigenous tribes found 
themselves and their lands situated in the middle of a con	ict that did not re	ect 
their concerns, in contrast to European nations, which could declare their ports 
and ships as neutrals but did not have to worry about threats to their territory. 
With battles raging around them, Native Americans found it impossible to stay 
out of harm’s way. Additionally, both American and British leaders sought their 
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help on the battleeld. Unable to remain neutral, most Natives preferred to ally 
with the British, who oered vital trading relationships and did not encroach on 
their lands.84 But a handful of nations joined forces with the Americans, includ-
ing the Delaware and the Tuscarora and Oneida, who broke with the other four 
members of the Iroquois Confederacy.85 e failure of Indian neutrality had 
disastrous consequences for these nations. e war weakened many of those who 
participated and resulted in the collapse of the once-powerful Iroquois Confed-
eracy. Native American interests were not represented at the Treaty of Paris, and 
the American victory meant the additional loss of Indigenous lands to settlers 
without British ocials to intervene.86 Territorially and diplomatically vulnera-
ble in a way that European nations were not, neutrality proved to be an attractive 
but ultimately elusive goal for Native Americans.
With the end of ghting, the United States could now turn its attention 
to the role it sought in international aairs as a newly independent nation. 
During the war, many Americans in Congress had optimistically viewed Rus-
sia’s Armed Neutrality as an opportunity for an alliance because of its embrace 
of free trade.87 Instead of that declaration establishing a common ground for 
neutral commerce, however, the experiences of Dana and John Adams exposed 
the frustrating complexities of European diplomacy, with its alliances, intrigues, 
and self-interests. With peace negotiations underway in Paris, the Continental 
Congress announced a dramatic shi in American policy when it advised its 
negotiators there, Franklin, Adams, and John Jay, to avoid joining the League of 
Armed Neutrality or any other European free-trade pact. Chastened by wartime 
diplomacy, Congress explained in its June 13, 1783, instructions, “the true inter-
est of these states requires that they should be as little as possible entangled in 
the politics and controversies of European nations.”88 On October 29, Congress 
formally instructed its ministers in Europe “that no further measures be taken 
at present towards the admission of the United States into that [Armed Neu-
trality] Confederacy.”89 While free trade and commercial relationships remained 
a priority for Congress, alliances with European countries did not. Although 
America’s national government institutionally evolved from 1776 to 1787, from 
the Continental Congress to the Confederation Congress and nally to the fed-
eral authority under the U.S. Constitution, the nation’s commitment to avoid-
ing international entanglements, including the Armed Neutrality Convention, 
remained a top diplomatic priority, even if these dealt with free trade.90
U.S. political leaders emerged from the revolution still committed to eco-
nomic neutrality. But aer a bruising exposure to the pitfalls of European di-
plomacy, they realized that their quest for free trade must also include political 
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neutrality: foreign relationships without entanglements. While the Treaty of 
Paris of 1783 armed U.S. political independence from Britain and the new 
nation’s territorial sovereignty, the agreement fell short in establishing the com-
mercial relationship America sought with Britain, which remained its principal 
trading partner.91 As an alternative, congressional ocials launched an am-
bitious campaign to attain the economic and political relationships that had 
eluded them during the war.92 Congress appointed Jeerson to join Adams and 
Franklin in Paris to pursue commercial agreements and diplomatic recognition 
from no fewer than sixteen European nations, including Great Britain, as well 
as the Barbary States. Jeerson craed his own Model Treaty, based on Ad-
ams’s 1776 template, which rearmed the concept that “free ships make free 
goods” and promised most-favored-nation status to other nations (rather than 
commercial reciprocity). Despite Congress’s high hopes, Jeerson (and his depu-
ties) achieved only two commercial treaties—with Prussia in 1785 and Morocco 
in 1786—both oering more-symbolic value than actual economic or strategic 
benets.93 Further complicating America’s postwar aspirations were colonial 
and revolutionary entanglements: Britain continued to impress American sail-
ors, and France sought American reciprocity during its revolutionary wars based 
on the 1778 alliance.94 While America’s political status had changed since the 
American Revolution, its political stature had not, at least in the eyes of most 
of Europe, further complicating eorts to gain recognition of its political sover-
eignty and economic autonomy.95
As the ineectual Confederation Congress made way for a stronger national 
government under the Constitution of 1787, the nation’s political leaders contin-
ued to stress the importance of politically unencumbered free trade. e detailed 
responsibilities given to Congress in Article I, Section 8 includes the power to 
“regulate commerce with foreign nations.” In one Federalist essay (Number 
11), Hamilton, its author, highlighted the economic in	uence a strong govern-
ment would wield in international commerce.96 Referring to America’s lack of a 
trading agreement with Britain, Hamilton wrote of the pending Constitution, 
“Would it not enable us to negotiate, with the fairest prospect of success, for 
commercial privileges of the most valuable and extensive kind, in the dominions 
of that kingdom?” He also emphasized that free trade (or economic neutrality) 
was impossible without a strong government: “e rights of neutrality will only 
be respected when they are defended by all adequate power. A nation, despicable 
by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being neutral.”97 At the same time, 
the new national government prepared for the combative realities of transatlan-
tic commerce, with Article I, Section 8 also giving Congress the power to declare 
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war, to issue letters of marque and reprisal, and to make rules about seized ships 
and cargo, just as the Articles of Confederation had authorized. Challenging 
colonial precedent, however, the Constitution, in Article I, Section 9, also ex-
plicitly prohibits states from issuing letters of marque and reprisal, making clear 
that waging war was the national government’s prerogative.98
Revolutionary America embraced international diplomacy with high 
ideals and high aspirations for the role it intended to play in the world. Despite 
facing the monumental task of defeating the British Army on the battleeld, 
American politicians believed they could also pursue and promote free trade 
across Europe. Bueted by the challenges involved in securing commercial and 
military alliances among reluctant European nations, neophyte American dip-
lomats received an education in the self-interests that drove international aairs. 
Upon achieving their country’s independence from Britain, American leadership 
did not abandon its quest for free trade or friendly relations with other states. In-
stead, the leaders of the young nation realized that the best way to achieve these 
goals was independently and unilaterally, without the encumbrances of other 
nations’ concerns. While U.S. political leaders received insights on the pitfalls 
of European diplomacy, Washington gained his own battleeld education on 
imperial rivalries as he fought alongside the French to defeat the British.
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“e Contests of European Nations”
George Washington and Neutrality
G eorge Washington, as the chief architect of the neutrality pol-icy, brought a unique and longstanding perspective on foreign aairs to his administration that diered from the experiences of most early 
American politicians. While revolutionary leaders like Benjamin Franklin, 
John Adams, and omas Jeerson received their education on the pitfalls and 
complexities of European diplomacy during their overseas missions, Washing-
ton obtained his tutorial on North American battleelds. As a military ocer, 
he had encountered the British and French as both allies and enemies in two 
dierent wars. Most recently, he had befriended the French ocers who had 
served with him during the American Revolution. As president, he exchanged 
correspondence with these French generals, who described, to Washington’s 
dismay, a hopeful revolution of their own now quickly descending into violence 
and chaos. ese epistolary reports of France’s volatile revolution, coupled with 
Washington’s previous military experiences, inspired two landmark presiden-
tial decisions: not to pursue an alliance with France and instead to establish a 
position of American neutrality. Despite their desire for free trade, American 
leaders’ revolutionary experiences had cooled their enthusiasm for international 
entanglements. With France and Britain engaged in their latest conict in 1793, 
Washington took the decisive step of combining his own perspectives on Euro-
pean aairs with the lessons of revolutionary diplomacy to enshrine neutrality 
as an enduring American priority.
Two interconnected events—the death of Washington’s father fol-
lowed by the passing of his half-brother, Laurence—occurring largely beyond 
his control, shaped Washington’s early career and his developing view of interna-
tional aairs. e premature death of Washington’s father meant that the estate 
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had insucient funds to send him to college. Fortunately for the young man, 
Lawrence, fourteen years his senior, assumed the role of mentor and surrogate 
father. He encouraged Washington to pursue a career in the military, as he him-
self had done. Lawrence also provided Washington with his only opportunity 
for “international” (really intercolonial) travel when he accompanied his ailing 
half-brother to the British colony of Barbados. Lawrence’s death from tubercu-
losis in 1752 (he was thirty-four) meant that the position of Virginia’s adjutant 
general, which he had held, was now vacant. Washington applied and embarked 
on the second major turning point of his early life. In 1753, he began his career 
as a military ocer with the colonial rank of major and, from this position, his 
serendipitous introduction to international aairs.1
at same year the Virginia colony sent its newly appointed adjutant gen-
eral to the Ohio River valley to investigate reports of French encroachments on 
British-controlled lands. Washington’s assignment seemed simple enough, but 
he was entering a complex and volatile situation in which the profound inter-
national and territorial stakes extended far beyond the Pennsylvania frontier. 
Since 1689, France and Great Britain had engaged in a series of dynastic wars, 
with a small portion of these conicts spilling onto American soil.2 In 1749, 
as part of its strategy during the War of Austrian Succession, France had built 
forts along the Ohio River to increase its territorial presence in North America. 
While Britain and its colonists possessed land claims along the Ohio, so too did 
France and the powerful Haudenosaunee Confederacy nations.3 One historian 
described the Ohio Valley at this time as “one of the most sensitive boundary 
regions in the world.”4 In his rst military assignment, the twenty-three-year-old 
ocer walked into a delicate situation that would have challenged even the most 
seasoned diplomat.
During this mission, Washington endured physical hardships as he traversed 
dense forests and crossed frozen streams; he also faced diplomatic obstacles as he 
attempted to meet and negotiate with French, British, and Haudenosaunee rep-
resentatives. e French ocials he encountered refused to relinquish their forts 
and other territorial gains on the Ohio River. Under instructions from Virginia’s 
governor to push them out, Washington returned to the area in May 1754 with 
200 Virginia militiamen and a handful of Seneca Indians. An attack ensued, 
with Washington and his troops killing several French soldiers. Reecting the 
confused and volatile environment of the Ohio frontier, this skirmish quickly 
escalated into the opening battle of the Seven Years’ War. Unlike earlier conicts 
over European succession, the governments of France and Britain justied this 
latest round of hostilities as a contest over their territorial holdings in North 
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America. Washington and his troops unwittingly provided the small spark 
needed to ignite this North American tinderbox that spread into a global war.5
Despite Washington’s dubious distinction as the colonial ocer who started 
the years-long ghting, his wartime experiences proved to be somewhat more 
positive. He served in the British Army from 1754 to 1758, although not quite in 
the rank he had hoped. e regular army did not recognize his status as a colonel 
in the colonial militia, nor did he receive a royal commission. Nonetheless, as 
a captain and aide-de-camp, Washington served directly under British general 
Edward Braddock, witnessing both the strengths and weaknesses of his com-
mander’s eorts. More importantly, Washington’s service with the British Army 
expanded and regularized his training as a career military ocer. He received 
valuable instruction during this period, “learning how to build forts, transport 
supplies, dispense justice, train and command soldiers, and give orders.”6 He also 
acquired the demeanor and authority of the British ocers he met.7
Washington’s wartime service also continued his education in the complexi-
ties of European diplomacy and the colonies’ minor role in it. Despite his partici-
pation in a global war in which he fought with the British against the French, the 
Virginian viewed his achievements largely from a colonial perspective. He served 
alongside British regulars, not as one of them, and he always saw British war 
aims and accomplishments as separate from those of the colonies. When Wash-
ington resigned his commission in 1758, his service had been in the Virginia 
militia, not in the British Army. He also believed by that time that his work in 
securing the Pennsylvania frontier for his fellow colonists had been completed, 
although the Anglo-French war continued for several more years. Washington 
might not have grasped the full intricacies of European diplomacy during his 
time in the Ohio River valley. Yet the escalation of his fact-nding mission into 
a global war made a lasting impression concerning the complexity and volatility 
of European aairs.8
From 1758 to 1775, Washington enjoyed a domestic hiatus. During these sev-
enteen years, he served in the Virginia House of Burgess, married Martha Custis, 
and began a lifetime of renovations on his beloved Mount Vernon estate. is 
break from military service came to end in June 1775, when the Second Con-
tinental Congress appointed Washington commander in Chief of the Conti-
nental Army. e man who assumed this post had matured into a thoughtful 
forty-three-year-old leader, with nearly two decades to reconcile his youthful 
military ambitions with a more realistic understanding of their deadly conse-
quences.9 With Great Britain now assuming the role of enemy and France even-
tually becoming an ally, this appointment continued Washington’s education on 
44 chapter 3
the diplomatic chess game that dened European rivalries and alliances. From 
a position of experience and authority, he could inuence international events 
rather than just being caught in their maelstrom.
e Treaty of Alliance between the United States and France and its commer-
cial companion, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, transformed the American 
Revolution into a global conict in 1778, with France and Britain once again 
at war.10 is alliance oered the American cause the additional troops and 
resources it desperately needed, while France saw an opportunity to undercut 
Britain as America’s primary trading partner in order to alter the European bal-
ance of power.11 As the commander of the Continental Army, Washington bore 
the responsibility for working with his former enemies in the French military. 
When negotiating with those ocers, he emphasized pragmatism, respect, and 
most importantly, putting American needs rst.12
e Franco-American alliance began on an optimistic note in July 1778 with 
the arrival of comte D’Estaing, a lieutenant general and vice admiral, and his 
naval eet of sixteen warships and 4,000 soldiers. Many Americans, including 
Washington, believed that D’Estaing and his eet would quickly break the Brit-
ish navy’s stronghold on the American coastline, allowing the tide of war to shi 
dramatically. Instead, the French navy encountered a series of disappointments, 
rst in its failure to challenge British hegemony in New York harbor, then in a 
poorly coordinated eort with American troops to capture Newport, Rhode 
Island. Aer two futile months D’Estaing and his eet retreated to the West 
Indies, with no immediate plans of returning to the American conict. Despite 
Washington’s personal misgivings about the French as allies and his disappoint-
ment in their recent naval failures, he understood the diplomatic necessity of 
publicly supporting this essential international agreement, especially among 
his troops.13 Writing to Major General John Sullivan aer the French retreat, 
Washington recommended “the cultivation of harmony and good agreement, 
and [also] your endeavors to destroy that ill humor which may have got into the 
ocers.”14 Despite these precautions, the future direction of the French alliance 
remained uncertain.
Prior to the 1778 alliance, several French citizens had joined the American 
cause on their own accord, and Washington’s reaction to their involvement cap-
tured his ambivalent feelings about foreign ocers. Of particular note were two 
men, the marquis de Lafayette and the marquis de La Rouerie, who both sought 
commissions in the Continental Army in 1777, commanded American troops, 
and eventually rose to the rank of general. Unlike a seasoned ocer such as 
the y-one-year-old D’Estaing, the twenty-year-old Lafayette eagerly sought 
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to learn the art of warfare from Washington, who was twenty-ve years his se-
nior. Furthermore, Lafayette’s willingness to make the nancial commitments 
required of an ocer, such as purchasing horses, equipment, and uniforms, con-
vinced Washington that he was not merely a glory-seeking “soldier of fortune.” 
is deferential relationship resulted in a lifelong friendship between the two 
men, with Washington regarding Lafayette as an adopted son.15 A letter written 
to Gouverneur Morris, an American businessman and later U.S. minister to 
France, succinctly captured the general’s appreciation of Lafayette’s talents and 
his exasperation with the other European ocers: “I do most devoutly wish, that 
we had not a single foreign ocer among us, except the Marquis de Lafayette, 
who acts upon very dierent principles from those which govern the rest.”16
In 1780, two years aer the unsuccessful deployment of its navy, France sought 
a quick and decisive return on its investment in the American theater and sent 
over approximately 5,500 men under the command of Lieutenant General comte 
de Rochambeau. Washington had not been consulted on these plans, and he 
now faced the prospect of welcoming formerly hostile French troops onto Amer-
ican soil. Despite the potential for awkwardness, both commanders treated each 
other with respect. In fact, the French government had specically instructed 
Rochambeau, a y-ve-year-old career military ocer, to defer to Washing-
ton.17 Some barriers remained, though. e Francophone Rochambeau and the 
Anglophone Washington required the use of a translator to discuss strategy, a 
role Lafayette performed on several occasions. More signicantly, when they 
rst met in September 1780, they could not agree on the best way to use their 
two armies. Eight months elapsed before their next meeting, and even the plans 
they agreed on at their May 1781 conference changed dramatically at the last 
minute. Washington advocated a joint invasion of New York, to which Rocham-
beau reluctantly concurred while secretly encouraging the French navy to enter 
the Chesapeake Bay. e eet’s attack in the Chesapeake demonstrated British 
vulnerability in the south. Washington, to his credit, responded quickly to these 
changing circumstances and endorsed Rochambeau’s plan to attack in Virginia 
instead of New York.
Whatever dierences had been present in planning the oensive had disap-
peared as the two armies traveled southward and smoothly executed their joint 
assault. e infusion of additional French and American troops overpowered 
the British army, forcing Lieutenant General Lord Cornwallis to surrender at 
Yorktown, Virginia, on October 17, 1781. France’s crucial resources and its o-
cers’ strategic insights had brought the American Revolution to a successful con-
clusion.18 Overnight, the victory transformed the French generals into American 
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heroes and forged a bond between the two nations and its military leaders, even 
if those sentiments had not always been present to that time.19
In the aermath of the British surrender, Washington oered praise for all 
those who had participated in the decisive victory, including the French ocers 
and their army. In his orders of October 20, 1781, Washington wrote that “he 
requests the Count Rochambeau will be pleased to communicate to the Army 
under his immediate command the high sense he [Washington] entertains of 
the distinguished merits of the ocers and soldiers of every corps.”20 As the 
Continental Army disbanded and the French generals and their troops assumed 
postings in the Caribbean and back in France, Washington’s remarks might have 
signaled the end of these revolutionary friendships. But the formation of the 
Society of the Cincinnati in the United States and France gave the general and 
those French ocers who assumed leadership roles in this new veterans organi-
zation reasons to stay in touch.21
In the aermath of their near-mutiny at Newburgh, New York, over pay and 
pensions in 1783, American revolutionary ocers formed the Society of the Cin-
cinnati to advocate for their concerns. is fraternal and hereditary organization 
elevated the sacrice and heroism of ocers above that of the common soldiers 
and even the civilian population. e popularity of this organization spread to 
France, with ocers there eagerly responding to the American Cincinnati’s in-
vitation to organize their own chapter. Members on both sides of the Atlantic 
wore a coveted blue-and-white ribbon, which symbolized the alliance between 
the two nations. Because the French chapter had more stringent membership 
requirements than the American one, many ocers below the rank of colonel 
appealed to the leadership of the two societies for a dispensation. ese episto-
lary requests were forwarded to Washington, president-general of the American 
society, from the French society’s leaders: General Lafayette, its president; Ad-
miral D’Estaing, its vice president for the navy; and General Rochambeau, its 
vice president for the army. General La Rouerie, although not one of its leaders, 
was an early member of the French society and a strong proponent of its high 
membership standards.22
ese seemingly mundane exchanges over eligibility launched a new phase 
of transatlantic correspondence between Washington and his French generals. 
During the battles of the American Revolution, from roughly 1777 to 1781, the 
correspondence between these men had largely dealt with military instructions. 
In the postwar period of 1784–88, their letters acquired a more personal tone as 
Washington and these French ocers reminisced about the war, built friend-
ships, and established the Society of the Cincinnati. Aer 1789 these letters grew 
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in signicance as every man assumed a role in his country’s politics. From 1777 
until their respective deaths, Washington exchanged the most letters (167) with 
his “adopted son,” the marquis de Lafayette. He and comte D’Estaing penned 58 
letters, 48 of these dealing with naval instructions during the American Revolu-
tion. Washington exchanged 32 letters with comte de Rochambeau and 26 with 
the marquis de La Rouerie. Unlike his other European correspondents, such as 
Catherine Macaulay Graham and Edward Newenham, Washington had forged a 
trusted bond with these men on the battleeld while also sharing a commitment 
to the ideas of liberty and republican government that had inspired their service 
in or alongside the Continental Army. Besides a greater intimacy with Washing-
ton, Lafayette also outlived his French military colleagues.23
As Washington and his French generals engaged in the business of launching 
the society, their letters celebrated a shared republican ideology based in mili-
tary sacrice and honor as ocers, masculine friendships, and an aristocratic 
Figure 3. e Diamond Eagle Ribbon, a gi from French  
ocers to George Washington, symbolizing the role the Society  
of the Cincinnati played in fostering postwar friendships.  
(e Society of the Cincinnati; designed by Duval and Fancastel, 1784)
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liberalism premised on individual rights and constitutions.24 ese exchanges 
transformed them into an epistolary “band of brothers,” with their correspon-
dence laying the groundwork for future Franco-American relations. Rocham-
beau, writing to Washington about membership rosters and charitable contribu-
tions, concluded that the society would “perpetuate . . . the tender sentiments of 
fraternity and friendship that we entertain for our brothers of your army, and for 
the celebrated chief whom we will respect and love till our last.”25 ese men also 
discussed the possibilities of transatlantic visits. Washington, who had never 
traveled outside of the western hemisphere, wrote to Rochambeau, “Should for-
tune ever put it in my power to come to France, your being at Calais would be 
an irresistible inducement for me to make it a visit.”26 La Rouerie, who was still 
in America, promised “to take a journey to Virginia  .  .  . to see once more the 
man which [sic] I shall love, respect and admire all my days.”27 Lafayette, always 
willing to put in an extra eort for Washington and the American Revolution, 
visited the United States from August to December 1784.28 Unable to arrive in 
time for the Society of the Cincinnati’s rst meeting, he nonetheless received a 
hero’s welcome, which included traveling with Washington, visiting the retired 
general at Mount Vernon, and receiving honorary U.S. citizenship.29
Beyond professions of friendship, these men shared the philosophical bonds, 
particularly a commitment to liberty, that had inspired their revolutionary 
service. General D’Estaing, who had rarely communicated with Washington 
during the Revolutionary War, became an eusive and prolic correspondent on 
matters relating to the society and to postwar remembrances.30 Writing to him 
on December 25, 1783, D’Estaing emphasized the values that united American 
and French ocers together, such as being “citizen-soldiers” and their “civil and 
military virtues” as well as their “gallant” conduct. He presented Washington 
with an American eagle sculpture that symbolized the freedom achieved during 
the American Revolution, writing, “Liberty (of which it is the happy and august 
symbol) has risen of itself, supported by wisdom, talents, and disinterestedness, 
by every virtue—by General Washington.”31 Washington echoed this sentiment 
in a letter to Rochambeau, describing his “pleasure” that “we have been con-
temporaries and fellow-laborers in the cause of liberty, and that we have lived 
together as brothers should do—in harmony and friendship.”32 ese letters 
expressed their shared philosophical sensibilities on government—support for 
individual rights, particularly liberty; respect for constitutional authority and 
the rule of law; and the belief in the enlightened leadership of the elites. In short, 
the French generals’ aristocratic liberalism matched Washington’s republican-
ism, making these men trusted informants for one another.33
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By the time Washington became president in 1789, he had already partici-
pated in two global wars between France and Great Britain. e letters he re-
ceived from his French generals, a happy byproduct of the latter of these, oered 
him a front-row seat to the rumblings that would eventually lead to a third war 
between the two European rivals. As president, Washington received interna-
tional news from other correspondents and sources in Europe as well.34 But the 
letters from his trusted brothers in arms, who had already served with him in 
one revolution and who now played leading roles in another, oered a rsthand 
perspective on European aairs that his other correspondents could not match. 
ese reports played a crucial role in Washington’s decisions to not aid France 
and, more importantly, to pursue a policy of neutrality toward warring Europe.
e year 1789 was a watershed one for America and for France. e United 
States entered a new phase of its revolution by launching a constitutionally based 
republican government, while France embarked on its own political makeover, 
with revolutionaries charging the Bastille prison, the members of the National 
Assembly pledging to write a new constitution, and these deputies proclaiming 
the people’s natural rights in the Declaration of Rights of Man and the Citizen. 
As Americans celebrated the ratication of the Constitution and the establish-
ment of their new national government, they also saluted the achievements of 
their French counterparts, who seemed to be wisely following the American 
path to political liberty and republican government.35 e French achievements 
of 1789 enjoyed almost universal support among Americans, including Wash-
ington and other future Federalists. is enthusiasm spilled into the streets and 
led to widespread celebrations of revolutionary France, despite glaring dier-
ences between it and the American experience. Although this initial burst of op-
timism would devolve into partisan acrimony in the United States and political 
violence in France, both sides, at least for the time being, enjoyed the idea that 
their revolutions would inspire political change throughout the world.36
From the perspective of Washington and his generals, the French Revolution 
can be understood as actually two revolutions. e rst one, occurring from 1789 
to 1791, saw aristocratic liberalism and enlightened French ocers and elites as 
ascendant, whereas the second one, taking place from 1791 to 1793, erased the 
accomplishments and ideas of the rst with more democratic impulses.37 During 
the initial stage of revolutionary hopefulness, beginning in 1789, these French 
ocers assumed prominent positions in their country’s army or in revolutionary 
politics and oered their insights to America’s newly elected republican presi-
dent. Comte D’Estaing, who had led the French navy in North America, was 
now the commanding general of the Versailles National Guard, a citizen-based 
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militia group with jurisdiction over the king’s palace. Comte de Rochambeau, 
the commander of French forces during the American Revolution, became the 
marshal of France in 1791, the last one Louis XVI would appoint. Now-comte 
La Rouerie, who had been a brigadier general in the Continental Army, found 
himself involved in political aairs when he served as a delegate from Brittany 
to the National Assembly in 1788. Among this group of generals, however, the 
marquis de Lafayette possessed the greatest ambitions for both himself and his 
nation’s revolution, hoping to become the George Washington of France. In 
June 1789, aer the fall of the Bastille, Louis XVI appointed Lafayette as the 
commander of the Paris unit of the National Guard, a newly established citizens’ 
militia responsible for maintaining order throughout France.38 is new posi-
tion placed Lafayette at the center of revolutionary unrest, including protecting 
the controversial king who had selected him.
During the rst year of the French Revolution, Washington and his former 
ocers contrasted America’s successful implementation of its new constitution 
against France’s attempt to dra one. As promised in its Tennis Court oath of 
August 1789, the National Assembly set writing a new constitution as its sole 
priority. Members of the ird Estate and aristocratic liberals advocated a con-
stitutional government, freedom of speech and press, and spreading the burden 
of taxation fairly and equally. In January 1789, Rochambeau summarized this 
leading, but not necessarily unanimous, approach to constitutional reform: “I 
am of the little number of the noble men that have voted in favor of the equal 
representation of the third order [the ird Estate]; your pupil Lafayette has 
voted for the same opinion, as you may believe it, but we have here a great 
number of aristocratical [sic] men that are very interested to perpetuate the 
abuses.”39 Despite the excitement of 1789, these noblemen wondered if France 
possessed the leadership and the ideological consensus to translate these ideas 
into political change.
La Rouerie’s letter to Washington of June 18, 1789, captured the early ambiv-
alence of an experienced military ocer eager to make a political contribution 
but who found the French situation lacking in leadership and direction. Aer 
fulsomely praising Washington as a “mighty eminence . . . born every three or 
four hundred years,” La Rouerie lamented France’s failure to produce men with 
similarly seless qualities: “Our aairs in this part of the world do not go as 
honest and impartial men could wish.” He then chronicled his own relation-
ship to the French Revolution: “I have been pretty active last year and in the 
beginning of this, when I thought the activity of an individual could be of ser-
vice to his country.” But La Rouerie’s service was short lived due to a “long and 
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hot skirmish” with members of the Assembly of Notables who opposed natural 
and civil rights. Contrasting his revolutionary service in America with that in 
France, La Rouerie concluded his letter with a prescient prediction: “I fear two 
great evils for my country, anarchy on one hand, despotism on the other.”40
In his October 1789 response, Washington expressed his hopes when he jux-
taposed America’s positive experiment with republican government alongside 
his wish that France would enjoy a similar outcome. First, he concurrently an-
nounced America’s successful launching of republican government to La Roue-
rie, Lafayette, Rochambeau, and D’Estaing: “I shall add to your satisfaction by 
informing you that the political aairs of the United States are in so pleasing a 
train as to promise respectability to our government and happiness to our citi-
zens.” Washington then linked the two revolutions together: “I am persuaded I 
express the sentiments of my fellow Citizens, when I oer an earnest prayer that 
it may terminate in the permanent honor and happiness of your government 
and people.”41 In other words, the United States had proceeded smoothly from 
revolution to republican government, and so could France.
e correspondence of 1790 continued to be hopeful about revolutionary 
progress on both sides of Atlantic, although the reports from the American side 
were increasingly optimistic, while those from France expressed growing anxiety 
about the future. Washington based his claims on the rsthand observations he 
had made during his presidential tours to the New England states in 1789 and 
to Rhode Island in 1790.42 Meanwhile, his French generals increasingly fretted 
about a revolution that continued to be strong in ideas and passion but weak on 
leadership and constitutions.
A letter from Rochambeau dated April 11, 1790, contrasted the pace and vol-
atility of the American and French Revolutions by recalling a moment during 
his service with the Continental Army. He wrote to Washington: “Do you re-
member, my dear general, of the rst repast that we have made together at Rhode 
Island. I did you remark [sic] from the soup the dierence of the character of our 
two nations, the French in burning their throat, and all the Americans waiting 
wisely of the time that it was cooled. I believe, my dear general, you have seen 
since a year that our nation has not change [sic] of character. We go very fast—
God will that we come at our aims.”43 Washington attempted to reassure his 
friend and colleague by replying: “But if there shall be no worse consequence 
resulting from too great eagerness in swallowing something so delightful as lib-
erty, than that of suering a momentary pain or making a ridiculous gure with 
a scalded mouth; upon the whole it may be said that you Frenchmen have come 
o well, considering how immoderately you thirsted for the cup of liberty.”44
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With the dierences between the two experiences becoming more apparent, 
many in France feared that their revolution would not end as happily as the 
American one had.
Lafayette sought to portray the upheavals in France as a type of construc-
tive chaos that would produce positive political changes and stability.45 Writing 
to Washington in January 1790, he explained, “We have come thus far in the 
revolution without breaking the ship either on the shoal of aristocracy, or that 
of faction,” then concluded, “we are stirring towards a tolerable conclusion.” 
Although he acknowledged that the “new building” might not be “perfect,” 
it would be “sucient to ensure freedom.”46 Several months later Lafayette ce-
mented the connections between the American and French Revolutions, and 
between Washington and himself, when he sent the president the key to the 
Bastille prison.47 He explained that the Bastille had represented a “fortress of 
despotism” and credited his former commander with inspiring in him the prin-
ciples of liberty that resulted in his ordering the prison’s destruction. Lafayette 
also rearmed his bond to Washington when he declared the key “a tribute 
which I owe as a son to my adoptive father, as an aide-de-camp to my general, as 
a missionary of liberty to its patriarch.”48 Yet comte de Chateaubriand, the future 
foreign minister of France, dismissed these keys “as rather silly toys which passed 
from hand to hand,” oering at least one critique of the symbolic links Lafayette 
attempted to establish with his American role model.49
Despite Lafayette’s condence in his leadership abilities and France’s 
long-term political prospects, Washington’s other correspondents in 1790 
blamed the National Assembly (now ocially called the National Constituent 
Assembly) for its failure to fulll its oath and write a constitution. e revolu-
tionary excitement of 1789 had produced a leadership vacuum in Paris, with dep-
uties to the National Assembly, which had displaced Louis XVI as the nation’s 
sovereign authority, showing more interest in ghting among themselves than 
establishing a new government. La Rouerie described the self-centered politi-
cians, whose intrigues merely exacerbated the chaotic French political situation: 
“I do not know indeed what to relate to you of the transactions which rascal-
ity, madness, avarice, and that super powerful love for disorder, which seems to 
be liberty to the eyes of insurrecting slavery.” He then blamed the constitution 
writers as emblematic of the leadership problems plaguing France because these 
men “dispute, slander, ght and kick each other most unmercifully” without 
considering the common good of the nation.50
e turning point in Washington’s views on the French Revolution 
came in late 1790, when he understood what his French ocers had been 
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describing—the unwillingness of the National Assembly to dra a new con-
stitution—and he urged quick action. On June 20, 1790, the National Assem-
bly presented a resolution to the president of the United States honoring the 
life of Benjamin Franklin, who had died on April 17. In this resolution, the 
deputies stressed the bonds that linked the two nations together, declaring: 
“At last the hour of the French has arrived—we love to think that the citizens 
of the United States have not regarded with indierence our rst steps towards 
liberty.”51 In other words, America and France shared the common bonds of 
liberty and freedom. In his response, Washington celebrated “the blessings 
of liberty” that linked the two nations together, then he added “the sincere, 
cordial and earnest wish, I entertain, that their labors may speedily issue in 
the rm establishment of a Constitution, which, by wisely conciliating the 
indispensable principles of public order with the enjoyment and exercise of the 
essential rights of man, shall perpetuate the freedom and happiness of the Peo-
ple of France.”52 e president agreed that liberty and freedom were wonderful 
concepts, but until the French created a stable government to protect these 
rights and promote the public order, their revolution would be incomplete and 
might possibly even fail.
In the aermath of this exchange with the National Assembly, Washington 
began to openly express his concerns about the instability of French politics 
to Congress, to his French generals, and to U.S. diplomats in Europe. In his 
annual address to Congress on December 8, 1790, Washington recommended 
that the United States shield itself from European conicts, particularly in the 
area of transatlantic trade. He declared, “e disturbed situation of Europe, 
and particularly the critical posture of the great maritime powers,” could have a 
disruptive eect on American commerce as these countries make “preparations 
for a War.” He added that European turmoil “ought to make us more thankful 
for the general peace and security enjoyed by the United States.” He additionally 
warned the nation and Congress to protect American economic interests from 
these external threats by relying on U.S. ships rather than foreign merchantmen: 
“Our sheries and the transportation of our own produce oers us abundant 
means for guarding ourselves against this evil.”53 Reecting the inuence of 
his French generals on his diplomatic outlook, this address in December 1790 
marked the rst time Washington had mentioned European warfare and U.S. 
foreign policy to Congress, while also providing an early indication of his incli-
nation toward neutrality.
Washington also employed this more assertive approach in his correspon-
dence with his French generals, urging them to focus on governance rather than 
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political rhetoric and excitement. Abandoning the bland reassurances contained 
in earlier letters, the president wrote to Lafayette on March 19, 1791, “My aec-
tion for the French nation, my sincere wish that their government may be respect-
able, and the people happy, will excuse the disclosure of this sentiment, the only 
one, I believe, that I have ventured to oer on the subject of the revolution.”54
Several months later Washington emphasized to him that the political disorder 
in France would not subside “until your Constitution is xed—your government 
organized—and your representative body renovated—much tranquility cannot 
be expected—for, until these things are done, those who are unfriendly to the 
revolution, will not quit the hope of bringing matters back to their former state.” 
He concluded, “But we do not wish to be the only people who taste the sweets of 
an equal and good government—we look with an anxious eye for the time when 
happiness and tranquility shall prevail in your country.”55 In the aermath of 
the king’s attempted ight that June, Washington oered Lafayette “his sincere 
regard for the French nation” and “his constant anxiety for [Lafayette’s] personal 
safety,” conceding, “it does not appear likely that the clouds which have long 
obscured your political horizon will be soon dispersed.”56 e president hoped 
France would fulll its revolutionary mandate, but the National Assembly’s fail-
ure to write a constitution made such an outcome unlikely.
Washington also wrote to U.S. diplomats in Europe to share his views on 
France’s growing instability. In a March 16, 1791, letter to David Humphreys, the 
American minister to Portugal, the president explained the diculty: “Of the 
state of things in France we can form no just idea, so various and contradictory 
are our accounts from thence.”57 In another letter, Washington made explicit his 
desire to remain aloof from European aairs, telling Gouverneur Morris on July 
28, “But I trust we shall never so far lose sight of our own interest and happiness 
as to become, unnecessarily, a party in their political disputes.”58 In a subse-
quent letter to Morris, who was now minister to France, Washington observed, 
“gloomy indeed appears the situation of France at this juncture,” adding, “who 
can say with any precision how these things will terminate.”59 He advocated dis-
tancing the young republic from such uncertainty, including any previous eco-
nomic commitments, writing, “In the present state of things we cannot expect 
that any commercial treaty can now be formed with France.”60 Two years before 
issuing the Neutrality Proclamation, Washington was prepared to shield the 
United States from troublesome European alliances, a preemptive stance made 
possible by the intelligence he had received from his French generals.
Amid this gloominess, late 1791 brought a brief glimmer of hope when the 
National Constituent Assembly completed the new French constitution, and the 
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king accepted it. On September 19, Louis XVI (who had signed the Treaties of 
Alliance and Amity and Commerce in 1778) shared the news with his ally, Pres-
ident Washington, in a brief letter: “Very dear, great friends and allies. We make 
it our duty to inform you that we have accepted the Constitution which has 
been presented to us in the name of the nation, and according to which France 
will be henceforth governed. . . . It is with real pleasure we take this occasion to 
renew to you assurances of the sincere friendship we bear you.”61 e president 
responded in an equally optimistic fashion, declaring: “Very great, good, and 
dear Friend and Ally. I receive as a new proof of friendship to the United States, 
the letter wherein you inform me that you have accepted the Constitution pre-
sented to you in the name of your nation, and according to which it is henceforth 
to be governed.”62 Writing to Lafayette, Washington reiterated his excitement 
and relief that the French people had translated their revolutionary ideas into a 
viable constitutional form: “I cannot conclude this letter without congratulating 
you most sincerely on the King’s acceptance of the Constitution presented to 
him by the National Assembly. .  .  . [W]hen your aairs are completely settled 
under an energetic and equal government the hearts of good men will be grati-
ed.”63 France’s attainment of the constitutional stability Washington had long 
advocated oered hope that it would follow America’s example and successfully 
fulll its 1789 revolutionary mandate.
e only problem was that, for myriad reasons that soon became apparent, 
France was not the United States. e French constitution, rather than taming 
revolutionary impulses the way the U.S. Constitution had, instead unleashed 
that country’s longstanding economic, social, and political tensions in violent 
and explosive ways. True to its Tennis Court oath, the relatively moderate Na-
tional Constituent Assembly disbanded and gave way to the more egalitarian 
Legislative Assembly, where ideological orthodoxy, recrimination, and violence 
became the driving impulses. e aristocratic liberalism that had informed the 
rst years of the French Revolution and the resulting constitution gave way to 
more provocative ideas designed to remake all of society.64 Despite the brief burst 
of optimism in late 1791, France’s entry into the democratic phase of its rev-
olution armed the wisdom of Washington’s earlier decision to distance the 
United States from its ally.
With the collapse of aristocratic liberalism and the violent assault on its sup-
porting components, including the king, the nobles, and the constitution, Wash-
ington witnessed his military friends becoming victims of a revolution they had 
once supported. e marquis de Lafayette, who had such high aspirations for 
himself and his country’s future, attempted to support the new government in 
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late 1791, despite the Legislative Assembly’s overt hostility to the new constitu-
tion and to the anemic king. In December, he became one of three commanders 
of the French army, along with Rochambeau and baron de Luckner.65 Writing to 
Washington on January 22, 1792, Lafayette described his ambivalence in accept-
ing this position: “I had refused every public employment that had been oered 
by the people, and still more had I denied my consent to my being appointed to 
any military command—But when I saw our liberties and Constitution were 
seriously threatened and my services could be usefully employed in ghting for 
our old cause, I could no more resist the wishes of my country men, and as soon 
as the King’s express reached my farm, I set out for Paris.”66 In his response, 
Washington expressed concerns for France’s political future: “We are however 
anxious that the horrors of war may be avoided, if possible. . . . [W]hile despotic 
oppression is avoided on the one hand, licentiousness may not be substituted 
for liberty or confusion take place of order, on the other.”67 Acknowledging the 
personal cost of France’s revolutionary chaos, he also expressed concern for La-
fayette’s well-being: “I assure you, my dear Sir, I have not been a little anxious 
for your personal safety, and I have yet no grounds for removing that anxiety,” 
a statement that demonstrated Washington’s helplessness and his prescience.68
e year 1792 marked the full-scale debut of French radicalism, with the 
Legislative Assembly launching a war on monarchy, both internationally and 
domestically. By April, hostilities between revolutionary France and monarchi-
cal Austria resulted in an ocial declaration of war between the two countries, 
with Prussia joining Austria’s side by June. Lafayette and Rochambeau led their 
troops into Austria, believing they were defending not only France but also the 
king and the country’s new constitution. By August, though, the Bourbon mon-
archy had been overthrown, and a month later the French republic had been 
declared.69 Radicals then turned their attention to violently purging the gov-
ernment and the military of anyone viewed as sympathetic to the monarchy, 
a policy that placed Washington’s ocers, and other aristocratic liberals, in a 
precarious position.
From 1792 onward, the violent excesses of the French Revolution hit Wash-
ington close to home as his former military comrades became victims of the 
political chaos he had warned against. Lafayette was the rst of those ocers to 
succumb to French radicals due to the prominent role he had played in protect-
ing the king as head of the Parisian National Guard.70 Although he attempted to 
escape from the Austrian front in 1792 and even make his way to America, La-
fayette was instead captured and imprisoned in Prussia that same year.71 His fate 
weighed heavily on Washington, who wrote to Lafayette’s wife and to his own 
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secretary of state to oer assistance.72 e president, with his cabinet’s approval, 
even took the unusual (and unsuccessful) step of contacting King Frederick Wil-
liam of Prussia in the hopes of gaining Lafayette’s release.73 Five years would pass 
before Washington would hear again from his beloved “adopted son,” who was 
released from the Olmutz prison in 1797.74
Over the next few years, Washington watched as his other military friends 
succumbed to this once-promising revolution. La Rouerie, who had participated 
in revolutionary politics in 1788 and who had shared with Washington his grow-
ing disillusionment with its excesses, attempted to escape but died in hiding in 
1793.75 Even in death, La Rouerie’s opponents hounded him. Accused of being a 
royalist, French radicals exhumed his body three weeks aer his death, decapi-
tated it, and displayed his head in the newly formed National Convention.76 Ro-
chambeau and D’Estaing, aristocratic liberals who had protected and supported 
the monarchy, albeit a constitutional one, became ensnared in the Great Terror 
of 1794. D’Estaing, who had guarded the king as head of the Versailles National 
Guard, was arrested in March 1794 and executed by guillotine in April.77 Ro-
chambeau, the last Bourbon marshal of France, proved more fortunate than his 
military colleagues, spending only six months in prison. He retired to his family 
estate upon his release and died in 1807.78
As Washington witnessed these personal examples of France’s political tur-
moil, he received an unsettling letter from the National Convention, a popularly 
elected body charged with writing a republican constitution and determining 
the Louis XVI’s fate, explaining the rationale behind its campaign against the 
king and his supporters. e letter calmly explained: “is revolution was nec-
essary. Royalty was still existing, and in every constitution where it exists there 
is no true liberty. Kings and equality are incompatible with each other.”79 Wash-
ington did not oer a response to this campaign of regicide and political purges, 
particularly in the name of constitution writing and republican government. e 
mandate of the National Convention ushered in even more violence and tur-
moil in 1793, with the execution of Louis XVI in January and the expansion of 
France’s antimonarchical European war to include Great Britain and the Dutch 
Republic in February, then Spain in March.80
France’s declaration of war against Great Britain in 1793, America’s primary 
trading partner, required the United States to formally reconsider its relation-
ship with its revolutionary ally.81 In a second round of letters to his foreign min-
isters in Lisbon and Paris, Washington oered a preview of how the U.S. gov-
ernment intended to respond. Writing to Humphreys on March 23, Washington 
articulated his desire to protect the young nation from European upheavals: “I 
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ardently wish we may not be forced into it by the conduct of other nations” and 
instead be “permitted to improve, without interruption” to utilize “the great 
advantages which nature and circumstances have placed within our reach.”82
Having spent the past few years warily watching continental aairs, with the 
help of his French generals, Washington immediately understood how his ad-
ministration needed to respond. Two months into his second term as president, 
he and his cabinet began to formulate a statement of American neutrality to 
shield the young republic from foreign turmoil, including distancing the nation 
from its erstwhile ally.83
Washington’s diplomatic education occurred on the North Ameri-
can battleelds of two major wars, which he fought with increasing degrees of 
responsibility. ese wartime experiences also yielded transatlantic friendships 
with trusted French generals who kept him abreast of European aairs once he 
became president. While Washington received many letters about the French 
Revolution, the ones from Lafayette, La Rouerie, Rochambeau, and D’Estaing 
occupied a special place because of the strong political and personal bonds these 
men shared with him. His participation in two global conicts, with Great Brit-
ain and France trading places as America’s ally and its enemy from one to the 
other, provided Washington with a unique perspective on the dangers and pit-
falls of becoming involved in this longstanding European rivalry. Inuenced by 
his battleeld experiences and the insights of his French generals, Washington 
pursued a policy of neutrality to protect the young nation from conicts that did 
not concern the United States.
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Ch a pter 4
“Americans in Politics”
Craing a Neutral Proclamation
O n July 7, 1793, Secretary of State Jeerson urged Congressman James Madison “to take up his pen” and respond to Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton’s published essays in support of the Neutrality Proclama-
tion.1 With Hamilton’s opinions appearing in partisan newspapers, Jeerson 
hoped to continue the debates that had begun in Washington’s cabinet.2 A few 
months earlier, the president had solicited detailed opinions on neutrality from 
his cabinet members, fully aware of the strong philosophical and personal dier-
ences that divided them. In both the formulation and the implementation of the 
Neutrality Proclamation, Washington shrewdly encouraged the full expression 
of these diverse views in order to produce a program that had the support of the 
entire cabinet. While Hamilton and Jeerson submitted lengthy treatises in 
the hopes of gaining the partisan advantage, the president had a dierent goal 
in mind.3 During the busy spring of 1793, he labored to reconcile the divergent 
philosophical, ideological, and historical viewpoints within his cabinet to for-
mulate a single, uni	ed response to the nation’s 	rst international challenge. 
e resulting proclamation, issued on April 22, 1793, became the 	rst step in 
Washington’s consensus-based eorts to shield the United States from Euro-
pean warfare.
In late March 1793, word reached the United States that its principal trad-
ing partners, Britain and France, had been at war for two months. Washington 
realized that the country needed to quickly distance itself from this latest Eu-
ropean conict. On April 19, he convened his cabinet to begin work on a state-
ment that announced America’s intention to remain friendly with both France 
and Britain but to avoid taking sides in a war that did not concern the young 
nation.4 Over the next month, Washington’s deeply divided advisors engaged 
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in vigorous and detailed debates on the best way to announce U.S. intentions, 
including whether to issue a proclamation of neutrality. Although Washington 
and the cabinet ironed out their dierences in order to produce a 	nal docu-
ment, Hamilton and Jeerson still continued to spar. During the summer of 
1793, the debate over neutrality moved into the nation’s highly partisan newspa-
pers. Hamilton wrote what became known as the “Paci	cus” essays in support 
of the proclamation, while Jeerson sought to undercut a policy he had once 
supported through Madison’s “Helvidius” series. As the United States sought 
to be neutral, partisanship did not threaten the success of this policy. Instead, 
the greatest challenges to American neutrality came from French privateering, 
British cargo seizures, Americans eager to pro	t from this war, and a national 
government unable to keep pace with these violations.
American neutrality was not a new idea for Washington. anks to the cor-
respondence with his former French generals and other reports from Europe, 
the president was well aware of the volatility of the political situation in Paris. 
He had long held the belief that America should be allowed to grow and prosper 
without outside interferences. As he had explained to Minister to France Morris: 
“And unwise should we be in the extreme to involve ourselves in the contests of 
European Nations, where our weight could be but small—though the loss to 
ourselves would be certain.”5 In April 1793, Washington masterfully guided his 
politically divided cabinet toward a united policy of promoting U.S. interests 
and protecting the nation from European warfare.
Prior to that spring, U.S. foreign policy focused on two major concerns: the 
institutional expansions needed to support the new Constitution and the out-
standing issues from the Revolutionary War and the subsequent peace treaty. 
Under the Constitution, all three branches of government have some stake in 
foreign aairs, with the executive assuming the largest role because of its ability 
to negotiate treaties and appoint ambassadors. Congress as a whole possesses the 
power to declare war, while the Senate has the exclusive responsibility to oer its 
advice and consent on treaties and ministerial appointments. Lastly, the courts 
can weigh in on international disputes. Making clear that foreign policy belongs 
exclusively to the national government, Article I, Section 10 prohibits states from 
entering into treaties and alliances with foreign governments.6 Congress further 
codi	ed the executive branch’s leadership in diplomatic matters when it passed 
the Foreign Aairs Act in 1789. is law established the Department of For-
eign Aairs (later renamed the Department of State) and created a cabinet-level 
secretary to handle diplomatic aairs and appointments.7 During its busy 	rst 
session, Congress also created the Departments of War and the Treasury, while 
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the attorney general was considered a legal advisor to the president and Congress 
(and so did not require a supporting department).8
On the policy front, the federal government continued to confront a laundry 
list of outstanding diplomatic issues from the Revolutionary War, particularly 
in the West, despite a peace treaty that had acknowledged U.S. sovereignty and 
independence. Britain refused to cede its military posts in the Old Northwest, 
and Spain blocked American commerce on the Mississippi River. In addition, 
both nations encouraged hostilities with Native American nations and with 
settlers in the Kentucky and Vermont territories.9 e U.S. Army’s war against 
Native Americans in the Ohio River valley in 1791 resulted in a disastrous defeat 
for Arthur St. Clair and his troops.10 On the Atlantic, the U.S. government still 
hoped for trading agreements, particularly with Britain and Spain, but these 
remained elusive. While the Treaty of Amity and Commerce had established a 
commercial relationship with France, this agreement did not produce a surge in 
demand for American trade goods. Instead, a 	nancially strapped France pre-
ferred that America repay its outstanding wartime loans.11 As a young nation, 
America’s diplomatic ambitions consistently exceeded its power and inuence 
to achieve these goals.
Amid these unresolved issues, reports from Europe in 1793 helped train U.S. 
diplomatic attention on a single matter. On March 27, an American ship trav-
eling from Portugal to Philadelphia carried word that France and Britain had 
been at war for almost two months. While George Washington learned of this 
dramatic development from Philadelphia’s General Advertiser, his two sparring 
cabinet members also shared the news with the president.12 On April 1, Secre-
tary of State Jeerson wrote, “France had declared war against several nations, 
involved in that declaration almost every power of Europe,” and on the 	h 
Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton announced that “war had been declared 
by France against England, Russia, and Holland.”13 Despite the importance of 
the two European powers to the United States, neither nation had bothered 
to communicate this development through diplomatic channels. Nonetheless, 
with its principal allies at war, it seemed to be only a matter of time before this 
conict would wash up on American shores. Regardless of how the news arrived, 
the American government needed to issue a quick and preemptive response if the 
United States hoped to avoid participating in a European war.
e wars of 1793 coincided with the start of Washington’s second term as 
president. He had reluctantly sought reelection in 1792, worn down by the par-
tisan disagreements and in	ghting occurring within his cabinet, in Congress, 
and in the public realm through newspapers and nascent party organizations. 
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ese dierences had originated during the 1790 debate over Hamilton’s “Re-
port on the Credit,” which envisioned a strong economic role for the federal 
government, including paying o the states’ Revolutionary War debts. By 1793, 
these opposing viewpoints had coalesced into Hamilton’s Federalists and Jeer-
son and Madison’s Democratic-Republicans. In addition to oering competing 
understandings of what responsibilities the federal government should have 
and how strictly the Constitution should be interpreted, these coalitions also 
disagreed on the value of France’s revolution and the importance of Britain as 
a principal trading partner.14 Despite the Federalists’ early enthusiasm for the 
French revolution, the transatlantic news of 1792–93 had soured them on its 
violent excesses.15 In the spring of 1793, Washington’s cabinet still consisted of 
its original members, with Hamilton serving as secretary of the Treasury; Knox 
as secretary of war; Jeerson as secretary of state; and Randolph as attorney 
general. Hamilton and Knox, both Revolutionary War veterans, tended to ally 
together, while the Virginia lawyers, Jeerson and Randolph, generally agreed 
on policy matters.16
As Washington contemplated America’s response to the European conict, 
he realized he would 	rst need to calm the ideological and increasingly personal 
disputes that divided Hamilton and Jeerson. Soon aer learning about the 
current Anglo-French hostilities, the president wrote similar letters to each man 
urging the development of a policy of “strict neutrality between the powers at 
war” that would discourage American citizens from entangling themselves (and 
the United States) in these conicts. Washington was particularly concerned 
about reports “that many vessels in dierent parts of the Union are designated 
for privateers and are preparing accordingly.”17 In anticipation of the cabinet’s 
	rst meeting to cra a policy, he urged them “to give the subject mature consid-
eration” so that “measures . . . deemed most likely to eect this desirable purpose 
may be adopted without delay.”18 As Washington steered the nation toward a 
neutral stance, he also needed to tame the partisan divisions within his cabinet 
in order to speak with a single voice on the world stage.
Even before receiving the April 12 letter, Hamilton had started to dra ques-
tions related to neutrality with the help of John Jay.19 In an April 9 letter to Jay, 
he referred to a conversation the two men had had in which they had agreed 
“that the Minister expected from France should be received.” Given the turmoil 
surrounding Louis XVI’s execution, though, Hamilton asked Jay “whether he 
[the minister] should be received absolutely or with qualications?” He further 
posited whether France’s political changes drew into question the “applicability 
of the [1778] treaties.”20 In a second letter, also written on the ninth, Hamilton 
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solicited his opinion on the propriety of “a proclamation prohibiting our citizens 
from taking commissions on either side” and whether such a statement “should 
include a declaration of neutrality.” Lastly, Hamilton asked Jay “if he could dra 
such a thing.”21 To Jeerson’s great irritation, these questions formed the basis of 
the upcoming cabinet discussion on the war in Europe.
On April 18 Washington began the long process of forging a compromise 
on neutrality when he distributed a thirteen-point query to solicit his cabinet’s 
opinions.22 Although these questions borrowed heavily from Hamilton and 
Jay’s discussions, the president penned the nal document himself in an eort 
Figure 4. George Washington as he appeared during his second term 
when the neutrality policy was formulated and implemented. (Mount 
Vernon Ladies’ Association; painted by Charles Willson Peale, 1795)
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to camouage its content’s origins. But Jeerson remained suspicious, conclud-
ing “that the language was Hamilton’s.”23 At other times in his administration, 
Washington had utilized questionnaires to reach a consensus on contested 
issues.24 e war between Britain and France posed signi	cant challenges to 
America’s independence and autonomy, so producing a uni	ed statement that 
protected and promoted U.S. interests possessed an urgency that surpassed ear-
lier controversies.
In the introduction to his query, Washington de	ned the predicament the 
United States faced: “e posture of aairs in Europe, particularly between 
France and Great Britain, places the United States in a delicate situation; and 
requires much consideration of the measures which will be proper for them to 
observe in the war between those powers.”25 e 	rst question addressed the 
fundamental issue: Should the United States issue a proclamation to discourage 
American citizens from interfering with this war, and should the United States 
proclaim its neutrality as well? Questions two, three, and twelve asked whether 
the United States should maintain diplomatic relations with France, including 
sending and receiving ministers, or should America wait until it establishes a 
new government? Questions four through nine tackled the complex issues of 
America’s obligations to France under the 1778 treaties.26 Pursuant to the Treaty 
of Alliance, what military support did the United States owe to France in its 
current war, particularly in its “guarantee” to protect French territories in the 
West Indies? As outlined in the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, would France 
be allowed to bring prizes into U.S. ports, while its British opponent would still 
be banned from out	tting privateers in these harbors?27 e query concluded 
with question thirteen: was it necessary to call together the two houses of Con-
gress to discuss the situation in Europe? Washington then directed his cabinet 
to meet at his house the following morning to discuss their “reections” on these 
questions.28
At the April 19 meeting, then, the cabinet reached agreement on the 	rst 
two issues: a proclamation to forbid citizens from participating in the Euro-
pean war, including carrying contraband, and unanimous support for welcom-
ing the recently arrived minister from the newly constituted French republic 
(although disagreements remained whether any exceptions should apply, per 
question three).29
When Washington and his cabinet met again three days later, they recog-
nized that the priority was announcing America’s neutral stance at home and 
abroad rather than wasting valuable time attempting to reach a consensus on the 
remaining eleven issues. Although Hamilton took the initial role in composing 
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the query and collaborated with Jay on a dra proclamation, the job of writing 
the 	nal statement went to Jeerson’s ally, Attorney General Randolph.30 De-
spite their equal participation in cabinet deliberations and decisions, Randolph 
and Knox have not received the scholarly attention of their two colleagues.31
Amid the partisan posturing in Washington’s cabinet, no one wanted to be-
come involved in a European war, including Jeerson. Where he and Hamil-
ton diered was how strongly to convey this message to the European powers: 
Hamilton preferred an explicit declaration that favored Britain, while Jeerson 
hoped to pursue neutrality without issuing a proclamation that would alienate 
France. Given neutrality’s long history in European diplomacy and Enlighten-
ment philosophy, Jeerson’s insistence that the 	nal proclamation not contain 
the word “neutrality” (using “impartial” instead) was a calculated move on his 
part to soen its eect on Franco-American relations.32 He believed that Amer-
ica’s noninvolvement in this war, as well as the availability of its free trade, would 
give the United States leverage with warring countries, particularly France.33
e exclusion of the word “neutrality” also had diplomatic rami	cations. It sug-
gested a “strict” neutrality that favored Britain while also suggesting a higher 
implementation threshold than “impartial” did.34 In the end, a carefully craed 
statement emerged that accommodated the cabinet’s diering viewpoints, with 
Washington achieving his ultimate goal: a unanimous declaration of America’s 
noninvolvement in European hostilities.
e proclamation issued on April 22, 1793, epitomized compromise—no 
one in the cabinet was completely happy with the 	nished product, but it con-
tained enough provisions to satisfy the competing viewpoints.35 e document 
acknowledged the “David and Goliath” struggle that existed between France, 
on the one hand, and Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United 
Netherlands, on the other, then declared that the United States intended “with 
sincerity and good faith” to “adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial 
toward the belligerent powers.”36 is statement formalized a frequent theme 
in Washington’s recent correspondence: his desire to shield the young nation 
from a European war.37 Having established the broad outlines of U.S. nonin-
volvement, the remainder of the proclamation “exhorted and warned” Ameri-
can citizens not to involve themselves in foreign matters and cautioned that, if 
they insisted on doing so, they would “not receive the protection of the United 
States, against such punishment or forfeiture” triggered by their participation. 
(Enforcing this provision would produce an enormous set of governing chal-
lenges for the Washington administration.) With this statement disseminated 
to the nation’s governors and to diplomats in the United States and Europe, as 
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well as appearing in the nation’s newspapers, Washington’s cabinet members 
returned to the unresolved issues from the query, particularly those dealing with 
America’s treaty obligations to France.38
In the weeks that followed, Hamilton, Jeerson, and Randolph tackled these 
outstanding questions with great gusto.39 With both men generally in agree-
ment, Knox happily deferred to Hamilton to present their joint opinions. On 
the opposing side were Jeerson and Randolph, who craed individual replies 
to the remaining issues.40 eir lengthy responses oered these men a chance to 
demonstrate their superior command of European history, earlier treaties, and 
Enlightenment writings on international law such as Hugo Grotius’s De Jure
Belli ac Pacis (“e Law of War and Peace”) and Mare Liberum and Vattel’s Law 
of Nations. e Enlightenment ideas Hamilton, Jeerson, and Randolph had 
studied in college proved particularly valuable because they oered a vision of 
free trade as a positive good rather than merely a tool of warfare.41 More impor-
tantly, each cabinet member saw a golden opportunity to set the future direction 
of American foreign policy toward Europe. Although Jeerson submitted his 
written responses 	rst, Hamilton had already presented his detailed opinions 
on these questions at the inconclusive April 19 cabinet meeting. As Jeerson and 
Randolph draed their answers, their responses addressed the eleven outstand-
ing issues as well as Hamilton’s views on them.42
With France now a republic rather than a monarchy and at war with much 
of Europe, Hamilton saw an opportunity to shi America’s European alliances 
away from France and toward Britain.43 As the author of the thirteen-point 
query, he knew exactly where to launch his assault: question three, using the 
arrival of the new French minister as the occasion to suspend or even renounce 
America’s treaty obligations to that nation. In his lengthy rationale, cosigned 
by Knox, Hamilton systematically argued that the political turmoil and regime 
change in France justi	ed America’s withdrawal from earlier agreements, most 
notably the Treaties of Alliance and of Amity and Commerce. Since these had 
been made with the monarch, not with a republican government, he believed 
that France’s shiing political institutions might force the United States into 
situations that were now undesirable and even dangerous. Invoking Vattel’s 
argument of national self-protection, Hamilton concluded: “If then a Nation 
thinks 	t to make changes in its Government, which render treaties that before 
subsisted between it and another nation useless or dangerous or hurtful to that 
other nation, it is a plain dictate of reason, that the latter will have a right to 
renounce those treaties; because it also has a right to take care of its own happi-
ness.”44 Since he had used question three to vitiate America’s treaty obligations 
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to France, the other outstanding issues dealing with the 1778 alliance were ren-
dered moot. Hamilton nonetheless oered a response to these questions, but his 
reply was shorter and did not warrant the cosignature of Knox.45
Not surprisingly, Jeerson and Randolph’s responses oered Washington 
a very dierent understanding of America’s diplomatic relationship to France, 
particularly its responsibilities under the 1778 treaties.46 For starters, Jeerson 
dismissed the heart of Hamilton’s argument that America’s treaties with France 
were no longer valid simply because a republic had replaced a monarchy. Instead, 
Jeerson (and Randolph in his separate response) contended that these agree-
ments had been with “the people who constitute a society or nation as the source 
of all authority in that nation” and that “the treaties between the United States 
and France were not treaties between the United States and Louis Capet, but 
between the two nations of America and France.”47
Jeerson also took issue with Hamilton’s interpretation of Vattel’s Law of Na-
tions as providing an “escape” clause from undesirable treaties. He argued that 
the treaty had to be more than “dangerous, useless or disagreeable,” that instead 
Vattel believed that the “danger which absolves us must be great, inevitable and 
imminent.”48 With Jeerson (and Randolph) contending that the 1778 treaties 
were still in eect, they addressed U.S. commercial and military obligations 
under these agreements now that France was engaged in a new war. Neither 
man saw an immediate threat to either the United States or to American neu-
trality from the “guarantee” clause of the Treaty of Alliance, requiring America’s 
military to defend French territories in the West Indies. Nor did they believe 
the Treaty of Amity and Commerce oered France special trading privileges 
in U.S. ports that had not been already guaranteed in other European agree-
ments.49 Both Jeerson and Randolph concluded that breaking these treaties 
posed greater dangers than maintaining them because France would interpret 
such action as an act of war, drawing America into the very conict it was trying 
to avoid.50
One issue that did not generate lengthy dissertations from these men was 
question thirteen: whether it was necessary to call Congress into session to ap-
prise them of the European situation. While Jeerson had originally favored 
involving the legislative branch, he now joined the other cabinet members in 
concluding that such a step was unnecessary.51 Congress’s lack of participation 
in the proclamation’s formulation also explained Vice President John Adams’s 
absence in the cabinet’s discussions. Despite Adams’s earlier role in draing the 
template for neutrality, the Model Treaty of 1776, the vice presidency found 
its initial constitutional home in Congress (as president of the Senate) rather 
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than in the executive branch.52 e decision of Washington and his cabinet to 
issue the proclamation without congressional consent resulted in the executive 
branch’s further assertion of its dominance over foreign aairs. Eschewing Con-
gress also provided a win for the politically savvy Washington, who, like other 
Federalists, believed in emboldening the presidency.53
e 	rst round of the cabinet’s consensus on neutrality came to a conclu-
sion on May 6, with the submission of Randolph’s comments. Although he had 
allowed these men to oer lengthy exegesis on the treaties speci	cally and on 
international law generally, Washington had told Jeerson that “he had never 
had a doubt about the validity of the treaty, but that since a question had been 
suggested he thought it ought to be considered.”54 e president had recognized 
that a foreign-policy statement needed the support of his entire cabinet to be 
successful. During the formulation and subsequent implementation of U.S. 
neutrality, Washington shrewdly encouraged each cabinet member to oer his 
detailed opinions on each aspect of this policy to permit a sharing and then a 
resolution of the political disagreements that divided them. While they might 
not win every debate, the men could walk away from the discussion knowing 
their views had been heard and even incorporated. Even Jeerson conceded 
that the president’s involvement in the discussions had prevented the 	nal doc-
ument from being “a mere English neutrality.”55 In honoring the treaties with 
France, at least for the time being, Washington chose the option least disruptive 
to the diplomatic status quo and more compatible with neutrality. Amid the 
intellectual 	reworks that produced this consensus, Hamilton, Jeerson, and 
even Randolph each shared the naive belief that their words and ideas could 
inuence European aairs, a premise that would be sorely tested as the United 
States worked to enforce the proclamation.
Despite the compromises that had produced the April proclamation, Ham-
ilton and Jeerson remained committed to their philosophical positions and 
thus, during the summer of 1793, sought to curry political support in the nation’s 
highly partisan newspapers. Liberated from the consensus building of Washing-
ton’s cabinet, Hamilton wrote under the peaceful pseudonym “Paci	cus,” while 
Jeerson employed a surrogate to express his opposition.56 Hamilton structured 
his seven-essay defense of the president’s Neutrality Proclamation around the 
criticisms lodged by an earlier essayist, “Veritas.”57
e Veritas essays originated as three letters to President Washington, sub-
sequently published in Philip Freneau’s pro-Democratic-Republican National
Gazette, based in Philadelphia.58 All three epistolary essays focused on the un-
constitutionality of the proclamation. e May 30 letter, published on June 1, 
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accused the president of being surrounded by “double dealing,” “monarchical 
mystery,” and “court intrigue” in unilaterally issuing this proclamation without 
concern for the will of the people. Additionally, it attacked Washington’s disre-
gard for America’s “duty” and “interest” to France under the 1778 treaties.59 e 
June 3 letter, published on the 	h, challenged the constitutionality of the proc-
lamation, arguing that it had “caused uneasiness” and reminding Washington 
that “popular opinion is the basis of our government.”60 e third and 	nal essay, 
written on June 6 and published on the eighth, challenged the “legality of the 
proclamation,” particularly the president’s authority “to annul solemn treaties by 
proclamation.” Veritas also took issue with what he saw as the administration’s 
“shamefully pusillanimous” approach to Britain despite their numerous viola-
tions of American sovereignty. He also questioned the timing of the proclama-
tion. Lastly, Veritas called on Washington to convene the “representatives of the 
people, who can alone express the national will,” in order to produce a policy 
that “all branches of the government” support.61 With the president under attack 
for the proclamation, and that criticism being ampli	ed in a Democratic-Re-
publican newspaper, Hamilton launched a counteroensive on June 27 in John 
Fenno’s pro-Federalist Gazette of the United States, also based in Philadelphia.62
Hamilton began the Paci	cus series with a refutation of Veritas’s criticism 
that the executive branch lacked the authority to issue the proclamation. He 
cited the president’s explicit role as commander in chief of the army and navy 
as well as the executive’s responsibilities for making treaties and appointing and 
receiving ministers. While the legislature participated in foreign aairs through 
advice and consent on treaties and ministers as well as its authority to declare 
war, these responsibilities were speci	c and not constant. Instead, it was the ex-
ecutive who served “as the organ of intercourse between the Nation and foreign 
Nations,” as well as the preserver of the peace and the interpreter of treaties, until 
war is declared.63
Hamilton’s response to Veritas’s criticism regarding U.S. treaty obligations to 
France composed the bulk of the Paci	cus essays, just as these issues had preoc-
cupied the cabinet’s discussions. In “Paci	cus no. 2,” Hamilton emphasized the 
defensive nature of America’s 1778 alliance, explaining that “assistance” would 
be given to France “upon attack.” With that country acting as the aggressor in 
the current war, America had no “oensive” obligations.64
In “Paci	cus no. 3” Hamilton explored America’s responsibilities under the 
“guarantee” clause of the Treaty of Alliance.65 Once again, he emphasized the de-
fensive nature of this provision: “it relates merely to defence [sic] and preservation 
of her American colonies.” Secondly, Hamilton noted that the “disproportion” 
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between the actions demanded by the guarantee clause and the lack of American 
naval resources to perform these tasks excused the United States from any defen-
sive obligations to France in its current war. He then cited Vattel to support this 
point, quoting from Law of Nations, “’If a state which has promised succors 	nds 
itself unable to furnish them, its very inability is its exemption.’”66 Hamilton 
concluded this essay with the contention that the revolutionary and oensive 
nature of France’s current war, including the toppling of its monarchy, extended 
far beyond “the ordinary case of foreign war” envisioned in the 1778 treaties and 
further excused America from involvement.67
Hamilton used Paci	cus essays four, 	ve, and six to refute Veritas’s notion that 
America owed France “gratitude” for its revolutionary assistance. In “Paci	cus 
no. 4,” he emphasized that the Neutrality Proclamation’s promise of “friendly 
and impartial conduct to all nations” continued current treaty obligations to 
France without requiring the United States to become involved in its war.68 In 
his conclusion to this essay, Hamilton explored the one-sided nature of “grati-
tude.” In his view, this referred to “a bene	t received or intended, which there 
was no right to claim.” But if the person oering assistance receives immediate 
bene	ts, “there seems scarcely in such a case to be an adequate basis for a senti-
ment like that of gratitude.” He argued that France gained immediate and tan-
gible advantages in its alliance with the United States so the concept of gratitude 
did not apply.69 In “Paci	cus no. 5,” Hamilton summarized France’s motivation 
for entering into the American alliance: “embracing a promising opportunity 
to repress the pride and diminish the dangerous power of its [British] rival . . . 
by lopping o a valuable portion of its dominions.” He also noted that France 
was not America’s only revolutionary ally and that the “cause had also numerous 
friends in other countries.”70 In the penultimate Paci	cus essay, Hamilton con-
cluded that France’s war “with all of Europe” did not concern the United States 
and that Americans ultimately “will support the government they established 
and will take care of their own peace,” despite eorts to detach them from each.71
In his conclusion to the Paci	cus series, Hamilton strongly defended U.S. 
interests and ideas as he responded to Veritas’s concerns about the timing and 
necessity of the Neutrality Proclamation.72 He explained that the proclamation 
became necessary when France declared war against the “commercial maritime 
nations” of Britain, Spain, and the Netherlands. France’s war against nonmar-
itime adversaries like Prussia and Austria did not concern the United States 
because these nations did not participate in transatlantic trade. A war involving 
America’s principal trading partners, however, required an immediate statement 
of neutrality to silence international expectations of military support, to protect 
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American shipping and agriculture, and to discourage U.S. citizens from enlist-
ing or taking sides in the conict.73 In its protection of U.S. interests, Hamilton 
emphasized the Neutrality Proclamation’s adherence to republican and consti-
tutional principles. He reiterated the president’s constitutional authority over 
foreign aairs but added that the executive spoke “in the name and on behalf 
of the United States,” unlike European kings and princes who “speak of their 
own dispositions.”74 While America pledged to be “friendly and impartial” to all 
nations, the young republic also intended to put its interests 	rst.75
Even before the appearance of the Paci	cus essays, Jeerson had begun to 
distance himself from the proclamation and the consensus that had produced 
it. Relying on Madison as his con	dential sounding board, the secretary shared 
his criticisms of the policy and oered an alternative approach.76 On May 13, 
he complained that the proclamation failed to promote “a manly neutrality” 
that recognized the “liberal rights” of the warring nations. Jeerson’s “bold” 
approach clearly referred to France’s revolutionary principles of “liberté, egal-
ité, and fraternité.”77 A month later he oered Madison another vision of how 
American neutrality should have been addressed: “it would be better to hold 
back the declaration of neutrality, as a thing worth something to the powers at 
war, that they would bid for it, & we might reasonably ask as a price, the broadest 
privileges of neutral nations.”78 Believing he had lost the battle of neutrality in 
the cabinet, the secretary of state sought victory on a dierent front—the arena 
of popular opinion.
Jeerson also bristled at the compromises that had produced what he consid-
ered to be an ideologically weak statement. In particular, he directed his ire at his 
putative Virginia ally in the cabinet for his eagerness to side with the Federalist 
bloc. To Jeerson’s great frustration, Randolph’s more moderate and less parti-
san views made him the cabinet’s swing vote, while the secretary had hoped he 
would be a reliable supporter like Knox was to Hamilton. Writing to Madison, 
he oered a withering critique of Randolph’s approach: “E.R found out a hair 
to split, which, as always happens, became the decision.” Jeerson, who saw such 
equivocation as a weakness rather than a virtue, added, “he always contrives to 
agree in principle with one, but in conclusion with the other.” His concluding 
assessment of Randolph underscored his frustration with the neutrality policy 
and the process that had produced it: “Everything my dear Sir, now hangs on 
the opinion of a single person, and that the most indecisive one I ever had to do 
business with.”79
A summer of Paci	cus essays proved too much for Jeerson, and he now 
looked for a way to move his private criticisms into the public arena.80 Unable to 
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write the responses himself for fear of disloyalty to Washington and public expo-
sure as a partisan, he once more turned to the next best thing: his Virginia neigh-
bor and ally, James Madison, who also served in a dierent branch of govern-
ment. On July 7, the secretary of state implored the congressman “to take up his 
pen” and respond to the secretary of the Treasury’s published essays in support 
of the Neutrality Proclamation. Unleashing his frustrations, he added, “Nobody 
answers him, & his doctrine will therefore be taken for confessed.”81 Over the 
next few weeks, as he lobbied a reluctant Madison to write the response, Jeer-
son also completed his separation from a proclamation he had once endorsed.
As Madison contemplated whether to respond to Paci	cus, he confronted 
both the geographical and political distances that separated him from the de-
bate. e representative spent the summer of 1793 at Montpelier, his home in 
Orange, Virginia, far removed from the political business of Philadelphia. As a 
member of Congress, Madison had not participated in the cabinet’s discussions 
nor been ocially noti	ed about the proclamation. Amid all these challenges, 
he concluded that “the task would be in bad hands” but promised Jeerson, “I 
will feel my own pulse” before any decision on the request.82
As Madison immersed himself in the issues surrounding the proclamation, 
his principal objection focused on its constitutionality. In a letter to Jeerson, 
he questioned if the executive branch had the authority to oer a “declaration of 
the Disposition of the U.S. on the subject of war and peace.” While he believed 
the president could oer “an injunction of a suitable conduct on the citizens” 
during wartime, the question of war or peace seemed “to be essentially and exclu-
sively involved in the right vested in the legislature.” Madison then added more 
pointedly, “Did no such view of the subject present itself in the cabinet?”83 Of 
course it had, with Jeerson agreeing with the majority that the executive had 
the authority to issue the proclamation and that Congress did not need to be 
consulted. Nonetheless, in late June Jeerson distanced himself from the proc-
lamation (and Hamilton’s defense of it) when he embraced Madison’s views on 
Congress’s constitutional role. Jeerson wrote, “Upon the whole, my objections 
to the competence of the Executive to declare neutrality . .  . were supposed to 
be got over by avoiding the use of that term,” a position he had successfully pro-
moted. He then continued his delicate balancing act by adding, “the declaration 
of the disposition of the U.S can hardly be called illegal, though it was certainly 
ocious and improper.”84
On July 22 Madison moved closer to draing a response to Paci	cus when 
he posed speci	c questions to Jeerson about the cabinet’s deliberations. He 
asked, 	rst, “how far concessions have been made on particular points behind 
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the curtain”; second, how committed was the president to “some doctrines”; 
third, what insights “from the law of nations” informed the “construction of 
the treaties”; and fourth, “whether any call was made by Great Britain or any 
other belligerent power . . . prior to the proclamation.” In concluding this letter, 
Madison explained the importance of this information: “If an answer to the 
publication be undertaken, it ought to be both a solid and prudent one,” partic-
ularly since its audience will be “none but intelligent readers.”85 As a newcomer 
to the neutrality debates, Madison’s broadly based questions permitted Jeerson 
to rede	ne the role he had played in the cabinet’s April discussions.
As Jeerson answered Madison’s questions, he continued to divorce himself 
from the administration’s policy. In terms of the concessions “made on particular 
points behind the curtain,” he told Madison, “I think it is better you should not 
know them.” In other words, he did not intend to share the compromises, includ-
ing his own, that had resulted in the proclamation. On Washington’s commit-
ment to certain doctrines, Jeerson wrote, the president “is certainly uneasy at 
those grasped at by Pacicus,” although he did not specify which ones. His vague 
response simultaneously undercut the integrity of Hamilton’s Paci	cus essays 
while also raising questions about Washington’s command of the complex issues 
involved. Jeerson’s answers to the 	nal two questions adhered more closely to 
the facts: Vattel’s writings had served as the cabinet’s principal guide on interna-
tional law, and “no call was made by any power previous to the proclamation.”86
At the end of July, Jeerson 	nally received good news from Montpelier. 
Madison wrote, “I have forced myself into a task of a reply,” adding that it was 
“the most grating one I ever experienced” in large part due to a “want of counsel 
on some points of delicacy, as well as of information as to sundry matters of 
fact.”87 As Madison began work on his essays, an elated Jeerson played an active 
role behind the scenes advising him on their content, reviewing the dras, and 
even submitting them to Philadelphia’s Gazette of the United States, in which 
Paci	cus had also appeared, for publication.88
With Madison willing to oer a public response to Paci	cus, Jeerson could 
turn his full attention to completing his transition from pragmatic cabinet mem-
ber to partisan leader. He and Hamilton had been at loggerheads over the Con-
stitution’s interpretation since 1790, when his rival had published his “Report 
on the Public Credit.” Jeerson now used his opposition to the neutrality policy 
as an excuse to leave Washington’s philosophically diverse cabinet. Soon aer 
learning of Madison’s willingness to counter Paci	cus, an emboldened Jeerson 
submitted his resignation letter to the president on July 31, eective September 
30, “to retire to scenes of greater tranquility.”89
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Anticipating his liberation from Washington’s cabinet, Jeerson used his re-
sponse to Madison’s July 30 letter to complete his separation from the proclama-
tion. First, he described his early opposition to the executive branch issuing any 
neutrality proclamation, recounting a conversation with Washington: “I had, at 
the time, opposed its being made a declaration of neutrality on the ground that 
the Executive was not the competent authority for that.” Later in the letter, Jef-
ferson described a hastily draed document that he believed placed Washington 
in an awkward position: “e instrument was badly drawn, and made the pres-
ident go out of his line to declare things which, though true, it was not exactly 
his province to declare.” In a 	nal blow to the compromises that had produced 
the proclamation, Jeerson discounted his role in the document’s creation: “e 
instrument was communicated to me aer it was drawn, but I was busy, and only 
run [sic] an eye over it to see that it was not made a declaration of neutrality.”90
Conveniently absent in his recounting was the April 18 query, the April 19 cabi-
net meeting, and his own lengthy submission from April 28 on the outstanding 
issues surrounding the neutrality policy.
Meanwhile, Madison found that responding to Paci	cus’s comprehensive 
defense of America’s right to remain neutral in this European war le him with 
little room to maneuver. Jeerson, with his 	nger 	rmly on the political pulse, 
advised him to avoid “caviling about small points of propriety.”91 A summer of 
neutrality violations in U.S. ports had armed the wisdom of this proclama-
tion. Instead of confronting all four of the major issues Hamilton had addressed, 
Madison trained his focus on a single issue: questioning the constitutionality of 
the proclamation. In his 	ve “Helvidius” essays, Madison revisited the concern 
he had originally shared with Jeerson: that Congress possessed authority over 
issues of war and peace, not the president.92 In “Helvidius no. 2,” he succinctly 
presented the argument that informed all 	ve essays: “e power to judge of the 
causes of war, as involved in the power to declare war, is expressly vested where 
all other legislative powers are vested, that is, in the Congress of the United 
States.”93 In emphasizing the constitutional responsibilities of Congress, Madi-
son’s views appeared patriotic and consistent with the Democratic-Republicans’ 
support of the legislative branch over the executive, even if this issue had not 
been controversial during the cabinet’s debates.94
Unfortunately for Jeerson, the Helvidius essays did not inict the fatal 
blow to the neutrality policy that he had sought. One reason is that the opin-
ions Paci	cus expressed hewed closer to Washington’s (and Jeerson and Ran-
dolph’s) more measured approach to international aairs than the pro-British 
recommendations Hamilton had previously advocated. Despite the writer’s 
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pro-Federalist vision of government, Paci	cus also promoted America’s vision in 
international aairs rather than the foreign-policy preferences of two bickering 
political coalitions. Lastly, and most importantly, a series of neutrality viola-
tions committed by the French, the British, and even U.S. citizens like Gideon 
Hen	eld and John Singleterry during the spring and summer of 1793 armed 
the wisdom of the administration’s policy.95 e urgent need to prosecute these 
threats to U.S. sovereignty and autonomy quickly superseded this partisan and 
ideological debate. Ironically, the word “neutrality,” which Jeerson had stren-
uously tried to downplay, became popularized during the Paci	cus-Helvidius 
debates, even appearing in Jeerson’s own correspondence.96 Additionally, with 
the numerous summertime violations occurring in the nation’s ports and re-
ported in American newspapers, neutrality became the operative term to de-
scribe this policy.
Despite his frustration with neutrality’s partisan overtones, Jeerson none-
theless recognized the importance of the United States avoiding European war-
fare. Several days aer the proclamation’s issuance, he had written to Madison: 
“I fear that a fair neutrality will prove a disagreeable pill to our friends, though 
necessary to keep us out of the calamities of a war.”97 Madison reached the same 
conclusion in May, writing to Jeerson: “Peace is no doubt to be preserved at 
any price that honor and good faith will permit.”98 Keeping America at peace 
trumped partisan preferences, even for them. Under Washington’s leadership, 
the formulation of the Neutrality Proclamation established two enduring prec-
edents for American diplomacy: 	rst, that the executive branch led the way in 
setting U.S. international priorities, and second, that Americans spoke in a sin-
gle voice in foreign aairs.
While the Helvidius essays did little to weaken the Neutrality Proclamation, 
their existence has exaggerated the role that partisanship and the disagreements 
between Jeerson and Hamilton played in its formulation. Further obscured in 
this binary con	guration was Washington, who advocated for a neutral stance 
toward the European war and insisted on consensus support for this policy. Al-
though both Madison and Jeerson carefully avoided alienating or disagreeing 
with Washington in public, they nonetheless engaged in a “whispering cam-
paign” that questioned the president’s ability to counter Hamilton’s poor ad-
vice and to recognize the Treasury secretary’s political machinations. Jeerson, 
in justifying a rebuttal to Paci	cus, repeatedly portrayed a president who had 
agreed to a policy that he did not fully understand. Madison advanced this 
impression as well, writing, “I regret extremely the position into which the P. 
[president] has been thrown,” adding, “it is mortifying to the real friends of the 
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P. that his fame and inuence should have been unnecessarily made to depend 
in any degree on political events in a foreign quarter of the Globe.”99 ese ru-
mors, although untrue, undercut the president’s role in craing a consensus on 
neutrality and fueled the partisan aura surrounding the proclamation.
Washington’s refusal to let Jeerson resign in September 1793 oers a com-
peting portrait of a president fully aware of the policy debates and the partisan 
intrigues surrounding him. In considering the request, Washington approached 
the subject with great care and respect. First, he honored Jeerson with a visit to 
his home, and during their conversation, he laid out a variety of reasons why his 
resignation should be delayed. Washington appealed to Jeerson’s sense of duty, 
expressing “his repentance at not having resigned himself.” He also attered Jef-
ferson and his diplomatic experience in Europe when he explained the diculty 
in 	nding a replacement: “mere talents did not suce for the department of 
state, but it required a person conversant in foreign aairs, perhaps acquainted 
with foreign courts.”100
Washington, recognizing the need to maintain a geographical and ideological 
balance in his cabinet, shrewdly mentioned that “Mr. Madison would be his 	rst 
choice” as Jeerson’s replacement, although he acknowledged the congressman 
would probably not take the job.101 If he could not retain Jeerson, Madison’s 
appointment oered the president the next best hope for taming political ten-
sions within his administration. Lastly, Washington told Jeerson that his chief 
antagonist, Hamilton, had also expressed a desire to leave the administration, 
a departure that might make staying in the cabinet more palatable. In the end, 
Washington struck a compromise that satis	ed both of their needs: Jeerson 
agreed to remain in the administration until December to “get us through the 
diculties of this year,” because “he was satis	ed that the aairs of Europe would 
be settled” and “Congress will have manifested its character and its views.”102 By 
extending Jeerson’s tenure until the end of 1793, Washington hoped to limit his 
ability to undercut the neutrality policy as a partisan leader, at least for a little 
while longer.103
In 1797 Washington complained to William Heath that, “instead of being 
Frenchmen or Englishmen in politics, they would be Americans—indignant at 
every attempt of either of these—or any other Power to establish an inuence in 
our Councils, or that should presume to sow the Seeds of distrust, or disunion 
among ourselves.”104 Even in retirement, he would remain committed to a for-
eign policy that put U.S. interests 	rst and avoid the dangerous entanglements 
of European aairs.
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During his second term as president, Washington sought a policy that not 
only shielded the young nation from the perils of European warfare but also pos-
sessed the support of the divergent philosophical and partisan voices that com-
posed his cabinet. He wisely let these four men submit lengthy abstract treatises 
and then consolidated their ideas into a statement that epitomized compromise. 
While partisan opinions found expression in the Paci	cus and Helvidius essays, 
these debates did not fundamentally change the substance or the eect of the 
neutrality policy. Instead, Washington’s proclamation established the primacy 
of the executive branch in foreign aairs and armed the importance of the 
nation speaking in a single voice internationally. e building of the neutrality 
policy occurred brick by brick, with each cabinet member contributing materi-
als to its construction, but it was its chief architect, George Washington, who 
deserves credit for the enduring edi	ce. His steadfast commitment to consensus 
would face even greater obstacles as he and his cabinet, including Jeerson, built 
a government capable of enforcing its far-reaching provisions. ese enforcement 
concerns were not hypothetical. In early April 1793, the newly arrived French 
minister brazenly encouraged Americans to enlist as privateers for his nation’s 
cause—and in direct violation of American neutrality.
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“To Keep is Country in Peace”
French Violations and Executive Actions
W ith the ink still drying on the Neutrality Proclamation, mar-itime citizens began to alert the national government that French privateering was occurring in America’s ports and along its coast.1
While cabinet members had put their full eorts into draing a consensus state-
ment based on Enlightenment ideas, they had paid little attention to enforcing 
it. During the hectic spring and summer of 1793, the Washington administration 
confronted a barrage of domestic and international challenges to the neutrality 
policy. Beyond a general desire to avoid European hostilities, the national gov-
ernment had no mechanisms in place to block French privateering, to prohibit 
U.S. citizens from serving on these vessels, or to respond to British complaints 
about ship seizures and losses. With the violations outpacing the government’s 
ability to respond, Washington once again employed his strong political skills 
to corral his advisors’ divergent views into comprehensive enforcement plans. 
Seeking consensus on the best ways to implement the proclamation, as he had 
done during its formulation, the president and his cabinet deliberated on and 
agreed to a series of groundbreaking policies that de	ned the responsibilities of 
nascent federal agencies. rough their painstaking craing of an enforcement 
strategy, Washington and his administration built a neutral federal government, 
beginning with the executive branch.
The first steps toward implementing the Neutrality Proclamation proved 
largely institutional, relatively small, and surprisingly contentious. e cabinet 
ocer with the greatest role in enforcing neutrality was the secretary of state. 
As constituted by Congress, this position bore responsibility not only for U.S. 
diplomacy but also supervised “state” matters, including communication with 
governors. Washington institutionalized the protocol of diplomatic channels 
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when he instructed Secretary of State Jeerson to disseminate the proclamation 
to American and European diplomats and to state governors.2
e letters to the various ambassadors captured both the boldness of Amer-
ica’s neutral stance and the young nation’s insigni	cance in European aairs. 
Writing to the French, English, and Dutch ministers stationed in the United 
States, Jeerson began, “As far as the public gazettes are to be credited, we may 
presume that war has taken place among several of the Nations of Europe.” He 
then announced America’s preemptive policy of neutrality: “Disposed as the 
U.S. are to pursue steadily the ways of peace, and remain in friendship with 
all the nations, the president has thought it expedient, by proclamation . . . , to 
notify this disposition to our citizens . . . , the line of conduct for which they are 
to prepare.” Acknowledging the lack of communication from Europe’s warring 
nations, Jeerson added that this statement was issued “without waiting for a 
formal noti	cation from the belligerent powers.”3 British minister George Ham-
mond’s cheeky response con	rmed Europe’s low opinion of America’s interna-
tional standing while also previewing the men’s rocky relationship. Hammond 
	rst armed America’s “friendly and impartial conduct towards the belligerent 
powers.” He then noted, “but as you seem to be of the opinion, that, in order to 
give this measure immediate and complete operation, it is necessary for this gov-
ernment to obtain some more formal knowledge of the existence of hostilities 
than such as is to be collected from the public Gazettes,” on February 1, 1793, 
France had indeed declared war against Britain and the Netherlands.4
Jeerson also wrote to the 	ve U.S. ministers posted in Europe, distinguishing 
between those stationed in countries that were at war (France, Britain, and the 
Netherlands) and those that were not (Portugal and Spain).5 To the diplomats 
based in warring countries, he instructed that they alert their host countries of 
America’s desire “to preserve peace and friendship with all the belligerent pow-
ers.”6 For those in countries not at war, Jeerson regarded his message as both 
informational and preemptive: “Should the nation where you are, remain neu-
tral, these papers will serve merely for your information: should they take part in 
the War, you will be pleased to make to them the same communication, which 
our ministers at Paris, London, and the Hague, are instructed to make.”7 e 
secretary of state’s letters to Europe announced America’s intention to pursue 
peace and friendship with all nations, rather than waiting for formal noti	cation 
from the warring countries or risking involvement by default. ese dispatches 
also underscored the U.S. government’s minor role in international aairs.
e domestic unveiling of this policy also exposed the gap between the 
statement’s boldness and the relative weakness of the American government 
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in enforcing it. Jeerson shared the proclamation with the governors of the 	f-
teen states (now including Vermont and Kentucky), declaring to each that the 
policy “will have the bene	t of Your Excellency’s aid towards their general and 
strict observance by the citizens of the State over which you preside.”8 Secretary 
of the Treasury Hamilton sent copies of the proclamation to the collectors 
of the customs stationed in the coastal cities, advising that “the building of 
vessels calculated and 	tted for war is a circumstance which will merit par-
ticular attention.”9 While Washington’s cabinet correctly identi	ed the states 
and ports as the frontline for possible neutrality violations, these letters did 
not specify how governors and customs collectors were supposed to handle 
any transgressions.
In 1789 Congress had nationalized the U.S. Customs Service through the 
Tari Act and the Duties on Tonnage Act and had also authorized 	y-nine 
customs districts across eleven states.10 e Customs Service had the twin dis-
tinctions of employing the bulk of the national government’s personnel and col-
lecting the lion’s share of its revenues. By 1792, the customs service had expanded 
into fourteen states and employed 146 ocers and 332 subordinates. e top 
position of collector of the customs proved to be a desirable one because of its 
high pay; its inuential role in a community, particularly in a busy port city such 
as Boston; and its ability to hire sta.11 e Customs Service also distinguished 
itself in revenue collection. Of the $5.1 million the U.S. government brought in 
during its founding decade, $5 million (88 percent) came from customs alone.12
While this agency had a clear role in revenue collection, its enforcement respon-
sibilities remained murky.
Disagreements on the best ways to employ the customs collectors and the 
U.S. attorneys produced the 	rst of many cabinet debates on the domestic 
enforcement of neutrality. e controversy began on May 4, when Hamilton 
recommended to Washington that the Treasury Department’s collectors of the 
customs report all neutrality violations, “including the building of ships with 
gun ports,” to the secretary of the Treasury.13 Given the Customs Service’s size 
and inuence, not to mention Hamilton’s authority over it, Jeerson’s vehe-
ment opposition to this proposal was not surprising. First, Jeerson feared that 
“the collectors of the customs are to be made an established corps of spies or 
informers against their fellow citizens.” Second, he saw Hamilton’s proposal as 
an unconstitutional power grab by the Treasury Department since this agency 
bore no responsibility for issues of war and peace. In addition, giving Treasury 
oversight of neutrality violations would further increase the power of the gov-
ernment’s largest department, “already amply provided with business, patronage, 
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and inuence.”14 Lastly, Jeerson believed that grand jurors and judges, rather 
than Treasury ocials, should handle neutrality violations because legal matters 
fell under their purview.15
Jeerson was not alone in objecting to Hamilton’s proposed circular. Wash-
ington expressed concern that the provision identifying “the building of ships 
with gun ports” as a neutrality violation might be misunderstood. He wrote 
to Hamilton, “I am not disposed to adopt any measures which may check 
Ship-building in this Country” and cautioned against “too promptly” adopting 
measures that are “not indispensably necessary.”16
is disagreement over enforcement protocol and responsibilities ended the 
same way disputes over the policy’s formulation had: with Attorney General 
Randolph craing a compromise. Randolph proposed that the customs collec-
tors report neutrality violations to the U.S. attorneys, who would then relay them 
to the attorney general.17 In addition, the revised instructions would not contain 
language about ship construction.18 is compromise took authority away from 
the Treasury secretary as well as the secretary of state, who also bore responsi-
bility for supervising the nation’s district attorneys and federal marshals.19 Al-
though the cabinet reached this agreement on May 10, Hamilton pushed back 
on eorts to curtail his department’s authority when he delayed the release of 
this revised circular until August 9, an enforcement lapse of three months.20
Washington and his cabinet found themselves embroiled in a second en-
forcement dispute when they debated the best way to issue sea passports (or sea 
letters). While government ocials and maritime citizens both agreed on the 
important role sea passports played in protecting America’s neutral commerce, 
questions quickly emerged on how to handle these requests. In late April, Ste-
phen Higginson, a prominent Boston merchant, wrote to Hamilton, “I wish 
there were sea Letters or other proper documents issued by the ocer of the 
union, to serve as a uniform mode of evidence as to property.”21 William Ellery, 
the customs collector of Newport, Rhode Island, requested that Hamilton pro-
vide “such sea letters or passports as you may deem will be for the security of our 
navigation and commerce.”22 As the government began to ful	ll these requests, 
questions abounded over what diplomatic format to follow, which federal o-
cial would issue these passports, and whether foreign-built but American-owned 
ships were eligible for these protective documents.
e concept of sea passports had its origins in the Treaties of Amity and Com-
merce that the United States had negotiated with France (1778), the Netherlands 
(1782), and Prussia (1785). If one party to the treaty was at war but the other was 
at peace, the latter could issue sea passports to protect its neutral commerce. 
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Despite their agreement on the overriding principle, each treaty contained a 
slightly dierent format for these passports. Such variations proved to be an 
abstract concern prior to 1793 because the United States had no reason to issue 
these documents to its merchant ships. But with Britain at war with U.S. treaty 
partner France, protecting American commerce became a top priority.23 Seem-
ingly minor issues assumed great importance because these sea letters provided 
the 	rst line of defense in America’s campaign to remain neutral.
During the 	rst week of May, Washington’s cabinet members, along with the 
Treasury Department’s commissioner of the revenue, Tench Coxe, exchanged 
a urry of letters in an attempt to resolve these outstanding issues.24 Jeerson 
wrote a detailed opinion on May 3, in which he made a strong case that “pass-
ports shall be given not merely to the vessels built in the United States, but to 
vessels belonging to them.” He added that American commerce would suer 
irreparable harm if foreign-built ships were subject to seizure, for “homebuilt 
vessels” provided “the transportation of a very small part of this produce to 
market.”25 In the discussions over which passport format to follow, diplomacy 
carried the day. With the United States already issuing sea letters using the 
Dutch template, Washington and his cabinet decided to also include language 
from the French treaty of 1778 to avoid any diplomatic misunderstanding with 
France.26 Lastly, despite his previous misgivings about the Treasury Depart-
ment’s reach, Jeerson agreed with Hamilton that the collectors of the customs 
in each port should issue these passports. e protection of American commer-
cial ships began in earnest on May 13, 1793, with the distribution of 500 blank 
ship passports to the nation’s customs houses, each bearing the signatures of 
the president and the secretary of state.27 One measure of these passports’ eec-
tiveness in promoting neutral American commerce, particularly in the trans-
portation of goods from the French West Indies, was Britain’s decision that 
November to attack U.S. ships because such cargoes were seen as bene	ting 
France’s war eort.28
As Washington and his cabinet methodically and incrementally implemented 
the neutrality policy, a tsunami named Edmond Charles Genet made landfall 
in Charleston, South Carolina, on April 8 and upended their delicate eorts. 
During his ten-month posting as the French Republic’s minister, Citizen Genet, 
as he styled himself, repeatedly challenged U.S. neutrality as he ful	lled the 
mandate of his revolutionary government and supplied his own interpretations 
along the way.29 While his antics armed the wisdom of Washington’s policy, 
his transgressions also exposed numerous enforcement diculties that the ad-
ministration had yet to consider.
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Genet’s tenure proved to be controversial from the outset, thanks to the am-
bitious and unrealistic instructions the idealistic Girondins, who now ruled the 
French republic, gave him. First, Genet was encouraged to form a “national pact” 
with the United States to renew the commercial and political bonds that had 
linked the two nations. In addition, he was supposed to seek advance payment 
of America’s Revolutionary War debts to support France’s wartime economy, 
to foster expeditions into Spanish Louisiana and Florida, and to liberally in-
terpret the privateering provisions of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce by 
oering French commissions to Americans willing to serve as privateers or as 
soldiers on expeditions against Spanish territory. Amid these blatant challenges 
to U.S. sovereignty, Genet was also told to respect the federal government and 
its authority.30
Armed with these ambitious instructions as well as 300 blank commissions, 
Genet further upended diplomatic protocol by arriving in Charleston rather 
than proceeding directly to the nation’s capital of Philadelphia. He blamed a 
Figure 5. Edmund Charles Genet (1763–1834), the troublesome 
minister from France whose antics armed the necessity and 
wisdom of the neutrality policy. (Wikipedia.com)
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turbulent Atlantic journey for his premature disembarking. Nonetheless, the 
minister conveniently found himself in a port city that was strategically import-
ant to France’s West Indian colonial trade and in a state that remained favorably 
disposed to his country’s revolution.31 Not surprisingly, Genet’s 	rst violation of 
U.S. neutrality occurred here, when he commissioned four American ships as 
privateers to support the French war eort. e names of these newly converted 
ships announced their revolutionary ideas—the Republican, the Anti-George, 
the Sans-Culotte, and the eponymous Citizen Genet—and their mission to ha-
rass and capture British vessels.32 With the French republic’s navy decimated 
by Britain’s superior eet, privateering represented a viable alternative wartime 
strategy.33 While Genet emerged as its most visible proponent, other French cap-
tains and their ships engaged in this practice in American waters as well.34
Genet’s southern detour meant that, for 	ve weeks, he conducted business as 
France’s minister before presenting his credentials to the president of the United 
States. As Genet slowly meandered northward, reports of his misdeeds seeped 
into Philadelphia from a variety of sources.35 President Washington received a 
letter from two Norfolk, Virginia, merchants who reported that the privateer 
Sans Culotte had been out	tted with guns and contained a large number of 
Americans but very few Frenchmen among its crew.36 Several days later a Fed-
eralist congressman, William Vans Murray, reported to Jeerson that the Sans 
Culotte had sailed north to Maryland’s Eastern Shore and had captured a British 
ship, the Eunice.37
ese rumors escalated into a full-blown diplomatic crisis on May 2, when 
British minister Hammond sent Jeerson the 	rst of numerous memorials com-
plaining of French privateering against British vessels. His May 2 letter reported 
that the French frigate Embuscade (the same vessel that had transported Genet 
to America) had captured the English merchant ship Grange in Delaware Bay 
near Philadelphia. Hammond, who enjoyed lecturing Jeerson, pointed out the 
obvious: the seizure had occurred in U.S. waters “in direct violation of the Law 
of Nations” as well as an “infringement on its [American] neutrality.”38 He fur-
ther urged the U.S. government to “adopt such measures . . . for procuring the 
immediate restoration” of the ship “and for obtaining the liberation of her crew 
now illegally and forcibly imprisoned” on the Embuscade.39 e involvement 
of American sailors, vessels, and ports in European warfare had been exactly 
what Washington (and his cabinet) had hoped to avoid in issuing the Neutrality 
Proclamation two weeks earlier.
Jeerson oered a vague but sympathetic response to Hammond’s memorial, 
declaring that “the US being at peace with both parties, will certainly not see 
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with indierence its territory or jurisdiction violated by either” and promised 
to investigate the matter.40 As subsequent exchanges between Hammond and 
Jeerson made clear, the American government did not have either rules or 
enforcement mechanisms in place to prevent French privateering. It also did 
not have any means to prohibit Americans from serving on these ships or from 
oering their vessels to a European nation’s war eort. On May 8, an impatient 
Hammond reminded Jeerson of his May 2 memorial and requested “as speedy 
an answer as may be convenient.”41 at day he also submitted two more memo-
rials that reported additional privateering violations, including the Embuscade
capturing two other British ships (the Four Brothers and the Morning Star) as 
well as describing the commissionings that had occurred in Charleston under 
Genet’s direction.42 As late as May 31, Hammond still had not received a de	n-
itive response from Jeerson on the return of captured British ships, inquiring 
of the secretary of state “at what time I may expect to receive the determination 
of this government upon it.”43 e British minister appeared to have a long wait 
ahead of him.
With Washington and his administration preoccupied with smaller ques-
tions over which federal ocials should report privateering violations and how 
to issue sea letters, a few weeks passed before they focused on the speci	cs of 
Hammond’s May 2 memorial concerning the Grange’s capture. At the heart of 
the discussion was whether the Delaware Bay constituted U.S. territory or inter-
national waters, as the French claimed. Jeerson, at the president’s request, asked 
the attorney general to prepare a legal opinion on the extent of America’s juris-
diction over the Delaware Bay. Randolph con	rmed that this bay was U.S. terri-
tory and that the French seizure of a British ship in its waters violated American 
neutrality.44 On May 15, Jeerson wrote to both the British and French ministers 
to convey this decision and to urge a restoration of the Grange to its owners.45 
On May 27, Genet, in a rare act of cooperation, agreed to this request, writing, 
“My brave brethren, the seamen of the Embuscade, have readily concurred in a 
measure which I represented to them as a proper mean to convince the American 
government of our deference and of our friendship.”46 e quick resolution of the 
Grange case oered the false impression that enforcing neutrality would be easy 
and uncontroversial. Instead, it represented only a small drop in the tidal wave 
of neutrality violations that would confront the administration.
Even before the successful resolution of the Grange case, Washington ex-
pressed concern that American ships and sailors were serving as French priva-
teers and on May 14 convened the cabinet to formulate a more comprehensive 
response. Employing the consensus-based approach that had proven eective 
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during the policy’s formulation, the president and his advisors quickly identi-
	ed their enforcement priorities. First, the administration sought to prosecute 
“certain citizens” who “have engaged in committing depredations on the prop-
erty and commerce of some nations at peace with the United States” in order to 
stop Americans from serving on privateers. As the supervisor of U.S. attorneys, 
Jeerson instructed William Rawle of Pennsylvania “to take such measures for 
apprehending and prosecuting” these violators “according to the law.”47 Second, 
Secretary of War Knox directed governors to use their state militias “to detain 
the parties 	rst aggressing until you could communicate the case to the presi-
dent” to prevent situations like the capture of the Grange in U.S. waters or the 
commissioning of privateers in Charleston from happening again.48
Beyond these initial steps, thornier issues such as the restoration of ships in 
open waters and the banning of all privateering activities in American ports 
preoccupied the cabinet for the remaining weeks of May. e Grange had es-
tablished the precedent of returning prizes captured in territorial waters. But 
did the U.S. government have a similar obligation for ships (typically British) 
seized in the open Atlantic, particularly if the privateer (typically French) had 
been out	tted in American ports? In separately submitted opinions, Hamilton 
and Knox argued that the United States should restore prizes brought into U.S. 
ports, regardless of where they were captured, “in order to avoid participation in 
the war.”49 Jeerson and Randolph countered that the two belligerents should 
expect privateering and the capture of prizes to occur in open waters during 
wartime, therefore the neutral United States had no involvement in such cases. 
Jeerson explained, “If the commission be good, then the capture having been 
made on the high seas, under a valid commission from a power at war with Great 
Britain, the British owner has lost all his right, and the prize would be deemed 
good even in his own courts.”50 Several days later, on May 21, Washington ad-
opted Jeerson and Randolph’s approach of not intervening in captures that had 
occurred on open waters, believing this stance to be the most compatible with 
American neutrality.51
With these smaller enforcement issues resolved, the president and his cabinet 
turned their attention to the overriding one: how best to prohibit French (and 
British) ships from manning, out	tting, and equipping privateers in American 
ports.52 In Jeerson’s notes from the cabinet meeting, titled “the Citizen Genet
and Its Prizes,” the secretary of state listed the many issues at play, including U.S. 
obligations under the Treaty of Amity and Commerce as well as the “touch-
iness” of Franco-American relations, particularly with the new minister’s ar-
rival and the popularity of the French cause. Nonetheless, Jeerson’s minutes 
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acknowledged that Article XXII’s prohibition against France’s enemies out	t-
ting privateers into American ports did not translate into permission for France 
to engage in this practice. Similarly, Article XVII of the treaty allowed France 
to bring prizes into U.S. ports but did not oer any elaboration on what else was 
permissible. As they concluded their discussions, Washington’s advisors contem-
plated several options: one, require French privateers to give up the prize and 
order the prize, the privateer, or both to leave, whichever was feasible (Hamilton 
and Knox); two, do not order or give away anything (Jeerson); three, order the 
privateer only away (Randolph). Demonstrating his savvy as a statesman, Wash-
ington selected Randolph’s recommendation because it promoted American 
neutrality while avoiding provocative actions that could jeopardize this stance.53
Before announcing these policies to the French and British ministers, Jef-
ferson took the additional step of asking Randolph to prepare a statement that 
defended America’s right to prohibit the French from commissioning privateers 
in its ports. Genet’s May 27 letter to Jeerson had contained a very generous 
interpretation of the 1778 Treaty of Amity and Commerce, an understanding 
that the French minister would repeatedly express in his proli	c correspondence 
to the secretary of state. Aer citing French privateering rights under that treaty, 
Genet added that the U.S. citizens commanding and manning these privateers 
had “entered the service of France in order to defend their brothers and their 
friends.”54 In response to the minister’s fulsome expectations, Attorney General 
Randolph provided Jeerson with a six-point statement that emphasized Amer-
ica’s sovereign right to prohibit the commissioning of privateers and to ban U.S. 
citizens from serving on them, that a “vessel  .  .  . illegally commissioned, and 
illegally manned . . ., should be put out of the protection of the U.S.”55
On June 5, 1793, with the cabinet’s decisions on privateering and Randolph’s 
statement on U.S. sovereignty in hand, Jeerson, in his capacity as the nation’s 
chief diplomatic ocer, communicated the administration’s enforcement pol-
icies to Ministers Genet and Hammond. He wrote to Genet, “aer mature 
consultation and deliberation,” the president has concluded that “the arming 
and equipping vessels in the Ports of the United States to cruise against nations 
with whom they are at peace, was incompatible with the territorial sovereignty 
of the United States,” then added the directive that “the armed vessels of this 
description should depart from the ports of the United States.” Acknowledging 
the arguments the French minister had included in his May 27 letter, Jeer-
son responded with an armation of America’s sovereign rights and countered 
that “the granting [of] military commissions within the United States by any 
other authority than their own is an infringement on their sovereignty.”56 In 
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confronting France’s principal transgression against American neutrality, he and 
Washington’s administration at large believed this letter would be enough to 
end French privateering.
Jeerson’s June 5 letter to Hammond addressed the concerns the British min-
ister had raised in his numerous memorials: stopping privateering against British 
ships and restoring captured vessels to their owners. Jeerson wrote that “the 
president, aer a full investigation of this subject, and the most mature consid-
eration,” had found the privateering complaints “to be just,” and his adminis-
tration had taken “eectual measures . . . for preventing repetitions of this act.” 
In terms of returning captured ships, the secretary of state reiterated his earlier 
argument that the seizures of British vessels by legally commissioned French 
privateers in international waters were acts of war between these two countries 
and did not concern the United States. While he acknowledged that the United 
States had not been prepared for the French privateering that began in Charles-
ton, Jeerson explained that the United States was now taking steps “that the 
vessels, so armed and equipped, shall depart from our ports.”57
With privateers ordered to leave American ports and the appropriate gov-
erning authorities (U.S. attorneys, governors, and customs ocers) and dip-
lomatic ocials noti	ed, Washington and his administration seemed well on 
their way to stopping additional transgressions and to upholding U.S. neutrality. 
Yet the reactions of the two European ministers demonstrated that the United 
States had craed an unenforceable “paper policy.” Genet remained committed 
to privateering in American ports, and Hammond intended to press the U.S. 
government to restore and even indemnify the British prizes French ships had 
captured. In Genet’s de	ant response to Jeerson, he reiterated France’s right to 
out	t and equip privateers in U.S. ports. Demonstrating the dramatic ourish 
that characterized his diplomatic tenure, Genet wrote to Jeerson, “I have seen 
with pain . .  . your letter of the 5th of this month.” Genet then rearmed his 
understanding of France’s privateering privileges: “e United States, friends of 
the French . . . , have permitted them to enter armed, and remain in their ports, 
to bring there—their prizes, to repair them, to equip in them, whilst they have 
expressly refused this privilege to their enemies.”58 Genet found authority for 
the current privateering activities by conating two provisions of the Treaty of 
Amity and Commerce: Article XVII, which permitted French captains to bring 
their prizes into American ports (but did not authorize equipping, out	tting, 
or manning them), while Article XXII prohibited France’s enemies from “	t-
ting” prizes in those same ports or “to sell” or “to exchange” captured ships and 
their cargoes.59 With the French so allowed to bring privateers into U.S. waters, 
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Genet further interpreted the “prohibition” against the signatories’ enemies as 
“permission” for France to privateer in American ports.
In his June 17 reply, Jeerson refuted the authority that Genet claimed the 
Treaty of Amity and Commerce had provided. He wrote, “e XVIIth arti-
cle . . . permits the armed vessels of either party, to enter the ports of the other, 
and to depart with their prizes freely.” But, Jeerson countered, “the entry of an 
armed vessel into a port, is one act; the equipping a vessel in that port, arming her, 
manning her, is a dierent one, and not engaged by any article of the Treaty.”60
In fact, the right of French vessels to bring privateers into U.S. ports had been 
armed in a May 30 circular that Hamilton had sent to the customs collectors.61
Genet, of course, was having none of this, and his vociferous commitment to his 
interpretation increasingly soured Washington and his cabinet on him.
With France continuing to privateer in American ports, Hammond re-
mained equally committed to involving the U.S. government in the return of 
British prizes. e minister based his appeal on two loopholes in America’s June 
5 enforcement policy: 	rst, claiming that the commissions of French privateers’ 
commissions were invalid, because a foreign power lacked sovereignty in Amer-
ican ports, and second, arguing that the seizures had occurred in U.S. waters, 
based on the Grange decision. Hammond dedicated the summer to pursuing 
these points in federal court and elsewhere (as detailed below) in order to force 
a decision favorable to British interests.
With the United States lacking a navy to enforce the administration’s June 
5 policy, French privateering continued with abandon, and Genet remained its 
enthusiastic supporter. Two of the privateers he had commissioned in Charles-
ton, the Sans Culotte and the Citizen Genet, proved to be particularly aggressive 
and proli	c, as did the Embuscade, which had transported the French minis-
ter to America.62 While the privateers’ initial captures had launched America’s 
enforcement policy, their later prizes, most notably the William and the Little 
Sarah, illustrated both the federal government’s neutral aspirations as well as the 
domestic and international diculties in enforcing them.
e William, a Scottish ship, was among the Citizen Genet’s many prizes. 
Its capture led to two landmark enforcement cases: 	rst, the prosecution of an 
American serving on privateers, and second, Hammond’s campaign to require 
the U.S. government to restore prizes captured in American waters. e Wil-
liam’s notoriety began on May 14, when a skeletal crew from the Citizen Genet
transported the ship into Philadelphia to be condemned as a prize.63 Lead-
ing this eort was the privateer’s prize captain, an American mariner named 
Gideon Hen	eld, who, along with another American, John Singleterry, had 
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been recruited to serve on the Citizen Genet.64 Hen	eld had joined its crew 
based on the lucrative promise that he would be put in charge of the priva-
teer’s 	rst prize.65 (In one of his memorials, Hammond described the nefari-
ous “houses of rendezvous” in Charleston where such transactions occurred.)66
Upon Hen	eld and Singleterry’s arrival in Philadelphia, U.S. Attorney Rawle 
arrested both men for violating American neutrality, pursuant to Jeerson’s 
May 15 instructions. Preventing Americans from participating in the current 
Anglo-French war was a major goal of the Neutrality Proclamation, and Wash-
ington and his cabinet hoped this initial prosecution would set an example and 
stop future violations.
Not surprisingly, Citizen Genet (the minister, not the vessel) vehemently op-
posed the arrests of Hen	eld and Singleterry, sharing his opinions with Jeerson 
on the matter. Tangibly demonstrating his disrespect for U.S. sovereignty and 
the rule of law, Genet questioned their arrests in a series of letters. On June 1, 
he wrote, “I have this moment been informed, that two ocers in the service 
of the republic of France .  .  . have been arrested on board the privateer of the 
French republic.” Genet dramatically added, “e crime which my mind cannot 
conceive, and which my pen almost refuses to state, is the serving of France, and 
defending with her children the common and glorious cause of liberty.” en the 
French minister took the even bolder step of asking for Jeerson’s intervention 
“and that of the President of the United States in order to obtain the immediate 
releasement [sic] of the abovementioned ocers.”67
Jeerson’s terse response wisely focused on the constitutional and legal im-
possibilities of Genet’s request. First, he pointed out that “Mr. Hen	eld appears 
to be in the custody of the civil magistrate, over whose proceedings the executive 
has no control.” Jeerson then added, “the act with which he is charged will be 
examined by a jury of his countrymen, in the presence of judges of learning and 
integrity.” He also included a memorandum from Randolph, outlining the fed-
eral government’s case against Hen	eld.68 e attorney general listed three major 
reasons for Hen	eld’s prosecution: 	rst, he was a citizen of the United States 
and subject to its laws; second, his actions violated American treaties with the 
three powers (Great Britain, Prussia, and the Netherlands) at war with France 
because these agreements required the United States and its citizens to remain at 
peace; and third, Hen	eld’s activities constituted disturbing the peace.69 Jeer-
son’s letter would not be the last time he explained to Genet the authorities and 
responsibilities of the federal government. Not easily dissuaded, Genet played an 
active role in defending Hen	eld’s right (and that of other Americans) to serve 
on French privateers.
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e William also 	gured in Hammond’s campaign to involve the U.S. gov-
ernment in the restoration of captured British ships. e British minister en-
couraged the William’s owners (as well as the Fanny’s, a vessel seized by the Sans 
Culotte) to petition for restitution of their ships through the U.S. district court 
in Pennsylvania. Each case rested on two arguments: 	rst, the William had been 
seized in U.S. territorial waters, speci	cally in the Chesapeake Bay, two miles 
from Maryland’s shore.70 Second, the petitions declared the French commissions 
invalid because a foreign power did not have the authority to privateer in Amer-
ica’s neutral waters.71 e William’s capture oered the federal government two 
opportunities to slowly assert its authority, with the U.S. attorney holding Hen-
	eld and Singleterry in jail for bringing this vessel into port, and the marshal of 
the district court assuming custody of the William (and the Fanny) as its owners 
awaited the federal judge’s ruling.72
While Jeerson and Randolph worked to prosecute neutrality violations in 
the federal courts, Secretary of War Knox began to see a positive response to 
his May 24 order that governors detain ships suspected of privateering in their 
ports.73 On June 9, Governor George Clinton of New York reported to President 
Washington “that a sloop was equipped, armed, and manned in this Harbor 
and ready to sail, and that there were reasons to suspect that she was intended 
to act as a privateer.” Clinton added that he had “ordered a small detachment 
of militia on board with directions to detain her until you should be noti	ed.” 
e governor identi	ed the ship as the American-owned Polly, but its French 
captain had renamed it the Republican, one of Genet’s original four commis-
sions.74 Washington and his cabinet, seeking to establish a protocol for dealing 
with cases like this, directed Clinton to deliver the vessel to Richard Harison, 
the U.S. attorney in New York, to investigate the allegations of privateering.75 
Jeerson, in his role as supervisor of the U.S. attorneys, speci	cally instructed 
Harison to institute “such proceedings at law against the vessel and her appur-
tenances as may place her in the custody of the law, and may prevent her being 
used for purposes of hostility against any belligerent powers.”76 By holding and 
disabling the Republican through legal channels, the federal government sought 
to put an end to the arming and equipping of all privateers in American ports.
e government’s temporary detention of both the William and the Republi-
can further enraged Genet. Believing in France’s fundamental right to privateer 
in U.S. waters, Genet launched an ill-advised tirade against the government’s 
eorts to remain neutral. Writing to Jeerson on June 14, he declared the hold-
ing of these vessels to be “in contempt of the treaties which unite the French 
and Americans” and “in contempt of the law of nations.” Dismissive of the 
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government’s policies, the French minister boldly directed Jeerson to “inform 
the President of the United States of these facts; to let him know that they [civil 
and judicial ocers] have used his name in committing these infractions of laws 
and treaties.” Genet concluded his letter with the demand that Washington pro-
vide immediate restitution, with damages and interests, for the French prize, the 
William, and the privateer, the Republican.77 In response, Jeerson returned to 
familiar arguments, 	rst refuting Genet’s belief in France’s right to privateer 
in American ports, then explaining that the judicial branch, not the executive, 
handled disputes over property.78
Despite Jeerson’s con	dence in the judiciary, the federal government’s en-
forcement eorts endured a signi	cant setback with the court’s ruling on the 
William. On June 21, the U.S. district court judge in Pennsylvania, Richard 
Peters, released the William from custody, declaring a lack of jurisdiction “to de-
cide in a matter growing out of the contests between belligerent powers.”79 Ham-
mond, undeterred by this ruling, immediately turned to the executive branch 
for redress. Writing to Jeerson, the British minister expressed “no doubt that 
the executive government of the United States will consider the circumstances 
of this capture as an aggression on its sovereignty and will consequently pursue 
such measures . . . for procuring the immediate restoration to its rightful own-
ers of the British Ship William thus illegally taken.”80 As Washington’s cabinet 
scrambled to formulate a response to Hammond, Secretary of War Knox di-
rected Governor omas Miin of Pennsylvania and his state militia to assume 
temporary custody of the William from the federal courts.81
e unwillingness of federal courts to exercise their statutory authority in 
admiralty cases such as that of the William placed an embarrassing obstacle in 
the government’s enforcement eorts. While the Judiciary Act of 1789 had es-
tablished that the U.S. district courts possessed “exclusive original cognizance of 
all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” Judge Peters, along with 
other judges in future cases, denied that the federal courts bore this responsi-
bility.82 is ruling le the federal government without admiralty authority at 
a time when foreign privateering was rampant. Without U.S. courts to detain 
prizes and resolve these disputes, Jeerson found himself in the awkward posi-
tion of turning to the unreliable and unpredictable Genet for assistance.
On June 25 the secretary of state requested that ships captured in U.S. waters 
by armed French vessels “be detained under the orders of yourself [Genet] or of 
the Consuls of France in the several ports, until the government of the United 
States shall be able to inquire into and decide on the fact.” In other words, the 
proverbial “fox” (French privateers) would be guarding the lucrative “hen house” 
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(ports with captured prizes). Additionally, Jeerson instructed Genet that if a 
French consul was unavailable, the state governors would be responsible for de-
taining the vessels until a “consul may be called in.”83 Pursuant to Jeerson’s 
request, Secretary Knox ordered the Pennsylvania state militia to transfer the 
William to Francois Dupont, the French consul in Philadelphia.84
e district court’s failure to assume its admiralty responsibilities, coupled 
with the delegation of this role to a foreign minister, laid bare the federal gov-
ernment’s impotence in enforcing neutrality. Jeerson, who had repeatedly 
explained America’s constitutional rules and its national sovereignty to Genet, 
now had to cede some of that authority to an individual who had never respected 
it in the 	rst place. Speci	cally, he sought Genet’s help in resolving the question 
at the heart of Hammond’s June 21 memorial: was the William’s claim of being 
“taken within the limits of the protection of the United States” legitimate? If so, 
he requested Genet “to give orders to the Consul of France at this port to take 
the vessel into his custody and deliver her to the owners”; if not, the minister 
should report this conclusion to Jeerson and await further instruction.85
With Jeerson (and the U.S. government) approaching Genet from a posi-
tion of weakness, the normally obstreperous French minister was all smiles and 
cooperation. In his response, Genet declared, “e arrangement you propose, 
sir, suits us in every respect,” adding, “I shall communicate them to the consuls 
and vice consuls of the republic.” He even made the preposterous claim that the 
French diplomatic community considered “the 	rst of our duties to respect all 
the rights of sovereignty of the United States.”86 Whether Genet would actually 
take any steps to resolve the twin cases of the William and the Fanny remained 
to be seen.87 What was clear was that Jeerson’s June 25 request had exposed 
the federal government’s lack of enforcement powers, a revelation that would 
embolden Genet to intensify his campaign against its authority.
In the aermath of the William ruling, the judicial branch proved to be the 
site of a second and even greater setback to the administration’s enforcement 
eorts with the acquittal of Hen	eld.88 Following his arrest in May for priva-
teering, Hen	eld came to trial on July 22 at a special session of the Pennsylvania 
Circuit Court in the case United States v. Heneld. Recognizing the trial’s signif-
icance, Attorney General Randolph and U.S. District Attorney Rawle worked 
together to prepare a strong case against him. Rawle, embracing his duties as 
district attorney, wrote a twelve-point indictment that built on the arguments 
contained in Randolph’s May 30 memorandum. First, the United States had in-
ternational treaties with several nations in which it pledged to remain peaceful. 
Since the Constitution considered these treaties to be the supreme law of the 
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land, Hen	eld had violated U.S. law. Second, as an American citizen, Hen	eld 
had an obligation as a member of civil society to obey the laws of the United 
States. He could not merely “opt out” when he found a particular law onerous. 
Rawle’s arguments proved persuasive enough to convince the Philadelphia-based 
grand jury to support the government’s indictment. Further bolstering the gov-
ernment’s case were the instructions to the jury from U.S. Supreme Court Jus-
tice James Wilson, one of the three presiding judges.89 Wilson reinforced Rawle’s 
arguments regarding the law of nations and a citizen’s constitutional obligations, 
concluding “that a citizen, who, in our State of Neutrality, and without the Au-
thority of the Nation, takes an hostile Part with either of the belligerent Powers, 
violates thereby his Duty and the Laws of his Country.”90 In establishing the 
legal basis for Americans remaining neutral, Randolph, Rawle, and Wilson also 
relied upon earlier instructions craed by Chief Justice John Jay.91
Despite the federal government’s united and seemingly formidable case 
against Hen	eld, his supporters mounted a spirited defense of his right (and 
that of other Americans) to privateer on behalf of France. Leading the charge 
was none other than the newly emboldened Citizen Genet, who had been the 
darling of Philadelphia’s Democratic-Republicans since his triumphant arrival 
in May.92 Still basking in the glow of numerous fetes in his honor and his newly 
acquired admiralty authority, Genet saw this case as his path to overriding the 
federal government’s opposition to French privateering. With that goal in mind, 
he personally 	nanced Hen	eld’s team of prominent Republican lawyers: Peter 
Du Ponceau, Jared Ingersoll, and Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant.93 ese attor-
neys argued three major points in his defense: 	rst, Hen	eld had renounced 
his U.S. citizenship when he boarded the privateer, so he was not violating any 
laws; second, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France did not prohibit 
Americans from serving on privateers; and third, perhaps most damning to the 
government’s case, the Neutrality Proclamation lacked statutory authority. e 
fast-moving trial, which began on July 22 and produced an indictment 	ve days 
later, ended dramatically on July 29, with the jury acquitting Hen	eld by a vote 
of 11 to 1.94
is verdict, occurring in the nation’s temporary capital of Philadelphia, 
elated Genet and his supporters and stunned the administration. Genet im-
mediately hosted a celebration in Hen	eld’s honor, inviting Philadelphians to 
“meet Citizen Hen	eld.” He also encouraged other “friends of liberty” to emu-
late Hen	eld and enlist on French privateers. With pro-Democratic-Republican 
newspapers such as Philadelphia’s National Gazette covering and disseminating 
the verdict, news quickly spread up and down the Atlantic coast. Hen	eld’s 
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supporters in Boston and New York City, for example, saluted the mariner’s 
activities and the “virtuous and independent jury of Pennsylvania” for arming 
republican values.95
e Heneld verdict, of course, inicted a devastating blow to a central ob-
jective of the administration’s neutrality policy: preventing Americans from 
participating in a foreign war. e responses of Washington, Hamilton, and 
Jeerson revealed a great deal about their relationship to this policy. A con-
cerned Washington pondered calling Congress into session to gain institutional 
support from the government’s remaining constitutional partner.96 Hamilton 
and Jeerson took a more partisan tack. Hamilton, who had been promoting 
the Neutrality Proclamation since late June through his Paci	cus essays, now 
directed his 	re at Genet in a new series under the pseudonym “No Jacobin,” 
with the 	rst essay appearing soon aer the verdict.97 Jeerson, seeking to spread 
his partisan wings and distance himself from the neutrality policy, penned his 
resignation letter to Washington on July 31, two days aer Hen	eld’s acquittal. 
e president shrewdly encouraged him to remain in the cabinet until the end 
of 1793.98
e long summer of enforcement challenges, exacerbated by these governing 
diculties and rising partisan tensions in the cabinet, produced a full-blown 
crisis with the Little Sarah incident. e ordeal of the Little Sarah began on 
May 24, when this ship entered Philadelphia as a prize of the proli	c French 
privateer Embuscade (which had previously captured the Grange).99 A month 
aer the Little Sarah’s seizure, Governor Miin wrote to Washington “that 
the Brigatine Little Sarah . . . is 	tting out as a privateer” and asked the president 
for direction in what “measures to be pursued.”100 By early July, the Little Sarah
had been rechristened as the privateer Petite Democrate, had been out	tted with 
fourteen cannons, and was “lying in the river Delaware at some place between 
this city and Mud Island.”101
What made the Little Sarah so signi	cant was that its capture and conver-
sion illustrated the failure of the federal government to ban privateering in its 
ports, including the nation’s temporary capital. When an exasperated Wash-
ington wrote to Jeerson on July 11 “what is to be done about the Little Sarah,” 
he was addressing both this speci	c case and the larger challenge of stopping 
privateering. e president had little doubt as to the culprit: “Is the Minister of 
the French Republic to set the Acts of this Government at de	ance—with impu-
nity? And then threaten the Executive with an appeal to the People?” Lamenting 
the failure to stop both privateering and Citizen Genet, he wrote, “What must 
the world think of such conduct, and of the Government of the United States in 
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submitting to it?”102 e Little Sarah launched Washington and his cabinet into 
a full-blown political and constitutional crises during the sweltering months of 
July and August 1793.
When the cabinet held its 	rst meeting about the Little Sarah on July 8, the 
more moderating voices of Washington and Randolph were not present. Instead, 
the partisan tensions that had been simmering all along were on full display as 
Hamilton and Knox sought a more aggressive approach to stop French privateer-
ing. Reecting a desire to weaponize American enforcement (and also to gain a 
partisan edge), they proposed the use of force to stop the repurposed Little Sarah
from sailing. Speci	cally, Hamilton and Knox advocated “establishing a battery 
on Mud Island [in the Delaware River], under cover of a party of militia, with 
direction that if the brig Sarah should attempt to depart before the pleasure of 
the President shall be known concerning her, military coercion be employed to 
arrest and prevent her progress.”103 is proposal enjoyed the enthusiastic sup-
port of Governor Miin, but Jeerson opposed it.104 Hamilton and Knox pre-
pared a thirteen-point memorandum that elaborated on the need to use military 
force to stop “the unequivocal breach of neutrality.” Jeerson countered with his 
own statement advocating a continuation of diplomacy rather than “the actual 
commencement of hostilities.”105 Hamilton and Knox’s provocative proposal 
marked a dramatic departure from the ineectual policy of asking privateers to 
voluntarily leave and reected the administration’s growing exasperation with 
France’s aggressiveness and Genet’s rising disrespect for U.S. sovereignty.
Washington’s return to cabinet deliberations on July 12 inserted a moderating 
voice that had been absent at the earlier meeting. Instead of addressing the forti-
fying of Mud Island, an undertaking he opposed, the president sought to resolve 
the crisis through constitutional and diplomatic channels.106 In an eort to un-
derstand “what shall be strictly conformable to the treaties of the United States 
and the laws respecting the said questions,” Washington and the cabinet turned 
to their constitutional counterpart, the U.S. Supreme Court, for answers. While 
the court reviewed these issues, Jeerson wrote a joint letter to Hammond and 
Genet on July 12 requesting that the seven ships involved in unresolved privateer-
ing cases, including the Little Sarah, be detained until the president received the 
court’s ruling.107 Although Washington’s approach avoided the hostilities associ-
ated with Hamilton and Knox’s proposal, it nonetheless encountered obstacles. 
British minister Hammond scoed at Jeerson’s letter: “I cannot conceal from 
you my surprise at the requisition contained in it.” He reminded the secretary 
of state that these vessels were out	tted to commit “hostilities on the subjects of 
Great Britain, or British property,” and concluded, “I have no wit of control over 
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any of them.”108 Genet, who had witnessed 	rsthand the American government’s 
weakness, simply ignored Jeerson’s request to detain the Little Sarah and in-
stead ordered the ship to depart the Delaware River, an action that infuriated 
Washington and his cabinet.109
Despite earlier setbacks in the lower courts, Washington and his cabinet har-
bored great hope that advice from the Supreme Court would help the govern-
ment resolve its current enforcement crisis. Returning to the consensus-based 
approach that had worked in the past, Hamilton, Knox, and Jeerson each 
draed detailed questions for the court and then consolidated their submissions 
into a single document. Once again the ideas of the proli	c Hamilton heavily 
inuenced the 	nal document because he had submitted the most questions 
(twenty two, compared with Jeerson’s fourteen and Knox’s twelve) as well as 
the most detailed. Interestingly, Randolph, the government’s chief attorney, did 
not return to Philadelphia in time to submit questions or to participate in these 
discussions.110
Aer obtaining Washington’s approval, Jeerson submitted the cabinet’s 
twenty-nine questions to the Supreme Court on July 18 with the following 
instructions: “e President would therefore be much relieved if he found him-
self free to refer questions of this description to the opinions of the Judges 
of the supreme court  .  .  .  , whose knowledge of the subject would secure us 
against errors dangerous to the peace of the United States and their authority 
ensure the respect of all parties.”111 ese comprehensive and carefully draed 
queries, falling into three broad categories, cogently captured the enforcement 
challenges that threatened American neutrality. e 	rst question tackled the 
broad theme of France’s right to privateer based on its diplomatic agreements 
with the United States: “do the treaties between the U.S. and France give to 
France or her citizens a right, when at war with a power with whom the U.S. 
are at peace to 	t out originally in and from the ports of the U.S. vessels armed 
for war, with or without commission?”112 A second area of concern focused 
on America’s obligations under the laws of neutrality and in its treaties with 
France and with its enemies to allow privateering in U.S. ports, including the 
selling of prizes, the out	tting of ships, and the establishment of consular 
courts. e 	nal set of questions focused on the speci	c enforcement challenges 
occurring in the United States: restitution of captured ships, the distance of 
its water boundaries, the prohibition of Americans serving on privateers, and 
selling U.S.-built ships to the warring parties for merchandise. e document 
also oered an opportunity for the Supreme Court to arm the free-trade 
principles that had inspired the Neutrality Proclamation: “Is the principle that 
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free bottoms make free goods . . . to be considered as [a] now established part 
of the law of nations?"113
Despite the care the administration had taken in identifying the myriad 
enforcement challenges associated with neutrality, the Supreme Court proved 
more interested in asserting its institutional independence than resolving pol-
icy disputes. On July 12, when Jeerson, on behalf of the president, had asked 
the justices to come to Philadelphia on July 18 to address “matters of great pub-
lic concern,” he had not speci	ed the topic to be discussed. On the seventeenth, 
Chief Justice Jay impatiently queried Washington as to when the court would 
know why they had been summoned.114 While Jeerson’s letter the next day 
amply answered Jay’s question, the Court expressed “a reluctance to decide it, 
without the advice and participation of our absent Brethren.”115 With a quo-
rum 	nally achieved, their response to the administration’s questions proved 
to be more of a triumph for their constitutional role than for the enforcement 
of neutrality. On August 8, the justices informed the president that “lines of 
the separation drawn by the Constitution between the three departments of 
government” prevented them from oering advice to the executive branch.116
While the federal judiciary would eventually 	nd its constitutional voice on 
admiralty and neutrality cases, its record thus far was disappointing to the 
administration.
With the judiciary unwilling to act, Washington briey contemplated turn-
ing to the remaining branch of government, the legislative as embodied in Con-
gress, for assistance. Writing to the cabinet on August 3, the president queried 
“whether it be proper—or not—to convene the legislature at an earlier period 
than that at which it is meet, by law? And . . . at what time?” Washington spe-
ci	cally cited Hen	eld’s acquittal and the administration’s ongoing diculties 
with Genet as reasons for involving Congress.117 A day later he noted a decree 
from France’s National Convention “authorizing their ships of wars and armed 
vessels to stop any neutral vessels loaded in whole, or parts with provisions, and 
send them into their ports” as an additional issue requiring congressional at-
tention.118 Jeerson once again emerged as the only cabinet member who sup-
ported calling Congress into session early. He argued that several legislative 
provisions were pending that would “enable the government to steer steadily 
through the diculties daily produced by the war in Europe.” In addition, “the 
legislature meeting a month earlier will place them a month forwarder” in their 
understanding of the unfolding events.119 Countering Jeerson were Hamilton, 
Knox, and Randolph, who shared the belief that recent events did not qualify 
as “an extraordinary occasion” for convening the legislature. ey also argued 
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that meeting a month early did not oer that much extra time for Congress to 
discuss events, and the scheduling change would create logistical challenges in 
terms of communication and travel.120 While Washington personally supported 
convening early, a lack of unanimity in his cabinet resulted in his dropping this 
proposal.121 With Congress not scheduled to meet until December and the judi-
cial branch slow to exercise its authority, the executive branch found itself with 
the sole responsibility for enforcing neutrality, at least for the time being.
Aer an exhausting three months spent reacting to a never-ending stream 
of privateering violations, Washington and his cabinet dedicated August to the 
formulation and issuance of systematic rules intended to stop infractions against 
American neutrality.122 While these policies did not break new ground or rein-
terpret treaties, they did oer a comprehensive assertion of the federal govern-
ment’s authority over enforcing neutrality. Washington once again employed a 
consensus approach in craing these policies as he solicited the opinions of all 
four cabinet members and incorporated their recommendations into rules that 
possessed their unanimous support.123
e 	rst decision, titled “Rules on Neutrality” and dated August 3, went 
to the heart of privateering violations when it declared, “e original arming 
and equipping of vessels in the ports of the United States by any belligerent 
parties, for military service oensive or defensive, is deemed unlawful.”124 e 
subsequent seven points made a distinction regarding the out	tting of merchant 
ships (lawful) versus warships (unlawful), while giving vessels the bene	t of the 
doubt when their purpose was unclear. Additionally, France’s enemies were not 
allowed to out	t prizes made of French ships, in recognition of its 1778 treaty 
rights. Pursuant to earlier treaties, stranded or wrecked warships, including pri-
vateers, were permitted in American ports for humanitarian and emergency rea-
sons. Lastly, these rules prohibited inhabitants of the United States from serving 
on privateers.
In an eort to uphold American neutrality and to calm British complaints, 
the administration’s second policy decision took an aggressive stance against 
French privateering and its insubordinate minister. e second August 3 state-
ment, titled “Cabinet Opinion on French Privateers,” declared that “the Minis-
ter of [the] French Republic be informed that the President considers the United 
States as bound pursuant positive assurances, given in conformity to the laws of 
neutrality, to eectuate the restoration of, or to make compensation for, prizes 
which shall have been made of any parties at war with France subsequent to the 
	h of June last by privateers 	tted out of their ports.” e policy continued 
that Genet “will cause restitution to be made of all prizes taken and brought 
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into American ports” or, if this was not possible, the indemni	cation of these 
prizes, “to be reimbursed by the French nation.” Lastly, the U.S. government in-
tended to deny asylum to any privateers in order “to prevent the future 	tting out 
of ” these vessels in American ports.125 is announcement reected a dramatic 
departure from Jeerson’s June 5 letters to Ministers Genet and Hammond, in 
which he had asked French privateers to voluntary leave American ports and had 
denied Hammond’s request for the restoration and reimbursement of captured 
British ships.126
ese policy decisions, of course, would be meaningless unless they were 
shared with the ocials in charge of enforcing them. On July 29, Washington 
reminded the cabinet of the importance of customs collectors in reporting viola-
tions, writing, “It will not be amiss . . . to reconsider the expediency of directing 
the custom house ocers to be attentive to the arming or equipping vessels—
either for oensive or defensive war in the several ports to which they belong—
and make report thereof to the governor, or some other proper ocer.”127 While 
the process for customs collectors to follow in reporting neutrality violations had 
preoccupied the cabinet in May, a circular had never been issued to these o-
cials. With Washington eager to systematically enforce neutrality, a recalcitrant 
Hamilton 	nally released this circular to the collectors of the customs on Au-
gust 4. He instructed them to “have a vigilant eye upon whatever may be passing 
within the ports, harbors, creeks, inlets and waters of such district to contravene 
the laws of neutrality . . . and [to] give immediate notice to the governor of the 
state and to the attorney of the judicial district.” Hamilton also disseminated 
the August 3 rules of neutrality in this circular.128 Similarly, Secretary of War 
Knox shared the neutrality guidelines with state governors on August 7 and the 
French privateering rules on August 16.129
e 	nal step of announcing these new enforcement rules was to share them 
with the British and French ministers. On August 7, Jeerson communicated 
the U.S. government’s new policies on privateering and neutrality to Genet and 
Hammond, including the decision that France would be responsible for restor-
ing or reimbursing captured British ships.130 In a subsequent letter to Hammond, 
dated September 5, he reiterated America’s intentions to oer either restitution 
or compensation for British vessels that had been captured either in U.S. waters 
or in its ports aer June 5, 1793, in case France failed to do so. Additionally, 
even though the United States did not have a treaty with Great Britain dealing 
with trade, “it was the opinion of the president that we should use towards that 
nation the same rule” that the United States follows in its free-trade agreements 
with France and others.131 In oering to indemnify British shipping losses, the 
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government sought to resolve a festering diplomatic crisis with its principal trad-
ing partner that could potentially lead to war.
One of the principal goals of the Neutrality Proclamation was to keep Amer-
icans from participating in European hostilities. e lion’s share of violations 
occurred on water and involved privateering. Yet there were a handful of individ-
uals, including the governor of Virginia, who hoped to support France’s war ef-
forts on land. On September 15, 1792, a French military ocer named Ferdinand 
Bayard wrote to Washington oering to raise a regiment of American troops and 
lead them into battle to aid the French republic, proclaiming: “e cause is a glo-
rious one. . . . e American corps of volunteers, may be raised by individuals, to 
save government some inconveniences which may result from its interfering.”132
Not surprisingly, Washington never responded to Bayard’s impudent oer.
e real shocker for Washington came from his revolutionary colleague and 
Virginia neighbor (and the state’s current governor) Henry “Lighthorse Harry” 
Lee, who oered to 	ght on behalf of France. Lee, then struggling with depres-
sion aer the death of his wife, sought a diversion that would utilize his military 
talents. He wrote to Washington, “Bred to arms I have always since my domestic 
calamity wished for a return to my profession, as the best resort to my mind in its 
aiction.” Lee added: “Finding the serious turn which the French aairs took 
last year I interposed with the Marquis [Lafayette] to obtain me a commission 
in their army. . . . I am consequently solicitous for the best advice.”133 Washing-
ton had to respond to Lee because of the potential problems a U.S. citizen of 
such political stature, military reputation, and close association to the president 
volunteering to help the French could cause to America’s fragile foreign policy. 
On May 6, Washington oered this carefully worded response to Lee: “I should 
ponder well before I resolved; not only for private considerations but on public 
ground.”134 e governor desisted. While Americans in Kentucky would even-
tually join French-led military units for action against Spanish Louisiana, the 
larger threat to neutrality continued to come from the sea, not the land.
e productive month of August included one more signi	cant, but not 
entirely unexpected, enforcement decision: unanimous cabinet support for re-
questing the recall of the troublesome French minister, Citizen Genet. While 
this action had been contemplated as early as July, the administration draed 
its case against Genet in mid-August and submitted it to the U.S. minister to 
France, Gouverneur Morris, a week later. e reasons for seeking Genet’s recall 
were not dicult to fathom: authorizing French privateering; permitting French 
consuls to exercise exclusive admiralty authority over French prizes (a confusing 
point considering Jeerson’s directive to Genet about the William); sending o 
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the Little Sarah, in violation of instructions to the contrary; disrespecting the 
U.S. government, particularly the president; and supporting Americans serving 
on French privateers.135 While the subsequent French decision to recall Genet 
represented a triumph of the federal government’s authority and sovereignty, 
it also proved to be a time-consuming process that would include additional 
charges against the minister and eventually involve Congress, the federal courts, 
and a shuing of diplomats.
August 1793 marked a dramatic turning point in the federal government’s 
enforcement eorts. Aer struggling with blatant neutrality violations and a 
lack of comprehensive policies and procedures with which to respond, the ex-
ecutive branch took concrete steps to make American neutrality a reality. In a 
series of statements, Washington and his cabinet explicitly banned privateering 
in U.S. ports, reiterated the prohibition against Americans from serving on these 
ships and from participating in European warfare in general, and established 
procedures for indemnifying captured ships. e government also asserted its 
sovereignty in diplomatic matters by initiating the recall of Citizen Genet, the 
French minister who instigated many of these infractions. ese enforcement 
eorts, of course, were not perfect, as evidenced by continued French violations 
and British complaints. Nonetheless, the recently constituted federal govern-
ment asserted itself and de	ned its authorities for the 	rst time in order to sup-
port Washington’s goal of “keeping this Country in Peace”136 Eventually, Con-
gress and the courts would embrace their constitutional duties and strengthen 
the government’s ability to enforce neutrality. But in its early days, as neutrality 
made the bumpy journey from Enlightenment concept to viable foreign policy, 
the executive branch took the lead in building a neutral nation. In doing so, the 
federal government came to promote and protect U.S. sovereignty and auton-
omy at home and abroad for generations to come.
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“A Rank Due to the United States”
Enforcing Neutrality across the Federal Government
A ugust 1793 marked an important turning point for Washington and his administration in their enforcement of neutrality. Having reached unanimous decisions on how to handle privateering and pri-
vateers, the president and his cabinet operated from a position of increasing con-
dence as they confronted new challenges to U.S. sovereignty from France and 
Britain. e involvement of the government’s other two branches in enforcing 
neutrality further strengthened their position. By 1794, Congress emerged as an 
eager constitutional partner through its passage of laws to protect the nation’s 
shipping and defend its coastal ports. e courts continued to struggle with 
their role and authority, particularly in neutrality cases, but eventually found 
their constitutional voice in a landmark 1794 Supreme Court ruling. When 
the executive branch formulated and enforced neutrality, Washington insisted 
on consensus within his cabinet to ensure that it had the administration’s full 
backing in order to be successful. With this policy now gaining tangible support 
across the federal government, the nation a	rmed its sovereignty by speaking in 
a single diplomatic voice, both at home and abroad.
As August 1793 came to a close, the last item on the administration’s enforce-
ment docket concerned a diplomatic controversy: the fate of the troublesome 
Citizen Genet. Employing the consensus approach that had proved eective in 
the Neutrality Proclamation’s formulation and in its initial implementation, 
Washington solicited the cabinet’s opinions about Genet individually and then 
craed their ideas into a unanimous statement. While the minister’s transgres-
sions had been piling up since his arrival in the United States in April 1793, July 
23 marked the rst time the administration discussed requesting an end to his 
tenure. Washington’s comments to the cabinet le little doubt where he stood. 
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“We must shortly determine what was to be done with Mr. Genet,” he declared, 
oering two guiding principles for his advisors to keep in mind: a	rming U.S. 
friendship with France while “insisting on the recall of Genet.”1 Aer a sum-
mer spent responding to the minister’s outrageous actions and demands, the 
normally reticent Washington had reached his breaking point. He commented 
to Jeerson on July 27 aer receiving one communication, “Another insulting 
letter, written in French, by the French minister.” Washington, of course, did 
not read or speak French (Jeerson and later Randolph provided translations). 
rough his prolic correspondence, Genet had found an additional way to an-
tagonize the president of the United States.2
Amid the many delicate compromises associated with the Neutrality Procla-
mation’s formulation and implementation, Genet’s removal proved to be partic-
ularly volatile. First, his privateering activities directly violated America’s neutral 
stance and threatened its sovereignty and authority as an autonomous nation. 
Allowing his actions to go unpunished was simply not an option if the United 
States hoped to attain the international and domestic respect it sought. Second, 
France remained a valuable ally, and the recall of its minister needed to focus on 
his transgressions while avoiding a diplomatic crisis that could threaten Amer-
ican neutrality and even lead to war. ird, Genet’s indiscretions placed him at 
the center of the partisan disagreements that Washington had largely managed 
to keep at bay through earlier compromises. Any statement on the minister’s 
misdeeds could have easily favored Hamilton’s Federalist supporters or dispar-
aged Jeerson’s Democratic-Republicans, with the controversy’s larger national 
signicance getting lost in the partisan crossre. As the administration took 
the unprecedented step in American history of asking for the recall of another 
country’s diplomat, the United States’ status as an autonomous and sovereign 
nation faced a monumental test.
Despite these strong personal and partisan tensions, the cabinet agreed 
quickly and unanimously that Genet’s tenure must end. What proved controver-
sial was determining how to proceed with requesting his dismissal and deciding 
what justications to provide to the French government. e administration 
chose to convey the message through established diplomatic channels rather 
than taking the more provocative step of writing directly to the leaders of the 
French republic. e U.S. minister to France, Gouverneur Morris, would pres-
ent the recall request to the French governing body, the Executive Council, and 
would also share Genet’s inammatory correspondence. e cabinet also agreed 
to notify Genet of this action, although Jeerson had initially dissented on this 
point because he did not want to further agitate the unpredictable minister. 
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Amid these agreements, partisanship intruded. Hamilton wanted to share the 
recall statement with the American public in order to undercut domestic sup-
port for the French republic and even redene America’s diplomatic relationship 
with France.3 With some of the parameters set (and now one unresolved), the 
four cabinet members turned their attention to draing the crucial letter that 
would explain the reasons for Genet’s removal.
While Genet’s privateering activities and his disrespect for the U.S. govern-
ment’s authority oered ample justications for his recall, his support among 
Democratic-Republicans added a partisan wrinkle to an otherwise airtight case. 
Since his arrival in Philadelphia, Genet had been the darling of a pro-French 
political coalition who celebrated the new minister, the French Revolution, and 
the newly established republic. Genet, who found himself “in the midst of per-
petual fetes,” erroneously believed these public and partisan outpourings trans-
lated into tangible American support for France’s revolutionary wars. He also 
profoundly misunderstood how the federal government operated, with Jeerson 
repeatedly explaining the Constitution’s separation of powers and the unique 
responsibilities that each branch possessed.4 ese two misinterpretations led 
Genet to believe he could defy the executive branch’s decisions on neutrality and 
privateering because he thought Congress possessed ultimate authority on these 
matters. Even more controversial, he intended to make an appeal to the Ameri-
can people, if necessary, to overturn the government’s neutral stance.5 If Genet 
proceeded with his foolish plans, Hamilton saw a golden partisan opportunity 
to discredit the Democratic-Republicans as well as the French cause by publicly 
announcing the minister’s recall.6
Despite Hamilton’s designs on composing the letter to Minister Morris, the 
responsibility for draing it fell to Jeerson as the nation’s chief diplomatic o	-
cer. e secretary of state approached Genet’s dismissal with understandable am-
bivalence. On the one hand, he possessed great hopes for the French Revolution 
and its republican aspirations. Nonetheless, he had witnessed rsthand Genet’s 
deciencies as a diplomat and the threat he posed to American neutrality. Writ-
ing privately to Representative Madison in July 1793, Jeerson oered this blis-
tering critique: “Never in my opinion, was so calamitous an appointment made, 
as that of the present minister of F. [France] here. Hotheaded, all imagination, 
no judgment, passionate, disrespectful & even indecent towards the P. [presi-
dent] in his written as well as verbal communications, talking of appeals from 
him to Congress, from them to the people, urging the most unreasonable & 
groundless propositions, & in the most dictatorial style.”7 Jeerson’s decision to 
submit his resignation letter to Washington amid the Genet recall underscored 
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his competing roles as partisan leader and chief enforcer of American neutrality. 
Of course, Washington asked him to postpone his departure until the end of 
the year, meaning the task of penning the rationale for the minister’s dismissal 
would fall to Jeerson.8
In the end, Genet’s appeal to the American people never materialized, nor 
did a spontaneous uprising of public support for him or the French cause take 
place. Instead, resolutions from towns and cities poured into Philadelphia ex-
pressing support for American neutrality, with some specically denouncing 
Genet’s behavior. An August 14 resolution from Kent County, Delaware, de-
clared: “Resolved unanimously, at the citizens now convened do approve of 
the Proclamation of Neutrality issued by the President of the United States; 
and that in their opinions, it was prudent and well timed.”9 During August, 
similar resolutions came from coastal cities such as New Haven, Norfolk, and 
New York.10 With the partisan time bomb defused, Washington backed Jeer-
son’s and Randolph’s separate recommendations that the recall be done quietly 
through diplomatic channels without a public announcement. With the obsta-
cles in the cabinet resolved, Jeerson dedicated the next several weeks to draing 
the letter to Morris, incorporating the suggestions of Washington, Hamilton, 
and the other cabinet members.11
e nal version of Jeerson’s letter, weighing in at twenty handwritten 
pages and echoing the Declaration of Independence, began with a brief history 
of America’s desire for neutrality during the current war. It then shied into an 
indictment of Genet’s systematic violation of this stance in six detailed sections: 
rst, Genet’s assertion of “his right of arming in our ports, and of enlisting our 
citizens and that we have no right to restrain him or punish them”; second, his 
unwillingness to recognize America’s admiralty authority over prize cases oc-
curring in U.S. ports; third, the minister’s lack of respect for a British merchant 
ship defending itself against illegal seizure because he incorrectly believed that 
the ship should be considered a hostile privateer; fourth, his insistence that 
French privateers had the right to sell their prizes in American ports; h, the 
minister’s frustration that the “English take French goods out of American 
vessels” despite these seizures being “one of those deplorable and unforeseen 
calamities” of war; and sixth, Genet’s acting as if he were a “co-sovereign of the 
[American] territory” and exercising the powers of the U.S. government as he 
“arms vessels, levies men, gives commissions of war, independently of them, 
and in direct opposition to their orders and eorts.” e secretary of state also 
specically mentioned the French minister’s decision to allow the Little Sarah
to sail away despite explicit orders from the U.S. government to detain the ship. 
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In concluding his instructions to Morris, Jeerson stressed, “our friendship 
for the nation [France] is constant and unabating,” but the French govern-
ment must “replace an agent, whose dispositions are such a misrepresentation 
of theirs.”12
With Jeerson’s dra completed, the cabinet and Washington met several 
times to review and revise this letter. On August 23, they unanimously agreed 
to send it to Morris under Jeerson’s signature.13 e secretary of state deliv-
ered these materials to a trusted ship captain, William Culver of the Hannah, 
for its transatlantic journey.14 Jeerson shrewdly delayed telling Genet of his 
recall until September 7 so the minister could not intercept its transmittal.15 e 
request for Genet’s recall represented a bold a	rmation of the federal govern-
ment’s neutrality policy, but now the waiting began. With a one-way trip across 
the Atlantic taking at least six to eight weeks, it would be several months before 
the administration would know if France would honor the U.S demand. In the 
meantime, the specic problems Genet had caused and the additional controver-
sies he would generate provided Washington and his cabinet with ample oppor-
tunities to extend the executive branch’s enforcement of neutrality.
One outstanding issue dealt with establishing the United States’ ocean 
boundaries. On June 29, 1793, Jeerson had requested Genet’s assistance in 
determining where the British ships William and Fanny had been captured, 
with the minister promising to help.16 In September, Jeerson learned that the 
French consul stationed in Philadelphia had died, which meant that these cases 
had been languishing in his o	ce since the summer. Genet’s negligence and the 
consul’s death put these unresolved jurisdictional issues back into American 
hands.17 With the hope of resolving the William and Fanny cases and future 
ones like them, the administration issued three landmark enforcement deci-
sions establishing America’s coastal boundary. On November 8, Jeerson an-
nounced to the foreign ministers based in the United States, including Genet, 
that the administration had established the nation’s coastal boundary as “one 
sea-league or three geographical miles from the sea shores.” Acknowledging 
that a nation’s coastal boundary might be as wide as “the extent of human 
sight, estimated at upwards of 20 miles,” or as small as “the utmost range of 
a cannon ball, usually stated at one sea league,” Jeerson explained that the 
United States had chosen the lesser distance because it was more consistent 
with current treaties. Using the newly established policy to resolve the case 
of the Fanny, the November 8 letters also concluded that, since the vessel was 
captured “four or ve miles from land,” the United States bore no responsibility 
for its indemnication.18
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With the country’s coastal boundaries dened, Jeerson’s November 10 let-
ter recognized and authorized U.S. district attorneys “as the persons the most 
capable of discharging” the investigation of such jurisdictional cases “with 
knowledge, with impartiality and with that extreme discretion” necessary in 
international disputes.19 He then obeyed his own instructions by referring the 
case of the William, seized closer to the U.S. coastline, to U.S. District Attorney 
Rawle for resolution.20 e third policy decision, also issued on November 10, 
contained procedures for foreign ministers and their consuls to follow when 
belligerent ships were seized in U.S. territorial waters. First, the consuls should 
notify the governor of the nearest state, who should “immediately” alert the “at-
tornies [sic] of their respective districts,” who would investigate such cases. Jef-
ferson’s guidelines also emphasized the importance of consuls reporting seizures 
in a timely manner so busy district attorneys could interview maritime witnesses 
before they returned to sea. Also, “this prompt procedure  .  .  . will enable the 
President by an immediate delivery of the vessel and cargo to the party having 
title, to prevent the injuries consequent on long delay,” such as the spoilage of 
goods and loss of income.21
rough the assertion of its executive authority, the federal government de-
ned the country’s Atlantic boundary and instituted a policy for reporting and 
investigating ship seizures occurring within this jurisdiction. Already commit-
ted to indemnifying ships captured within its ports and its territorial waters, 
the U.S. government nally had a clear denition of what composed those wa-
ters. Following its newly established guidelines, the executive branch resolved its 
backlog of privateering complaints and addressed the new cases washing up on 
its shores almost daily. Many claims were deemed ineligible for compensation 
because of where the ships were seized. Several did qualify, including the Wil-
liam, whose long judicial ordeal nally ended in 1795, when its owners received 
damages of $1,580 from the federal government.22
During the fall of 1793, as the administration consolidated its enforcement ef-
forts, o	cials discovered that Citizen Genet was not the only French citizen dis-
respecting American neutrality. e district attorney for Massachusetts, Chris-
topher Gore, reported that Boston’s French vice consul, Antoine Duplaine, had 
recently commissioned an American ship, the Roland, as a privateer, and it had 
subsequently brought an English prize, the Greyhound, into Boston harbor.23
e French commission of the ship and its resulting privateering activities clearly 
violated neutrality. Yet these transgressions represented only part of the story. 
On August 21, with the owners of the Greyhound challenging its capture, the 
federal marshal took possession of that vessel, awaiting legal resolution of the 
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case pursuant to the administration’s instructions. at evening Vice Consul 
Duplaine took the bold step of dispatching “twelve armed marines” and their 
commander to seize control of the Greyhound, declaring it French property.24
is “daring violation of the laws,” as Jeerson described it, generated a swi 
response from Washington’s cabinet.25 ey unanimously agreed to revoke Du-
plaine’s exequatur and directed Gore to prosecute him.26
As the supervisor of U.S. attorneys, Jeerson laid out to Gore the administra-
tion’s case against Duplaine. He emphasized a vice consul’s “unfounded right” 
to exercise admiralty jurisdiction, “probably meaning to assert it by this act of 
force.” ese directives also claried Duplaine’s status as “a foreigner, clothed 
with a public character,” and included Jeerson’s reminder that “consuls are not 
diplomatic characters, and have no immunities whatever against the laws of the 
land.” He concluded, “Consequently, Mr. Duplaine is liable to arrest, impris-
onment, and other punishment, even capital, as other foreign subjects resident 
here.” Jeerson informed the district attorney, “e president therefore desires 
that you will immediately institute such a prosecution against him, as the laws 
will warrant.”27 Gore responded on September 10 that he had arrested Duplaine, 
who had posted a bond of $1,000 to guarantee his appearance before the next 
circuit court.28
e Duplaine case also provided an opportunity for the federal government 
to remind all French consuls and vice consuls operating within the United 
States of the limits of their powers. Addressing this cohort on September 7, 
Jeerson noted that “several of the Consuls of France are exercising, within the 
United States a general admiralty jurisdiction,” including assessing the validity 
of prizes. (e failure of the U.S. courts to exercise this authority had created 
an administrative vacuum that the French consuls eagerly lled.) He added, 
“Moreover that they are undertaking to give commissions within the United 
States, and to enlist, or encourage the enlistment of men, natives or inhabitants 
of these states, to commit hostilities on nations with whom the United States 
are at peace.” Reminding these French nationals that such actions violated 
American laws, Jeerson asserted the government’s right to revoke exequaturs 
and to prosecute and punish those consuls and vice consuls engaged in such 
activities.29
As the case made its way through the federal courts, Jeerson revoked Du-
plaine’s exequatur as vice consul for New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Rhode 
Island pursuant to his own September 7 instructions. On October 3, the secre-
tary of state explained to him that, “as Vice-Consul of the republic of France, you 
have with an armed force, opposed the laws of the land. . . . [T]he President of the 
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United States has considered it as inconsistent with the authority of the laws . . . 
that you should any longer be permitted to exercise the functions, or enjoy the 
privileges of vice consul in these United States.”30 Letters announcing this revo-
cation were sent to the appropriate diplomatic o	cials, Morris and Genet. e 
federal government also published this statement in the nation’s newspapers to 
send a clear message to the maritime community and to other consuls and vice 
consuls regarding the limits of French authority in U.S. ports.31
Amid these decisive steps, the federal government’s eorts to prosecute Du-
plaine proved more disappointing. Following Jeerson’s instructions, District 
Attorney Gore prepared a case against the vice consul, but he failed to get a 
unanimous decision from the circuit court’s grand jury. As Gore explained to 
Jeerson, “Eleven of the jury were for making the presentment, but more could 
not be convinced of its legality.” Once again, the Neutrality Proclamation’s lack 
of legal authority proved problematic: “they agreed that the facts were proved; 
but doubted of the law.”32 Despite this failure in the courts, the administration, 
by revoking his exequatar, successfully used its diplomatic authority to block 
Duplaine from further violating American neutrality as a vice consul.
Along with Genet’s and Duplaine’s activities in American ports, the admin-
istration soon learned that France’s neutrality violations were not limited to 
privateering in the Atlantic. In late August, Jeerson received a letter from two 
Spanish diplomats who described a statement circulating in Louisiana “for the 
purpose of stirring up that province and making it independent from” Spain. 
Genet, of course, had authored this recruitment plea, with the hope of regaining 
Louisiana for France.33 Several months later the same diplomats oered tangible 
evidence of his military preparations: four Frenchmen were “under authoriza-
tion from the French minister, Mr. Genet, to head for Kentucky, and make as 
many recruits as they can along the way, of Americans and Frenchmen.” Addi-
tionally, they were to travel by ship “on the Ohio and Mississippi [Rivers] to Lou-
isiana to attack the rst post in the province . . . and to proceed to New Orleans,” 
where they would be met by a French eet.34 Besides Kentucky, Genet was also 
oering commissions to U.S. citizens in South Carolina and Georgia in order to 
forcibly seize not only Spanish Louisiana but also East Florida.35
Alarmed by this news, Jeerson, at Washington’s behest, alerted Kentucky’s 
governor, Isaac Shelby, to stress “that they [agents for France] may not be permit-
ted to excite within our territories or carry then any hostilities into the territory 
of Spain.” He reminded Shelby that “these illegal expeditions” threatened the 
peace of the United States and urged him to use the state militia to put down 
any resulting rebellions, if necessary.36 Jeerson also enlisted Secretary of War 
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Knox to write the governor that if the “course of laws . . . should be ineectual,” 
he should use “military force” to prevent the French invasion of Louisiana.37
Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, the shameless Genet published a 
declaration in a Philadelphia newspaper on December 27, 1793, denying any 
involvement in these activities: “the minister of the French republic, has not 
authorized the recruiting, formation, or assembling of any armed force or any 
military corps on the territory of the United States.”38 In early 1794, Edmund 
Randolph, having replaced Jeerson as secretary of state, received conrmation 
that Genet had successfully recruited over 2,000 Americans to invade Spanish 
Louisiana.39
During the summer and fall of 1793, troubling reports of British assaults on 
American merchant ships demonstrated that France was not the only warring 
nation violating U.S. neutrality. While France’s maritime transgressions had 
largely focused on enticing merchant ships to serve as privateers to bolster its 
navy, Britain adopted aggressive wartime policies that targeted the cargoes of 
American merchant ships to strip them of their neutral status. e British gov-
ernment’s rst order in council, dated June 8, 1793, and arriving in Philadelphia 
on September 12, identied wheat, our, and meal as contraband and authorized 
the Royal Navy to detain and seize any ships headed to enemy ports with these 
items.40 With the United States serving as a major supplier of grain to France, 
this policy resulted in the capture of at least fourteen American merchant ships 
en route to the European continent.41 On November 6, the British government 
issued a second order in council that extended this starvation policy to France’s 
West Indian colonies and expanded the scope of goods included. It authorized 
“the seizure of all ships laden with goods the produce of any colony belonging to 
France or carrying provisions or other supplies for the use of any such colony.”42
Because of the Caribbean’s proximity to the United States, the November 6 
order hit American shipping particularly hard, with 250 vessels seized, and 150 
of those condemned. No longer in possession of their ships and cargoes, captains 
and seamen became stranded in the West Indies as they awaited the intermina-
ble adjudication of their cases.43
Reports of ship seizures connected to the June 8 order reached Philadelphia 
in late summer, as Washington and his cabinet prepared for Congress’s consti-
tutionally mandated convening later in the year. ese British polices stood as a 
direct assault on American neutrality, particularly their underlying philosophi-
cal doctrine that “free ships make free goods.” But the outbreak of a yellow-fever 
epidemic in the nation’s capital interfered with the administration’s ability to 
respond to these encroachments and delayed its preparations for the upcoming 
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congressional session in December. e likely source of the required infesta-
tion of female mosquitoes, which transmitted yellow fever, was the arrival of 
shiploads of refugees and their cargoes from the war-torn Caribbean island of 
Santo Domingo, present-day Hispaniola.44 Philadelphia’s population of 55,000, 
as did those of other American cities, absorbed about 2,000 Santo Domingans. 
By August, Philadelphians began to exhibit the disease’s “colorful” symptoms, 
including yellow skin and black vomit.45 Highly contagious, yellow fever cut a 
wide swath of infection across Philadelphia, resulting in staggering weekly death 
tolls during the months of September and October.
With the yellow-fever outbreak showing no signs of abating, Philadelphia’s 
mayor urged residents to evacuate, and Washington and his cabinet complied. 
Attorney General Randolph sought higher ground and less contagious air in 
Germantown, Pennsylvania, while Hamilton, who had contracted the dis-
ease in early September, recuperated in a mansion outside of the capital.46 By 
mid-September, Washington reluctantly relocated to Mount Vernon, at his 
wife’s urging, to escape the “malignant fever,” while Jeerson returned home to 
Monticello.47 With the national government geographically scattered, Jeerson 
paid a visit to Mount Vernon on September 22 to resolve the growing backlog 
of governance issues.48 One of the topics Washington raised was the temporary 
relocation of the nation’s capital until the epidemic ended. Specically, he asked 
the cabinet, as well as Representative Madison and others, whether the presi-
dent possessed the constitutional authority to convene the upcoming Congress 
in a city other than the capital.49 While Article II, Section 3 of the Constitu-
tion states, that the president “may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both 
Houses, or either of them,” it does not specify whether this power extended to 
changing Congress’s venue. e responses were unanimous: the president lacked 
the authority unless a positive law was passed. Madison explained: “From the 
best investigation I have been able to make in so short a time,” summoning Con-
gress “at a time and place to be named by” the president “seems to require an 
authority that does not exist under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States.”50 While Congress would eventually grant this authority, such a change 
would not be possible prior to the December 1793 session.51
As yellow fever raged into November, Randolph reported to Washington, 
“e mayor and the physicians dissuade people from returning yet, and espe-
cially in great numbers.”52 In response, the president and his cabinet took up 
temporary residence in nearby Germantown in order to conduct the govern-
ment’s business in a less geographically scattered manner. e administration’s 
primary task was draing Washington’s annual address to Congress. While 
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the Neutrality Proclamation and the subsequent challenges to it—privateering, 
Genet, and relations with France and Great Britain—dominated these discus-
sions, the cabinet disagreed on the best way to explain the proclamation to Con-
gress. ey also debated whether to include other issues in this address, such 
as Indian aairs and the government’s nancial health.53 Remarkably, despite 
the swirl of events surrounding American neutrality since the proclamation’s 
issuance, Congress had not been o	cially notied of this policy. e president’s 
message to the two chambers would need to comprehensively address what had 
transpired since April, including Genet’s myriad privateering violations, designs 
on Spanish Louisiana, and the subsequent recall request. Along with Britain’s 
orders in council, France and Spain posed additional diplomatic challenges, with 
the former rescinding its “free ships make free goods” policy for U.S. ships and 
the latter encroaching on U.S. territory along the Florida border and the Mis-
sissippi River.54
Over the course of several meetings in November and through the prepa-
ration of numerous dras, the cabinet debated how best to share these prob-
lems with Congress while maintaining their partisan edge. Jeerson, of course, 
wanted to emphasize the Franco-American friendship, despite Genet’s pending 
recall and France’s May 9 policy of targeting neutral merchant ships traveling to 
enemy ports.55 Hamilton and Knox, not surprisingly, chose the opposite tack: 
denounce France and praise Britain, despite that country’s new hostile trade 
policies. At the November 28 meeting, Washington once again demonstrated 
his political savvy (and limitless patience) by approving a balanced approach that 
highlighted American di	culties with both countries.56 By the time Congress 
gathered in December, the long epidemic was drawing to a close, as freezing 
temperatures killed o the infectious mosquitoes. During the interminable fall 
of 1793, yellow fever had claimed the lives of at least 4,000 Philadelphians and 
resulted in the distribution of over $36,000 in relief funds to survivors.57
Washington’s annual address to Congress actually consisted of four separate 
speeches, all written by Jeerson but blessed by the cabinet. e rst one most 
closely resembled a traditional annual address, or “State of the Union,” with the 
speech emphasizing the year’s highlights.58 At noon on December 3, Washington 
entered the Senate chamber, accompanied by his cabinet and Chief Justice Jay, 
and addressed both houses of Congress.59 His speech provided an update on the 
administration’s policies of the past year, beginning with neutrality. Washington 
explained the need for the proclamation: “As soon as the War in Europe had 
embraced those powers, with whom the United States have the most extensive 
relations; there was reason to apprehend that our intercourse with them might 
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be interrupted, and our disposition for peace, drawn into question.” With Con-
gress now o	cially informed of the neutrality policy, he invited the legislators 
in their “wisdom . . . to correct, improve or enforce this plan of procedure; and 
it will probably be found expedient to extend the legal code.”60 Acknowledging 
the weakness of the judicial branch in its handling of privateering cases, he also 
advised that “the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States  .  .  . demand 
some further provisions.” As he concluded this section of the speech, Washing-
ton claried that neutrality did not mean pacism: “ere is a rank due to the 
United States among Nations, which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost by 
the reputation of weakness.” Instead, “if we desire to avoid insult, we must be 
able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments 
of our rising prosperity, it must be known, that we are at all times ready for war.” 
To this end, the president reported that an inventory was being prepared of the 
nation’s “arms and military stores.”61
Washington presented three additional speeches that highlighted America’s 
specic diplomatic di	culties with Europe and in the Mediterranean Sea. e 
second speech, delivered on December 5, updated the House and Senate on rela-
tions between the United States and France and Great Britain. While a	rming 
France’s “friendly attachment to this country,” it also noted the National Assem-
bly’s hostile new policy of May 9 “making enemy goods lawful prize in the vessel 
of a friend, contrary to our treaty.” e address also announced Genet’s trans-
gressions, including his “tendency . . . to involve us in war abroad, and discord 
and anarchy at home,” and included the numerous letters leading to the request 
for his recall. Washington also highlighted Britain’s aggressive actions against 
American shipping and its commerce, specically that nation’s “orders  .  .  . to 
restrain generally our commerce in corn and other provisions to their own ports 
and those of their friends.”62
e third and fourth messages to the House and Senate, both occurring on 
December 16, focused on challenges to American neutrality and U.S. sover-
eignty beyond the Atlantic. Washington’s third speech highlighted Spain’s ter-
ritorial encroachments against the United States, including the disputed Florida 
border, where “the southern Indians” engaged in “hostilities” against Americans, 
and along the Mississippi River, where Spain had erected navigational barriers 
to U.S. trade.63 Washington’s other address that day dealt with the di	culties 
American ship captains encountered in the Mediterranean from the Barbary 
States, including the need to pay ransoms in order to free maritime citizens.64
e challenges to neutrality the president described on December 5 and 16 
would require future diplomatic missions and congressional actions to resolve.
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Washington’s composite address received enthusiastic responses from both 
houses of Congress. On December 7, the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives, Democratic-Republican Frederick Muhlenberg of Pennsylvania, praised 
the Neutrality Proclamation on behalf of his colleagues: “We accordingly wit-
ness with approbation and pleasure the vigilance with which you have guarded 
against an interruption of that blessing, by your proclamation.”65 In Washing-
ton’s brief response to the House, he wrote, “It is truly gratifying for me to learn, 
that the proclamation has been considered, as a seasonable guard against the in-
terruption of the public peace.”66 e Senate’s response, delivered by its president 
(and the nation’s vice president), John Adams, also a	rmed the wisdom of the 
Neutrality Proclamation: “we therefore contemplate with pleasure, the procla-
mation by you issued, and give it our hearty approbation,” adding, “we deem it a 
measure well timed, and wise.”67 In his reply to the Senate, Washington singled 
out “the decided approbation, which the Proclamation now receives from your 
house,” and rea	rmed the importance of this policy to his administration.68
With neutrality receiving the blessing of both houses of Congress, the legislative 
branch became an energetic constitutional partner in its implementation.
As the ird Congress began its work in January 1794, members eagerly em-
braced Washington’s instructions to “correct, improve or enforce” neutrality 
through the passage of legislation designed to support it. Although the presi-
dent’s December addresses detailed trading violations against American ships 
from France, Britain, and the Barbary States, his description of British “vexa-
tions and spoliations” made a particularly strong impression on Congress as it 
considered a variety of remedies. is perspective had received additional cre-
dence on December 16, 1793, when Jeerson submitted his long-delayed vale-
dictory “Report on Commerce” to Congress, originally requested in 1791. In 
this report, the outgoing secretary of state portrayed America’s positive trading 
relationships with Spain, Portugal, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Swe-
den, in contrast to its negative experiences with Britain.69 Jeerson summarized 
depredations against American commerce stemming from its orders in council: 
the Royal Navy’s seizure of “800–900 vessels and nearly 40,000 tons of cargo” 
as well as the “proportional loss of seamen, shipwrights, and shipbuilding.” In 
response to these hostilities, Jeerson proposed that the United States dramati-
cally shi its trading relationships away from Britain and toward friendlier com-
mercial partners, most notably France.70
With Jeerson concluding his tenure as secretary of state several weeks aer 
submitting this report, the task of implementing these ideas fell to his friend 
and Democratic-Republican ally, Representative Madison. On January 3, 1794, 
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Madison introduced seven resolutions intended to increase America’s com-
mercial independence from Britain. e specic proposals included punitive 
measures: the imposition of import and tonnage duties and port restrictions 
on nations, including Great Britain, that did not have a commercial treaty with 
the United States, and the application of these funds to compensate American 
victims of the Royal Navy.71 In addition, his resolutions encouraged domestic 
manufacturers, increased international trade with other nations, and sought to 
break Britain’s monopoly on America’s importation of manufactured goods.72
With the House of Representatives controlled by Democratic-Republicans and 
the Senate equally divided between them and the Federalists, Madison’s legisla-
tive proposals attracted more debate than decisions.73
Congressional anger toward Britain increased with the submission of Sec-
retary of State Randolph’s lengthy report “e Vexations and Spoliations on 
Our Commerce, since the Commencement of the European War” on March 
5, 1794.74 Unlike Jeerson’s December 16 report that characterized America’s 
European trading partners, with the exception of Great Britain, in a positive 
light, Randolph made clear that French “privateers harass our trade no less than 
those of the British,” among its other transgressions. In addition, Randolph 
summarized the number of American shipping complaints: “the British were 
thirty-two; against the French twenty-six; against the Spanish ten; and against 
the Dutch one.”75 His report provoked a new round of outrage from members 
of Congress, who sought a more aggressive approach to defending U.S. mari-
time commerce.
On March 12 Congressman eodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts, a Federal-
ist, led the response with a legislative package emphasizing U.S. defense prepa-
rations. Among his proposals was the establishment of een regiments of aux-
iliary troops, consisting of one thousand men, serving for two to three years, as 
well as presidential authority to call an embargo.76 ese initiatives borrowed 
generously from the recommendations of Treasury Secretary Hamilton, who 
had previously suggested them to Washington.77
As Madison’s and Sedgwick’s competing proposals awaited consideration in 
the House, Washington submitted another report to Congress on March 25 de-
tailing assaults on American shipping, this time in the West Indies. e U.S. 
consul to French Martinique, Fulwar Skipwith, oered a devastating portrait 
of the Royal Navy’s ruthless campaign against American commerce: “e ship 
Delaware with thirty three other American vessels have been condemned in the 
Vice-Court of Admiralty of Montserrat—about the same number have been 
also in St. Kitts, and upwards of one hundred and y more have been arrested 
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and carried into the dierent ports of the English Windward Islands, and no 
doubt will share the same fate.”78 ese captures, of course, had been autho-
rized under the British government’s November 6, 1793, order in council. With 
the two March reports detailing that country’s uno	cial war against a neutral 
United States, a furious Congress sprang into action.
Abandoning the competing proposals of Madison and Sedgwick (and Jef-
ferson and Hamilton) for the time being, a unied Congress supported an im-
mediate response to protect American shipping. Beginning on March 26, 1794, 
it ordered “that an embargo be laid on all ships and vessels in the ports of the 
United States  .  .  . bound to any foreign port or place, for the term of thirty 
days,” and directed the executive branch to enforce its provisions, including 
potential exemptions.79 As the gatekeepers of the nation’s ports, the Treasury 
Department instructed the customs collectors to take the lead in prohibiting 
ships from sailing, while the War Department, then lacking a standing navy, 
relied upon state militias, under the authority of the governors, to provide mili-
tary support.80 Treasury also elded requests for noncommercial exemptions to 
this ban, including transporting political news (such as word of the embargo) 
or sailing out for humanitarian reasons.81 In the latter case, numerous vessels 
applied for sea passports to rescue stranded American seamen whose ships had 
been seized in the Caribbean. One successful application stressed its adherence 
to the embargo’s goals because “no goods, wares or merchandise of any kind or 
nature will be sent, and the boat so permitted shall bring back any American 
seamen that are there.”82 Another approved request involved two vessels sailing 
to Saint Domingue (Hispaniola) “to carry as passengers any habitants of that 
island wishing to return, along ‘with their clothing, baggage and sea stores.’”83
With Congress extending the thirty-day embargo until May 25, the economic 
hardships on ship captains and seamen increased, as did the request for sea pass-
ports to escape these di	culties.84 In a May 1 letter to Washington, Hamilton 
questioned whether the latest batch of passport applications was for humanitar-
ian purposes or “a cover for carrying on mercantile speculations contrary to the 
true spirit of the embargo.”85 While the president approved the eight passports, 
he also agreed with Hamilton’s suspicions: “I am so fully impressed with the 
necessity of discontinuing the issuing of them without some restrictions.”86 Al-
though intended to protect America’s transatlantic commerce, the embargoes 
harmed the maritime community’s ability to earn a living and also proved in-
creasingly di	cult to enforce. e unpopularity of the embargo was conrmed 
on May 12, when a proposal to extend it until June 20 was overwhelming de-
feated in the House of Representatives 73 to 13.87
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While the executive branch did its part to enforce the congressionally man-
dated embargoes, Washington came to realize that a more enduring solution 
would be needed to uphold American neutrality and to protect the nation’s com-
merce. Rejecting Madison’s unrealistic plans for redening Anglo-American 
commerce and Sedgwick’s belligerent proposals, he oered a third approach: the 
appointment of a special envoy to Britain to resolve America’s trading di	cul-
ties. Randolph had originally suggested this idea, and by mid-April, Washington 
concurred, explaining, “my objects are, to prevent a war.”88 e next day he nom-
inated Chief Justice Jay to serve “as envoy extraordinary of the United States, 
to his Britannic majesty.”89 is appointment was quintessential Washington: 
diplomatic, peaceful, and a reminder to Congress that the executive branch, not 
the legislature, initiated U.S. foreign policy.
Despite Congress’s failure to redene U.S. diplomacy, it proved more suc-
cessful in passing a series of laws designed to protect American commerce and 
to ultimately promote neutrality. is prolic legislative output, relying on the 
Sedgwick-Hamilton recommendations as well as Knox’s reports, included the 
Defence [sic] of Certain Ports and Harbors, the establishment of a Naval Arma-
ment, the erecting and repair of Arsenals and Magazines, the creation of a corps 
of artillerists and engineers to support and build these facilities, and an $80,000 
appropriation to build a six-ship naval eet, with the vessels including the USS
Constellation.90 Lastly, on April 19 the Senate approved Jay’s appointment as spe-
cial envoy 18 to 8, opening a new front in the implementation of neutrality, this 
time through international diplomacy.91
With congressional authorizations to strengthen the nation’s coastal defenses 
in place, Secretary of War Knox devoted his energies to implementing these 
measures. First, he appointed engineers, including Pierre L’Enfant, to fortify 
the port cities of Philadelphia, New York, and Wilmington in consultation with 
their state governors.92 Despite the federal government’s eorts to lead the way in 
enforcing neutrality, it lacked the repower to do so, and once again it turned to 
the states for assistance. As Knox explained to Washington, “e governors are 
commanders in chief of the militia of their respective states” and had been called 
upon in the previous year “in the name of the president of the United States to 
perform certain unpleasant duties relative to the preservation of our neutrality.” 
He further requested that, as “a conciliatory and grateful measure” to the gover-
nors as commanders of the militia, they should be consulted on the fortication 
of their ports. Additionally, they should share their recommendations with the 
president and secretary of war. Lacking a strong military presence in the federal 
government, Washington had little choice but to agree to Knox’s proposal.93
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Among the military legislation was the Naval Armaments Act, which autho-
rized the construction of the six vessels, with four mounting forty-four guns and 
the remainder thirty-six. In his plans for building the nation’s rst navy, Knox 
sought frigates that “combine the greatest possible force, with adequate strength, 
and swiness of sailing, so as to render them equal or superior to any ships . . . be-
longing to the powers of Europe.” In distributing them, Knox acknowledged that 
“the government is the government of the whole people,” and he proposed that 
the busy ports of Charleston, Norfolk, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and 
Boston each receive one of the warships.94 On June 3, Washington nominated six 
ocers who would serve as captains of the ships.95 With the help of these newly 
Figure 6. e USS Constellation, one of the six original warships 
that made up the U.S. Navy in the 1790s. (Wikipedia.com)
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appointed o	cers, Knox also submitted plans for the uniforms of the U.S. Navy, 
sparing no detail in each description. e specics of each uniform made clear 
who held what rank: a captain wore a “full dress coat to be blue with long bu 
lapels,” while a lieutenant’s coat would be “blue with half lapels of bu.” e 
lower-ranking midshipmen would wear a “plain frock coat of blue . . . without 
lapels,” and marines would wear “plain short coats of blue, turned up with red.” 
Amid these careful deliberations, Knox dismissed the captains’ proposal for “em-
broidery” on the uniforms as an “expensive ornament for a Republican Navy.”96
By June 1794, Washington could point to an impressive list of accomplish-
ments in the enforcement of American neutrality. His four speeches to Congress 
in December 1793, based on compromises he forged within his cabinet, oered 
the rationale for neutrality as the wisest policy for the young nation to pursue. 
Additionally, the president presented further domestic and international chal-
lenges the government needed to tackle and encouraged the legislative branch 
to join in the eort. Amid partisan divisions in his administration and in Con-
gress, Washington shrewdly sought a middle ground in its implementation be-
cause he saw neutrality as a national policy that promoted U.S. political and 
commercial interests while keeping the country at peace. With the enactment of 
laws to strengthen the nation’s coastal defenses joining the administration’s ear-
lier bans on privateering, the paper proclamation began to develop a backbone 
and become a national priority.
e year 1794 marked another important turning point in the government’s 
enforcement of neutrality, with the timid judicial branch nding its constitu-
tional voice in the landmark case Glass v. Sloop Betsey.97 With roots in Citizen 
Genet’s notorious commissions, this case began in July 1793, when his prolic 
namesake, the Citizen Genet, captured the sloop Betsey and brought it into Bal-
timore as a prize. Exercising admiralty authority, the French consul a	rmed 
the legality of the capture. e Betsy’s owners, hailing from the neutral nations 
of Sweden and United States, led a suit in the U.S. district court in Maryland 
to overturn the French consul’s ruling and ultimately recover their ship and 
its cargo. e district court judge, William Paca, accepted the French consul’s 
authority over the matter, arguing “that the admiralty-courts of neutral coun-
tries have no such jurisdiction,” only those of warring nations. When the owners 
appealed to the U.S. circuit court for Maryland, the presiding justice, William 
Paterson, upheld the lower court’s ruling but paved the way for the case to appear 
before the Supreme Court.98
As the Supreme Court considered the fate of the Betsey, Chief Justice Jay (just 
before his appointment as special envoy to Great Britain) saw an opportunity 
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to a	rm the neutrality proclamation (which he had helped dra) to thwart 
France’s war preparations and to exercise the admiralty authority that some Eu-
ropean countries chose to cede to belligerents.99 With this in mind, the court 
asked two central questions: rst, did the district court have the authority to 
exercise prize jurisdiction, and second, did a foreign country have the authority 
to erect admiralty courts in the United States? In answering the rst question, 
Jay located the judicial branch’s authority in Article III, Section 2 of the Con-
stitution, “to all cases aecting admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” with the 
district courts serving as the starting point for these cases, according to Section 9 
of the 1789 Judiciary Act. Since the federal courts possessed sovereign authority 
over admiralty in the United States, Jay concluded, “the admiralty jurisdiction, 
which has been exercised in the United States by the consuls of France . . . is not 
of right.” In its unanimous ruling, issued on February 18, 1794, the Supreme 
Court returned the case of the Betsey to the district court for resolution and, 
more importantly, prohibited foreign countries from exercising admiralty au-
thority in the United States.100 With Jay’s bold opinion, the Supreme Court -
nally exercised the jurisdiction over international law and commerce that the 
Constitution and the Judiciary Act had authorized. In turn, the district court 
assumed its newly recognized role in the case of the Betsey, which resulted in the 
release of the ship and the payment of $2,400 to its owners.101
In the aermath of this landmark decision, the federal courts issued a series 
of rulings in prize cases that further claried the U.S. government’s jurisdiction 
over neutrality violations. Building on the precedent established in Sloop Betsey, 
these rulings also relied on existing treaty obligations as well as the role of U.S. 
citizens. Interestingly, all four cases originated in the privateering hotspot of 
Charleston. In 1794, the U.S. district court of South Carolina ruled in Jansen 
v. Vrow Christina Magdalena that federal courts have jurisdiction on “matters 
arising on the high seas,” an authority that came from treaties with Holland, 
Prussia, Sweden, and the 1778 treaties with France.102 In a ruling that repudiated 
the Heneld case, the Supreme Court in Talbot v. Jansen (1795) concluded that 
a U.S. citizen captaining an American ship had violated the nation’s neutrality 
laws when he privateered for France.103 at same year, in Williamson v. Betsey, 
the district court distinguished between a ship’s previous national a	liation and 
its current one. is case concerned a former American privateer that had been 
dismantled and sold. Having been rebuilt in a French port and now possessing 
a French commission, the court ruled that this vessel did not violate American 
neutrality.104 In 1796, the Supreme Court a	rmed in Moodie v. Ship Phoebe 
Anne that a French privateer can enter an American port for repairs pursuant to 
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the 1778 treaties with France (and consistent with the administration’s August 3, 
1793, policy).105 Despite a slow start, the federal courts embraced their admiralty 
authority with gusto and contributed to the federal government’s enforcement 
of neutrality.
Along with the Sloop Betsey ruling, the eventful months of 1794 also nally 
brought news from France concerning Genet’s fate. Gouverneur Morris’s Oc-
tober 18, 1793, letter to Washington, transported to Philadelphia by the trusted 
ship captain William Culver and arriving in mid-January 1794, announced 
“that your intentions are fullled” regarding Genet.106 France’s government had 
undergone dramatic changes since the minister’s appointment, with the more 
aggressive Jacobins seizing power from the Girondins. e Reign of Terror had 
begun, with the execution of Marie Antoinette occurring the same week that 
the Jacobins approved Genet’s recall.107 In a second letter, dated November 12, 
1793, Morris informed Washington that Genet’s replacement would consist of 
a four person “commission,” with Jean Antoine Fauchet serving as France’s new 
minister to the United States.108 In February 1794, Fauchet and his delegation 
arrived in Philadelphia, avoiding the detours and delays that had doomed Genet. 
On February 22, in an unexpected birthday gi to Washington, Fauchet pre-
sented his credentials to the president, bringing Genet’s challenging ten-month 
tenure to an end.109
Genet’s recall, however, came with several stipulations. In its October com-
munications with Morris, the Jacobin government demanded that the minister 
be sent back to France as a “prisoner” and “should be punished.” Morris claried 
to the French government that the United States wanted his dismissal, not his 
head.110 In February, Secretary of State Randolph o	cially a	rmed that Genet’s 
recall had satised the U.S. government’s demands.111 Washington, who had 
once described Genet as “entirely unt for the mission on which he is employed,” 
became his unlikely savior.112 Instead of facing deportation to France and exe-
cution by guillotine, the deposed minister moved to New York State, married 
Cornelia Clinton, became a U.S. citizen, and lived happily as a gentleman farmer 
until his death in 1834.113 Ironically, his now father-in-law, Governor George 
Clinton, had dealt with numerous privateering violations generated by his future 
son-in-law.
France’s second stipulation dealt with the tenure of U.S. Minister to France 
Morris. As early as September 1793, the French republic had sought the ouster 
of Morris, who they considered hostile to their revolution.114 With Genet’s re-
call, French authorities saw their opening. Minister Fauchet, who Washing-
ton praised as “temperate and placid” and his predecessor’s opposite “in all his 
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movements,” made the request in a conversation with Randolph on April 9.115
France’s diplomatic quid pro quo sent the administration into a political tailspin 
as it scrambled to nd someone willing to accept the job. On April 29, Washing-
ton wrote to two prominent New Yorkers, Robert Livingston and Chief Justice 
Jay (who had not departed for Britain yet), to gauge their interest in this post, 
but both demurred.116 e ever-eager Hamilton submitted a bipartisan list of 
twenty-eight names that included his political rivals Jeerson, Madison, and 
Randolph (perhaps to remove them from the national government), while Ran-
dolph oered ve suggestions.117 In the end, Washington selected someone who 
did not appear on any of these lists but who had close philosophical and geo-
graphical ties to Jeerson and Madison: James Monroe of Virginia.118
Born into the Virginia gentry in 1758, Monroe initially pursued a career in 
the Continental Army. His failure to raise a regiment, despite the rank of lieu-
tenant colonel and the support of General Washington, resulted in his return 
to the College of William and Mary. He gained a lifelong friend and mentor in 
Jeerson (who was Virginia’s governor at the time) when he studied law in his 
o	ce. Monroe served in the Virginia House of Delegates as well as the nation’s 
Confederation Congress, where he acquired another inuential friend in Mad-
ison.119 In appointing Monroe, given his close ties to Jeerson and Madison and 
his pro-French sentiments, Washington hoped to balance the partisan tensions 
associated with his nomination of the pro-British and Federalist Jay to Lon-
don.120 is bipartisan appointment, however, proved to be an embarrassment. 
Monroe failed to uphold American neutrality, and Washington was forced to 
recall him in 1796.121 is setback in France, however, did not hinder his later 
political career, in part due to his powerful political allies. He later served as 
governor of Virginia, secretary of state and acting secretary of war during the 
War of 1812, and the nation’s h president. Despite their earlier philosophical 
dierences, Monroe’s presidency saluted Washington’s, as he also toured the 
nation to promote national unity and a	rmed the ideas of the Neutrality Proc-
lamation in the Monroe Doctrine, his statement of U.S. hemispheric autonomy 
and sovereignty.122
While Washington and his cabinet breathed a sigh of relief over the installa-
tion of the new French minister, his predecessor’s antics continued to generate 
problems. Despite Jeerson’s exhortation to Kentucky’s governor to stop Amer-
ican citizens from participating in the invasion of Spanish Louisiana, a letter 
from one of the state’s U.S. senators, John Brown, reported that these enlist-
ments continued with impunity. Written on January 25 but reaching Randolph 
on February 27, Brown described the numerous military units that had been 
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organized and were already engaged in attacking “Spanish dominions in Louisi-
ana.” Among the leaders of these regiments were Generals George Rogers Clark 
and Benjamin Logan, who were then leading 2,000 men down the Mississippi 
River. Another Revolutionary War veteran, Colonel John Montgomery, had 
raised 200 soldiers and had positioned them at the mouth of the Cumberland 
River to head o the Spanish. e senator lamented the surprising ease with 
which these and other regiments were being formed: “So popular is the under-
taking here that I fear the government will want power, either to prevent it or 
punish the adventurers.”123
In dramatic contrast with his controversial predecessor, Fauchet moved 
quickly to put an end to the invasion of Spanish territories and to a	rm Amer-
ican neutrality. In a statement appearing in Philadelphia’s General Advertiser
on March 6, 1794, the minister proclaimed: “Every Frenchman is forbid [sic] 
to violate the Neutrality of the United States. All commissions or authoriza-
tions tending to infringe that neutrality are revoked and returned to agents of 
the French Republic.”124 Additionally, Arthur St. Clair, governor of the North-
west Territory, had delivered his own statement on December 8, 1793, directing 
the territory’s inhabitants “to observe a strict neutrality towards Spain; and to 
abstain from every act of hostility against the subjects and settlements of that 
crown.”125 Yet despite Fauchet’s and St. Clair’s eorts, the volatile situation re-
quired a more sweeping pronouncement from the federal government.
On March 24, 1794, the administration issued a second neutrality proclama-
tion in order to prevent a war on its western borders. Like its April 22, 1793, pre-
decessor, the western proclamation was a collaborative eort, with each cabinet 
member oering his suggestions. e new attorney general, William Bradford, 
wrote the nal version, as Randolph had previously done for the original. It also 
did not include the word “neutrality,” in a nod to the philosophical compromise 
that had resulted in the rst statement. e western proclamation diered from 
its predecessor in one important regard: it placed Washington at the center of 
the document with the repeated use of the personal “I”: “Whereas I have received 
information.” is emphasis demonstrated the importance of neutrality to the 
president as well as his growing frustration with the violations of this policy, 
particularly by fellow Revolutionary War veterans.
e March 24 proclamation focused on the recruitment activities in Ken-
tucky, where American citizens had “assembled an armed force for the purpose 
of invading and plundering the territories of a nation at peace with said United 
States.” e statement warned that citizens engaged in unauthorized military 
activities did so “at their peril” and were admonished “to refrain from enlisting, 
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enrolling, or assembling themselves for such unlawful purposes.” Lastly, Wash-
ington directed “all court magistrates and other o	cers . . . to exert the powers . . . 
to prevent and suppress all such unlawful assemblages.”126 is second proclama-
tion provided two important reminders. First, the United States faced threats to 
its sovereignty and autonomy not just along the Atlantic but also to its west and 
south. Second, there were still U.S. citizens eager to take up arms in a conict 
that did not involve or concern their own country. Despite these dramatic devel-
opments in Spain’s North American holdings, the 1794 Neutrality Proclamation 
has failed to garner the historical attention of its 1793 counterpart.127
Despite some setbacks, the rst half of 1794 witnessed a succession of tri-
umphs in the government’s enforcement of neutrality, including congressional 
measures to protect American trade and ports, the judiciary’s recognition of 
its admiralty authority, the successful recall of a disrespectful European dip-
lomat, and the issuance of a western neutrality proclamation. e culmination 
of the government’s comprehensive enforcement occurred in June, with the 
passage of the Neutrality Act of 1794.128 With the abortive invasions of Span-
ish Louisiana and Florida fresh on his mind, Washington urged both houses 
of Congress to act. Writing on May 20, the president asked “for a stronger and 
more vigorous opposition” than existed under current law “to keep America 
in peace” and to prevent its citizens from participating in foreign wars.129 Al-
though divided along partisan lines, with the vice president breaking the tie 
in the Senate and the House voting only 48 to 38 in favor, Washington gained 
the law he was seeking.130
e sweeping Neutrality Act gave long-overdue legal authority to the procla-
mations and the policy decisions that composed the government’s enforcement 
eorts. Containing ten sections, this law systematically addressed the array of 
neutrality violations the executive branch had encountered on both the land and 
sea since April 1793 while also oering legal remedies to resolve these challenges. 
Sections 1 and 2 embodied the original intention of both neutrality proclama-
tions by making it illegal for American citizens to accept commissions from a 
foreign prince or state and by prohibiting all persons within the United States 
“from enlisting or hiring other persons to enlist in the service of any foreign 
prince or state.” If an American were to accept such a wartime commission, he 
could be ned up to $2,000 and imprisoned for three years.131 Sections 3 and 4 
addressed privateering by banning “the tting out and arming [of] vessels within 
the ports of the United States” for the purpose of supporting a war “against a 
prince or state with [which] the United States are at peace” as well as the aug-
menting ships of war within the jurisdiction of the United States.132
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Section 5, building on the 1794 Neutrality Proclamation, prohibited the 
presence of military expeditions on American soil “to be carried on against the 
territory of a foreign prince or state with [which] the United States are at peace.” 
Section 6 gave long overdue authority to the U.S. district courts to hear “cases of 
captures made within the territorial waters of the United States.” e seventh 
section authorized the president to enforce these provisions with “the land or 
naval forces of the United States.” e eighth provision, building on the ad-
ministration’s August 1793 privateering policy, authorized the president to order 
the departure of foreign vessels whose presence violated U.S. treaties. Section 9 
addressed treason and piracy, while the nal provision authorized this law until 
1797. Its reauthorization that year and then permanent establishment in 1800 
a	rmed the wisdom and necessity of America’s neutrality.133
The year 1794 proved to be a watershed in the implementation of American 
neutrality. No longer just an idealistic policy, it became the law of the land as 
the government’s three branches embraced their constitutional responsibilities 
in support. e executive branch, having initiated the proclamation, led the way 
in its enforcement by energizing government o	cials, banning privateering, ini-
tiating lawsuits, dening the nation’s coastal boundaries, and punishing errant 
foreign o	cials. But this ambitious stance required the full support of the en-
tire federal government to be successful. Congress emerged as an eager partner, 
passing laws to protect American shipping and ports and to codify the neutral-
ity doctrine. e courts also joined in its enforcement by nally embracing its 
constitutional and legal mandates to defend U.S. sovereignty on the high seas. 
Even the nation’s maritime citizens began to see the value of neutrality as the 
government helped them recover their illegally seized ships and cargoes and to 
receive indemnication for their losses. Washington’s vision of building a strong 
national government capable of promoting and protecting U.S. sovereignty and 
commercial interests through a policy of neutrality came to fruition during this 
productive year. With a united federal government successfully enforcing neu-
trality at home, Washington and his administration turned their attention to 
resolving international threats, with diplomatic missions to Britain and Spain as 
well as to points in the Caribbean and the Mediterranean Seas.
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“My Object Is to Prevent War”
Enforcing Neutrality across the Globe
W ith the successful enforcement of neutrality occurring at home, the U.S. government turned its attention to peacefully resolving the challenges to its policy across the globe. Washington’s 
diplomatic initiatives followed the road map he had presented in his four-part 
address to Congress in December 1793.1 In 1794, his administration launched a 
peaceful oensive as it concurrently posted envoys to London, Spain, the Carib-
bean islands, and the Barbary States of Algeria and Morocco. ese appoint-
ments highlighted the numerous international incursions on U.S. neutrality and 
sovereignty, including boundary disputes on the North American continent and 
assaults on American commerce in the waters of the Atlantic, Caribbean, and 
Mediterranean. e mixed outcomes of these ensuing diplomatic discussions, 
with many issues taking over a decade to resolve, demonstrated that it was easier 
to enforce the neutrality policy at home than abroad. Nonetheless, these mis-
sions, and their eventual resulting treaties, possessed important legacies for the 
young nation. First, they announced Washington’s commitment to promoting 
peace and asserting U.S. autonomy and sovereignty. Second, these agreements 
aided America’s maritime citizens. Lastly, and most importantly, these pacts 
established the enduring precedent that the United States would place its needs 
rst when engaged in international negotiations.2
With their proximity to the United States, Europe’s Caribbean colonies 
emerged as a top diplomatic priority as American shipping became ensnared by 
Anglo-French warfare. Prior to the outbreak of war in 1793, the Washington ad-
ministration had appointed Fulwar Skipwith (1765–1839), a Virginia native and 
protégé of Jeerson, to serve as U.S. consul on the French island of Martinique.3
In the contentious realm of eighteenth-century shipping and trading, consuls 
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provided a cost-eective way for countries to protect their commercial interests 
abroad. Although appointed by the president and approved by the Senate, con-
suls lacked governmental or diplomatic status; they also did not receive a salary. 
Instead, they were well-connected businessmen who possessed an exequatur, a 
legal document permitting them to represent their fellow citizens in a foreign 
country. Operating under the direction of the U.S. State Department, consuls 
possessed responsibility for aiding and protecting American citizens, including 
sailors and captains, engaged in commerce overseas.4 Skipwith primarily acted 
as an unpaid observer of events in Martinique, including reporting on revolu-
tionary activities and recording American shipping losses. Largely powerless, the 
U.S. government had also advised him not to alienate France.5
By 1793, with France and Britain at war and the United States attempting 
to remain neutral, assaults on American shipping escalated, as did Skipwith’s 
workload. Britain’s orders in council, particularly those of November 6 target-
ing trade to and from France’s Caribbean holdings, made American ships and 
their crews vulnerable to capture and imprisonment. In a March 7, 1794, report 
to Secretary of State Randolph, Skipwith explained that the British had seized 
“about two hundred and twenty sail of American vessels” and taken them into 
various British-controlled ports. As the U.S. consul in Martinique, Skipwith 
worked to aid the captured American sailors throughout the Caribbean, includ-
ing procuring “a suciency of bread, beef and water to support them to their 
respective homes.” He pointed out that without such assistance, many of these 
seamen “would have entered the foreign [government’s] service.”6
In addition to Skipwith’s reports, Washington learned rsthand of American 
ship seizures from maritime citizens who petitioned the U.S. government for 
assistance. On May 6, 1794, John G. Wachsmuth and three other “citizens of 
the United States” described the “dierent losses they met with, by the captures 
of the following vessels and cargoes taken and carried by the British cruisers to 
the Island of Jamaica.”7 A week later Washington received a petition “from a 
committee appointed by numerous citizens of the United States holding claims 
against the French Republic.” eir principal complaint was that they had not 
been paid for goods they had shipped to the French colonies of Saint Domingue 
and elsewhere.8 e administration also became actively involved in the rescue 
of Joshua Barney, a ship captain and naval veteran of the Revolutionary War, 
whose ship, the Sampson, was seized by the British in Santo Domingo.9 Ran-
dolph arranged for both transportation and a passport to bring Barney from 
Jamaica to Baltimore, although the U.S. government did not pay the $525 bill 
for the journey.10
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Skipwith’s efforts to aid Americans trapped throughout the Caribbean came 
to an abrupt end with Britain’s capture of Martinique in March 1794. Unable 
to conduct consular or any other business on the war-torn island, Skipwith re-
turned to the United States a month later. (His meandering journey to Philadel-
phia included the British navy seizing and impounding his ship.)11 He quickly 
returned to consular and diplomatic duties, accompanying the newly appointed 
minister to France, James Monroe, to serve as consul general to the legation.12 
In May 1794, Congress authorized $900 to reimburse the “just and reasonable 
expenses incurred by Fulwar Skipwith, in relieving the wants, and facilitating 
Figure 7. Commodore Joshua Barney of Baltimore, Maryland,  
one of the many ship captains the U.S. government rescued  
from the Caribbean as part of its neutrality policy.  
(Maryland Historical Society; painted by Rembrandt Peale 1817)
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the return of the seamen” seized in the British West Indies.13 is payment un-
derscored the critical assistance Skipwith had provided to Americans in the Ca-
ribbean and the enormous void his departure created.
e congressionally mandated embargoes of 1794 oered one strategy for 
protecting American shipping in the Caribbean by keeping the vessels at home. 
Washington, however, recognized the more urgent need to continue Skipwith’s 
relief eorts, this time with a full-time representative possessing diplomatic 
authority.14 In April 1794, the president named Philadelphia lawyer Nathaniel 
Cabot Higginson “as an agent on behalf of the United States, to proceed to the 
British West India Islands for certain purposes relating to the ships or vessels of 
the United States, which have been, or may be seized and sent into the ports of any 
of those islands.”15 In addition, Higginson received a warrant for $5,000 to cover 
his $2,000 salary as well as any expenses he might incur, including indemnifying 
ship losses. As special agent, he would be island-hopping across the British Carib-
bean, pursuant to Secretary of State Randolph’s instructions to proceed “without 
delay to the Islands of Barbados, Tobago, Grenada, Martinico [sic], Dominica, 
Antigua, Montserrat, St. Christophers, San Domingo, Jamaica, and New Provi-
dence.”16 is diplomatic mission encountered an unexpected setback in its initial 
months when Higginson died soon aer arriving in the British colony of Domi-
nica.17 Without an agent in the Caribbean to assist them, America’s maritime cit-
izens, their ships, and their cargoes remained in limbo, with no resolution in sight.
On December 5, 1793, Washington had explained to Congress that “the Brit-
ish government having undertaken, by orders to the commanders of their armed 
vessels, to restrain generally our commerce in corn and other provisions to their 
own ports” was one of the major reasons for American trading diculties.18 He, 
of course, was referring to the two orders in council. e rst, dated June 8, 
1793, labeled food stus heading to France, particularly grain, as contraband 
and aggressively repudiated the principle that America’s free (that is, neutral) 
ships meant free goods. e second hostile British order, dated November 6 tar-
geted American ships carrying goods from France’s Caribbean colonies.19 Even 
indirectly, British actions, such as a 1793 truce negotiated between Portugal and 
Algiers permitting Barbary pirates to cross the Straits of Gibraltar and enter the 
Atlantic, made American ships vulnerable to attacks.20 With the British gov-
ernment’s aggressive policies resulting in an undeclared war on U.S. shipping, 
Washington sought a peaceful solution through the nomination of Chief Justice 
Jay as a special envoy to Britain.21
In assuming the position of “extraordinary envoy,” Jay was not replacing the 
current U.S. minister to Britain, omas Pinckney of South Carolina. Instead, 
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his role focused exclusively on securing a commercial treaty with Britain. Jay, 
who remained chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, had amassed signicant 
diplomat experience under the Confederation Congress, including serving as 
its secretary of foreign aairs, its minister to London, and a delegate to the 1783 
Treaty of Paris negotiations. Washington hoped that his stature and experience 
would ensure the success of this complex and delicate mission.22
e detailed instructions Jay received captured the long list of U.S. grievances 
since 1783 as well as the young nation’s almost naive hope that a treaty with 
Britain would resolve them. Hamilton and other prominent Federalists took the 
lead in draing the guidelines of Jay’s mission, with Secretary of State Randolph 
modifying and then submitting them to the envoy on May 6, 1794.23 Consisting 
of six major sections, Randolph began the document by counseling Jay to avoid 
a “wound” to Pinckney’s “sensibility” by assuming this role of envoy. He then 
stated bluntly that the United States hoped to avoid war, but at the same time, 
the nation intended “to assert with dignity and rmness of our rights and our 
title to reparation for past injuries.” Of course, Randolph was referring to the 
numerous “vexations and spoliations” occurring under the British orders of June 
8 and November 6, 1793. Specically, Jay should seek “compensations for all the 
injuries sustained,” while “captures will be strenuously pressed by you.” Another 
area of concern were British attempts to compromise America’s friendships and 
alliances with other nations, particularly France. Randolph reminded Jay of the 
neutral stance of the United States, being “free in our aections and indepen-
dent in our government,” and stressed “that our neutrality has been scrupulously 
observed.”24
Randolph’s instructions also focused on outstanding issues from the 1783 
Treaty of Paris, a topic with which Jay already possessed great familiarity. e 
United States sought compensation for damaged property, including enslaved 
laborers, and also wanted Britain to abandon its North American forts because 
“one of the consequences of holding the posts has been much bloodshed on our 
frontiers by the Indians.” A central component of Jay’s mission concerned the 
negotiation of a commercial treaty with Britain that guaranteed “reciprocity 
in navigation”; “the admission of wheat, sh, salt meat, and other great staples, 
upon the same footing . . . as British staples in our ports”; the armation that 
“free ships make free goods”; “security for neutral commerce”; “no privateering 
commissions to be taken out by the subjects” of either nation; and U.S. “consuls 
to be admitted in Europe, the West and East Indies.” Randolph oered two 
important caveats for this potential treaty. One, “if a treaty of commerce can-
not be formed upon a basis as advantageous as this, you are not to conclude or 
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sign any such” agreement at all. A second deal breaker would be any provision 
that would “detach us from France” or “derogate from our treaties and engage-
ments with France.” Lastly, once Jay arrived in London, he should reach out to 
the diplomats from the League of Armed Neutrality nations—Sweden, Russia, 
and Denmark—who were considering reestablishing this alliance.25 With high 
expectations surrounding this mission, Jay boarded a boat for Britain on May 
12, 1794.26
For the next six months, Jay engaged in negotiations with Lord Grenville, the 
secretary for foreign aairs and an architect of the aggressive orders in council 
against American trade. Despite the obstacles Jay faced in convincing Britain 
to cease such hostile policies toward the United States, the government proved 
more receptive to his overtures than might be expected. e war with France had 
been draining the government of allies and resources, and remaining at peace 
with the United States presented an attractive option.27 Of course, Jay would 
not get everything he sought, but Grenville took the negotiations seriously and 
even made some concessions. Jay succeeded in getting Britain to abandon its 
western military posts and to indemnify American shipping losses occurring 
in the current war. e biggest disappointments centered on free trade. Britain 
dismissed American neutrality through its refusal to arm the principle “free 
ships make free goods” along with its continued policy of regarding foodstus 
as contraband.28
Amid these mixed results, Jay addressed two additional issues that were not 
in the original instructions: impressment of American sailors and shipping 
losses in the Caribbean. In discussions with Grenville, he raised the topic of 
the Royal Navy impressing American sailors and even succeeded in getting an 
anti-impressment provision in an early dra of the treaty. Although this article 
did not make it into the nal version, the issue was not as controversial as it later 
would become, largely because the impressments were occurring in British ports 
and not from American ships. Over time, the Royal Navy became more aggres-
sive in its capture of American seamen, including attacking American ships in 
open water and seizing their crews. With its disruption of American transat-
lantic commerce and its violation of U.S. sovereignty, shipboard impressment 
would be one of the primary causes of the War of 1812.29
e administration’s Caribbean mission enjoyed an unexpected revival 
during Jay’s negotiations, even though this topic had not been included in his 
instructions. Upon his arrival, Jay came to realize the value of sending an envoy 
to London with exclusive responsibility for resolving American shipping losses, 
particularly those in the Caribbean.30 His recommendation coincided with a 
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letter from Philadelphia’s merchants, led by omas FitzSimons, who requested 
that a U.S. agent be sent to Britain to adjudicate their losses. (In the spring of 
1794, FitzSimons’s ship Sally had been captured in the Atlantic and condemned 
in British Bermuda.)31 In response to Jay and FitzSimons, Washington ap-
pointed Samuel Bayard, a Philadelphia lawyer and U.S. Supreme Court clerk, 
to prosecute claims before British admiralty courts.32 Following the instructions 
originally written for Higginson, Bayard arrived in London in December 1794 
to pursue his rst case: compensation for the Sally.33
With the negotiations completed on November 19, 1794, Jay and the nished 
treaty journeyed across the Atlantic to gain its approval from the federal govern-
ment and the American people. e treaty arrived in Philadelphia on March 7, 
1795, and Washington called the recently recessed Senate back into session on 
June 8 to begin their deliberations.34 Controversy quickly swirled around the 
agreement ocially known as the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Naviga-
tion. Democratic-Republicans had opposed Jay’s mission at the outset, favoring 
a new approach that lessened U.S. dependency on Britain as a trading partner.35
Washington and Randolph also made the fateful decision not to divulge its pro-
visions to the public, and the Senate deliberated in secret. Its terms were ocially 
revealed aer its ratication on June 24, 1795, by a vote of 20 to 10, further 
fueling the partisan and popular backlash the congressional opposition had 
already ignited. Perhaps most problematic were the treaty’s actual provisions, 
twenty-eight in all, which paled in comparison to Jay’s loy instructions.36 e 
principle opposition to the agreement, of course, centered on Britain’s unwill-
ingness to respect the U.S. right to free trade and therefore, its neutral stance 
in the current war, a glaring contrast with the relationship America had with 
France in its Treaty of Amity and Commerce.37
Despite these shortcomings, Jay had made progress in several areas. First, 
Britain agreed to abandon its western military posts, beginning in June 1796, 
although critics contended that this departure should occur sooner. Second, 
American ships of all sizes would be allowed to trade in the East Indies, while 
vessels under seventy tons could trade in the British West Indies. e limits on 
West Indian trade, composing Article XII, became a rallying cry for the treaty’s 
opponents (and even some of its supporters like Hamilton); the Senate asserted 
its authority by striking it from the ratied document.38 Lastly, the agreement 
established several commissions to, among other things, identify the river that 
formed the Canadian boundary in Maine (Article V), to address prerevolution-
ary American debts owed to British merchants (Article VI), and to consider ship 
losses and cargo seizures occurring in the current Anglo-French war (Article 
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VII). Funding these commissions provided an additional opportunity for Con-
gress to oppose Jay’s Treaty, as it became known, with the House of Representa-
tives engaged in a contentious debate over the $90,000 needed to support them. 
e appropriation was eventually approved by the narrow margin of 51 to 48.39
e panel established under Article VII, known as the “seizure” commission, 
essentially codied the Skipwith/Higginson/Bayard missions. During its ten-
ure, this committee provided signicant nancial remuneration to American 
ships (and some British ones), demonstrating the value of the federal govern-
ment’s intervention on behalf of its maritime citizens. e commission con-
sisted of ve members: two British, two American, and one chosen randomly. 
Washington appointed two attorneys: Christopher Gore of Massachusetts, 
who had been serving as district attorney for that state, and William Pinkney 
of Maryland, a state politician.40 eir British counterparts were John Nicholl 
and Nicholas Antsey, both experienced maritime lawyers. e h spot went to 
the American Revolutionary War veteran and painter Colonel John Trumbull. 
Although Trumbull had recently served as Jay’s secretary at the treaty negotia-
tions, he lacked legal and diplomatic experience, owing his appointment largely 
to the fact that he was already in London.41 Article VII instructed the commis-
sioners to address shipping losses that could not obtain adequate damages in 
the “ordinary course of judicial proceedings” or under the standards established 
in Jeerson’s September 5, 1793, letter to James Hammond, where he had an-
nounced the U.S. policy of indemnifying foreign ships captured in American 
waters, including Britain’s.42
e London-based commission began its work in 1796 by considering the 
cases of two American ships, the Betsey (not to be confused with the sloop Bet-
sey), seized in the West Indies, and the Sally, captured in the Atlantic en route 
to France.43 With American ships making up the bulk of the losses, the U.S. 
commissioners found themselves playing oense against Britain’s defensive ma-
neuvers. In the case of the Betsey, British commissioner Nicholl contended that 
the panel had no jurisdiction over the matter because the vice-admiralty rul-
ing in Bermuda was nal. e three American commissioners overruled their 
British counterparts and awarded the Betsey’s owners $28,000 for their losses. 
Nicholl made a similar argument in the case of the Sally, but instead of wait-
ing to be outvoted, he and his co-commissioner abandoned the panel for three 
years to prevent the case from proceeding. e British commissioners eventually 
returned to the table and completed their work in 1804. During its nine-year 
existence, the Article VII commission heard over 600 cases and made awards 
totaling $6.8 million, with $6.7 million going to 553 American and $143,000 to 
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twelve British shippers.44 Philadelphia merchant FitzSimons, the owner of the 
Sally who had pushed for a U.S. commercial agent in London, received $5,200 
for his loss.45 (Likewise, during the Adams and Jeerson administrations, Skip-
with, in his role as commercial agent in France, would pursue American claims 
against the French government, with mixed results.)46
Alongside these small victories, the opposition to Jay’s Treaty had the ironic 
eect of demonstrating popular support for Washington’s neutrality policy. 
Numerous resolutions poured into Philadelphia from coastal cities that were 
dismayed that the treaty had not done more to uphold American neutrality and 
to protect American shipping and seamen. Boston citizens opposed the treaty 
“because it surrenders all, or most of the benets, of a commercial nature, which 
we had a right to expect, from our neutrality in the present European war.”47
Similarly, New York citizens proclaimed, “As a neutral, and commercial peo-
ple . . . , the United States should never voluntarily consent to any article prohib-
iting ee vessels from making ee goods.”48 Citizens from Sussex County, Vir-
ginia, (located near the James River) complained that the treaty was “degrading 
to the [nation’s] dignity because no adequate reparation is made by Britain for 
insulting our Flag, obstructing our commerce, imprisoning our citizens and im-
pressing our seamen.”49 rough these petitions, port cities muscularly asserted 
the rights and respect the United States should enjoy with its trading partners, 
particularly Great Britain, and in doing so enshrined the concept of neutrality 
as an American priority.
Jay’s inability to fully achieve his diplomatic instructions reected less his fail-
ure as a negotiator and more the weak hand Americans held against the formi-
dable British. Most historians have concluded that Jay’s Treaty, for all its aws, 
represented the best the United States could hope for in these negotiations.50
e most enduring legacy of the agreement reected Washington’s pragmatism 
in appointing an envoy to Britain to head o warfare with this powerful nation. 
As the president had explained to Secretary of State Randolph in nominating 
Jay for this diplomatic mission, “my objects are, to prevent a war.”51 rough 
its promotion of American neutrality without bloodshed, this agreement repre-
sented a major achievement in Washington’s international vision of peace and 
independence for the United States and demonstrated his underappreciated 
skills as a statesman.
In November 1794 Washington launched a second diplomatic mission to 
Europe, this one receiving a warmer welcome than its British counterpart. In-
terested in pursuing peace in Europe and North America, King Charles IV of 
Spain encouraged the president to appoint a U.S. envoy to resolve questions 
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about the nation’s western boundary along the Mississippi River. Washington 
had shared news of this overture in his December 16, 1793, address to Congress, 
including his appointment of commissioners to conclude a treaty dealing with 
the “subjects of boundary, navigation and commerce.”52
e U.S. territories abutting Spanish Louisiana, particularly Kentucky, had 
long been a hotbed of military unrest, as Genet’s abortive western campaign and 
the subsequent Neutrality Proclamation of 1794 had made clear.53 At the same 
time, Spain had grown tired of European warfare and was seeking ways to break 
its military alliance with Britain through a peace treaty with France.54 eir 
desire to avoid a North American war over the Louisiana territory, as well as 
concerns about British plans on that continent, further motivated Spain to seek 
a diplomatic solution to issues surrounding the Mississippi River.55
On July 26, 1794, the Spanish government formally requested the appoint-
ment of an American envoy: “His Catholic Majesty desires that the President 
send a person with full power . . . for a treaty of alliance to be independent of 
the circumstances and relationships of the [present European] war.”56 Although 
the United States already had two envoys in Madrid, William Carmichael and 
William Short, Spain dismissed them “as most addicted to France” and lacking 
the authority to successfully negotiate a treaty.57 Seeking to accommodate this 
request, Washington once again engaged in diplomatic musical chairs to pro-
duce a candidate with the requisite stature. Aer both Jeerson and Patrick 
Henry declined to serve in this post, he nominated the U.S. minister to Britain, 
Pinckney, as the “envoy extraordinary” to Spain.58 In his letter of introduction, 
the president assured King Charles IV that the South Carolinian possessed 
the “delity, probity, and good conduct” to “render himself acceptable to your 
Majesty.”59 Pinckney’s instructions, supporting America’s neutral aspirations of 
international peacefulness and territorial sovereignty, directed him to negotiate 
a treaty “concerning the navigation of the river Mississippi, and such other mat-
ters relative to the connes of their territories.”60 Pinckney’s nomination sailed 
through the Senate unanimously on November 24, 1794, reecting the country’s 
less contentious relationship with Spain.61
e favorable environment that had produced Pinckney’s mission resulted in 
an equally successful nal agreement. Within the treaty’s twenty-three provi-
sions, Pinckney dened the boundaries of Spain’s North American holdings and 
also secured the U.S. right of navigation on the Mississippi River. e treaty also 
gave the United States the “right of deposit” in the bustling Spanish port of New 
Orleans. is provision meant that America’s maritime citizens could store and 
sell their merchandise in this commercially and geographically advantageous 
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city without having to pay additional duties. Finally, the treaty established com-
missioners (similar to Jay’s Treaty) to resolve spoliation cases emanating from 
assaults on Spanish and American shipping during the current war.62
While the treaty did not oer the generous free-trade provisions of the 
Franco-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce, the resolution of commercial 
and boundary issues along the Mississippi River settled longstanding tensions 
and gave the United States a crucial foothold for westward expansion.63 Pinck-
ney’s Treaty, also known as the Treaty of San Lorenzo and the Treaty of San 
Ildefonso because of the migrating negotiation venues, was signed on October 
27, 1795. Washington armed the “general approbation” for Pinckney’s eorts 
when he shared the news that the Senate unanimously ratied the agreement on 
March 3, 1796.64 With the approval of this treaty, the United States could point 
to two successful negotiations with European powers that armed its rights on 
land and sea.
e most expensive and longest-lasting negotiations of Washington’s presi-
dency (and beyond) occurred with the Mediterranean states of Algiers and Mo-
rocco. e independent empire of Morocco and the semiautonomous Ottoman 
regency of Algiers were home to aggressive and ruthless “corsairs,” or pirates, 
who preyed on European and American shipping. Piracy ebbed and owed in 
relation to the Portuguese navy’s blockade of the Straits of Gibraltar, prevent-
ing these states from sending vessels into the Atlantic.65 Not content to simply 
seize ships and cargoes, pirates also kidnapped seamen and demanded exorbitant 
ransoms for their release. If the ransoms were not paid, captured sailors would 
be sold into slavery and a life of hard labor in mines or in ship galleys. Such bar-
baric practices led European and American sailors to dub these Mediterranean 
nations the “Barbary States.”66
e liing of Portugal’s blockade in 1785 had le American ships vulnerable 
to Algerian piracy, and in May and December of that year, the Maria and the 
Dauphin, along with twenty-one sailors, were captured in the open Atlantic. e 
cash-strapped Confederation Congress managed to raise $80,000 in order to 
purchase treaties with Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Morocco and sent an envoy, 
John Lamb, to handle the negotiations. e dey of Algiers wanted more than 
half that sum, $48,000, merely to release the twenty-one American hostages, 
resulting in the collapse of Lamb’s eorts.67 e captured seamen languished in 
Algerian prisons until 1792, when thirteen of the surviving captives petitioned 
the U.S. government for help.68
Appointing a new envoy to the Mediterranean states launched an additional 
front in Washington’s international campaign to promote U.S. sovereignty 
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abroad and to protect the rights of its maritime citizens. As he had done in the 
three earlier annual messages to Congress, Washington used his fourth address 
in 1793 to announce his diplomatic goals in the Mediterranean region of “ob-
taining recognition of our Treaty with Morocco, and for the ransom of our Cit-
izens and the establishment of peace with Algiers.”69 is formal notication 
to Congress built on eorts already underway by Secretary of State Jeerson, 
including the appointment of an envoy to Algiers as well as the disbursement 
of the $20,000 already appropriated to obtain a treaty with Morocco.70 Tragedy 
once again slowed negotiations. e rst envoy, John Paul Jones of naval fame, 
died before he even reached Algiers, as did his successor, omas Barclay. e 
third appointee, Colonel David Humphreys, a Revolutionary War veteran and 
current minister to Portugal, successfully reached Algiers and began the arduous 
task of negotiating the release of the American seamen.71
e diplomatic situation Humphreys entered in September 1793 had been 
further complicated by the recent peace treaty between Britain and Portugal, 
which reopened the Atlantic to Algerian vessels. By October, the pirates had 
captured eleven more American ships and imprisoned over a hundred seamen. 
is latest round of assaults angered Congress, which soon authorized estab-
lishing the U.S. Navy, consisting of six frigates to protect American shipping in 
the Mediterranean region and elsewhere.72 Amid these challenges, Humphreys, 
with the assistance of Joel Barlow (1754–1812), fellow poet and U.S. consul to Al-
giers, represented the United States, while one of the American captives, James 
Leander Cathcart, acted on behalf of the dey of Algiers.73 e resulting treaty, 
achieved in 1795, led to the release of the surviving American hostages. In ex-
change, the United States would pay $642,500, supply three naval frigates, and 
oer an annual tribute of $21,600 in naval supplies.74 Although costly, this agree-
ment encouraged settlements with Tunis and Tripoli for $107,000 and ensured 
a cessation in assaults, at least for the time being. e Washington administra-
tion’s successful foray into Mediterranean diplomacy also included the required 
renewal of an earlier commercial agreement, the 1786 treaty with Morocco.75 e 
1795 treaty, like its predecessor, oered more symbolic value than economic ben-
ets. Nonetheless, it rearmed the young nation’s commitment to free trade and 
its promotion of U.S. autonomy and sovereignty across the globe, particularly in 
the turbulent Mediterranean.76
e president’s annual address to Congress in December 1795, occurring ex-
actly two years aer he had announced these diplomatic missions, served as a 
victory lap for the administration’s international accomplishments. An unusually 
ebullient Washington declared that more so than any other time, the current 
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period of American “public aairs has aorded just cause for mutual congrat-
ulation.” He then proceeded to list the successful treaty negotiations with Mo-
rocco, Algiers, Spain, and Great Britain. ese agreements armed the wisdom 
of Washington’s neutrality policy as well as his political skills in leading an in-
ternational campaign to promote American neutrality, to protect the nation’s 
maritime citizens, to avoid warfare, and to assert U.S. sovereignty as an indepen-
dent nation. He concluded, “e extinguishment of all the causes of our external 
discord . . . on terms compatible with our national rights and honor, shall be the 
happy result,” adding, “how rm and how precious a foundation will have been 
laid for accelerating, maturing and establishing the prosperity of our country!”77
One immediate challenge for Washington and his administration was the 
cost of international diplomacy. While the agreements with the Mediterranean 
states proved to be expensive, the other treaties also came with price tags. On 
March 31, 1796, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering reported to both houses 
of Congress the expenses associated with implementing the provisions of the 
accords. Jay’s Treaty cost around $80,000, while Pinckney’s Treaty was esti-
mated to be $18,000, with the bulk of these costs associated with the ongoing 
commissions. e treaty with Algiers came in at a whopping $762,000.78 ese 
expenses, of course, did not include the monies needed to build a navy, erect 
coastal defenses, and fund the militias, also important pieces in the protection 
of America’s maritime economy.
e costs associated with treaty making, of course, had important policy and 
partisan ramications. ese international burdens came at a time when the 
U.S. government was still struggling to pay o its Revolutionary War debts. 
Hamilton’s 1790 “Report on the Public Credit” had recognized the need to place 
the young nation on a sound nancial footing in order to ensure its “strength 
and security.” Defending the nation’s interests militarily, both in the West and 
in the Atlantic, had long been identied as crucial functions of the new govern-
ment.79 Washington’s treaties demonstrated that nancial resources were also 
needed to keep the nation in peace and promote its interests. ese agreements, 
with their long-term nancial and political ramications, also contributed to the 
growth of the executive branch’s power and inuence. Washington’s presidential 
successors, Jeerson and Madison, would rely on the nation’s public credit to 
purchase Louisiana and to fund its war eort in 1812.80 But as current leaders of 
the Democratic-Republican opposition, which favored a smaller national gov-
ernment and more congressional inuence, the extension of Hamilton’s nan-
cial approach into international aairs and the accompanying expansion of the 
executive branch’s authority dismayed them.81
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Washington’s diplomatic eorts established the precedent of peacefully 
promoting U.S. interests abroad. But with America’s weight in the world still 
relatively small, there were limits to what diplomacy could accomplish. When 
negotiations failed, Washington’s successors turned to military force to garner 
the attention and respect of more powerful nations. In 1798, John Adams con-
ducted a “Quasi-War” by arming American merchant ships to fend o French 
trading assaults.82 In 1801, Jeerson deployed the edgling U.S. Navy to the 
Mediterranean to address Tripoli’s renewed attacks against American ships. 
And in 1812 Madison pursued war against Britain to stop its aggressive practices 
against American ships, including impressment.83 e reliance on military force 
to promote and sustain U.S. priorities would open new chapters in the nation’s 
diplomatic history.
The year 1794 was a momentous one in the implementation of U.S. 
foreign-policy goals. ese priorities had been craed a year earlier in the Neu-
trality Proclamation, which announced America’s intention to remain friendly 
with warring nations but not to take sides in the growing conict. In December 
1793, Washington delivered one lengthy annual address to Congress and three 
shorter ones in which he outlined the foreign-policy initiatives he intended to 
pursue with Britain, France, Spain, and the Mediterranean “Barbary States” in 
order to promote and secure American neutrality. With the domestic implemen-
tation of this policy well underway, the administration turned its attention to 
its international enforcement, in conjunction with Congress. During this whirl-
wind year of diplomacy, the United States posted envoys to London, Madrid, the 
French Martinique in the Caribbean, and to the Mediterranean states of Algiers 
and Morocco to defend U.S. autonomy and to protect its citizens. While the 
resulting negotiations might have been longer, costlier, and less favorable than 
Washington, his administration, Congress, and the American people may have 
wanted, they could nonetheless point to a string of diplomatic successes that 
avoided war, compensated ship captains, liberated sailors, and raised the young 
nation’s standing throughout the globe. With his skilled execution of this policy 
at both home and abroad, Washington successfully launched America’s neutral 
stance and built a federal government capable of enforcing it.
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Conclusion
“First in Peace”: George Washington, Statesman
T he final years of Washington’s presidency were not happy ones for him. Despite substantial achievements in launching the republican government, including the successful implementation of the neutral-
ity policy, Washington found himself exhausted from the demands of the job 
and frustrated with the increasingly personal attacks made by partisan newspa-
pers. e politically diverse cabinet that had carefully craed and methodically 
enforced neutrality through a series of delicate compromises no longer existed. 
In addition, the president confronted the missteps of two Democratic-Repub-
licans in his administration, Edmund Randolph and James Monroe, whose 
partisan biases undercut his policies. Despite Washington’s sense of disappoint-
ment and even failure, American neutrality helped launch the United States as 
an independent, sovereign nation, both at home and abroad, and served as an 
enduring cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy well into the nineteenth century. 
In craing the proclamation and then implementing it through the federal gov-
ernment’s three branches and across the globe, Washington demonstrated his 
mastery as a political negotiator and established his enduring presidential legacy 
as a statesman who kept the young nation at peace.
Several weeks after announcing America’s foreign-policy triumphs to 
Congress, Washington sounded a very dierent note in a letter to Gouverneur 
Morris, the former minister to France.1 Written on December 22, 1795, he re-
iterated his neutrality policy: “It is well know that peace has been the order of 
the day for me, since the disturbances in Europe rst commenced.” Yet, the 
president lamented, “by a rm adherence to these principles, and to the neutral 
policy which has been adopted, I have brought on myself a torrent of abuse in the 
factious papers in this country.” In particular, Washington focused on the Dem-
ocratic-Republican opposition to Jay’s Treaty. Although conceding that “a more 
favorable one were to have been wished,” he argued that the nal document had 
its merits and was not as unpopular or as terrible as its opponents contended. 2
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As Washington bemoaned rising partisanship, he only needed to look at his 
administration to see its corrosive eects. By early 1795, his cabinet had com-
pletely turned over. Lacking the range of views that had forged the neutrality 
policy, with Jeerson and Randolph on one philosophical side and Hamilton 
and Knox on the other, it now consisted of four new members, all Federalists.3
Randolph’s forced resignation in August 1795 transformed Washington’s cabi-
net into a partisan entity and made explicit the deep political divisions among 
its original members that had been previously held in check. Randolph enjoyed 
the distinction of being Washington’s longest-serving cabinet member, having 
held the posts of attorney general and then secretary of state. Aer Jeerson’s 
departure, he was also the only Democratic-Republican remaining. His contin-
ued service to Washington in two critical positions made him a reliable, hard-
working, and trusted advisor, even if he lacked the political and philosophical 
brilliance of Jeerson or Hamilton. News of Randolph’s later political mis-
steps hit Washington hard, particularly his desire to elevate governing above 
partisanship.4
Randolph’s dramatic departure from the administration occurred for two rea-
sons: rst, because he committed misdeeds, and second, because his Federalists 
colleagues in the cabinet, notably Timothy Pickering and Oliver Wolcott, made 
sure Washington knew about them. In March 1795, a British ship had captured 
the Jean Bart, a vessel carrying French minister to the United States Fauchet’s 
diplomatic dispatches to France. ese papers were eventually handed over to 
the British minister to the United States, George Hammond, who then shared 
them with Secretary of the Treasury Wolcott. ree of the dispatches, the third, 
sixth, and tenth, contained incriminating partisan information about Randolph 
and the Whiskey Rebellion. In Dispatch 10, dated October 31, 1794, Randolph 
discussed the rebellion with Fauchet and its implications for Democratic-Repub-
lican politics. In Dispatch 3, written on June 3, Randolph reported to Fauchet 
that Washington’s administration had “hastened the local eruption, to make 
an advantageous diversion, and to lay the more general storm which it saw was 
gathering.” Perhaps most damaging to Randolph was Dispatch 6, written on 
September 5, in which the secretary of state attempted to raise money from Fau-
chet in order to promote pro-French policies within the administration.5
Aer Washington reviewed translations of these dispatches (helpfully pro-
vided by Secretary of War Pickering), the president summoned Randolph to 
explain his betrayal of administration policy. is meeting occurred on August 
19, with Pickering and Wolcott also present. Randolph, unable to challenge the 
veracity of these documents, submitted his resignation to Washington later that 
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day.6 While continuing to deny any wrongdoing, he was unable to successfully 
dispute the contents of Fauchet’s dispatches.7
Another partisan disappointment confronted Washington, this one coming 
from France. In 1794, the president had reached across the widening partisan 
aisle and nominated Monroe to be the new minister to France. He saw this 
appointment as an opportunity to soothe partisan discord and to also send 
an envoy more favorable to the French. Monroe, of course, was the friend and 
neighbor of the two leading Democratic-Republicans, Jeerson and Madison. 
He was also a strong supporter of the French Revolution, in contrast to his 
predecessor, Morris, whose disdain for it had led Paris to ask for his recall.8
Washington nominated Monroe on May 27, and the new minister sailed a 
month later.9
While Monroe’s mistakes marred his brief tenure as minister to France, 
he also entered a chaotic political situation. e Committee on Public Safety, 
which had presided over the Reign of Terror, still controlled foreign aairs, al-
though the National Convention also claimed governing authority. Amid this 
political confusion, Monroe hastily presented his credentials to the National 
Convention. Immediately aerward, he delivered a speech stressing the bonds 
between the two republics, their similar governments, their commitment to 
rights, and their shared military struggle for independence, which France was 
still ghting.10 ese remarks, particularly the linking of the American Revolu-
tion with France’s current upheaval, undercut U.S. policy to remain aloof from 
the European conict.
e excesses of this speech could be attributed to the excitement and confu-
sion of the moment. But Monroe committed a more serious mistake when he 
placed his partisan preferences above U.S. policy. Concerned about the eects of 
Jay’s Treaty on Franco-American relations, he shared a summary of its contents 
with the French government.11 Washington was understandably livid when he 
received the news. In response, he urged Monroe not “to sow the seeds of distrust 
in the French nation, and to excite their belief of an inuence, possessed by Great 
Britain”; most importantly, he urged his minister to “maintain” America’s “strict 
neutrality.”12 Despite this admonition, Washington had already decided to re-
call Monroe. With Randolph no longer in the cabinet to defend the Virginian, 
Washington informed the new secretary of state, Pickering, that he sought a 
minister “who will promote, not thwart the neutral policy of the government.”13
With the arrival in Paris of Monroe’s successor, Federalist Charles Cotesworth 
Pinckney, in December 1796, the Washington administration no longer had a 
bipartisan cast.14
144 Conclusion
Although the political missteps of Randolph and Monroe added color to 
Washington’s second term, they should not be allowed to obscure the greater 
achievements associated with the formulation and implementation of neutrality 
at home and abroad. First among these accomplishments was the administra-
tion’s decision to avoid participating in the European conict, despite pressure 
from France and Britain. is approach ensured that U.S. autonomy and sover-
eignty would be upheld. It also set the precedent that U.S. foreign policy should 
put American needs rst and avoid cumbersome alliances.
With assaults on American shipping testing the strength of this policy, Wash-
ington and his administration made a series of powerful decisions to enforce 
neutrality. e United States banned privateering in its ports and instructed cus-
toms ocers to report privateering violations, authorized U.S. district attorneys 
to prosecute them, and empowered state governors to use the militias, if needed, 
to enforce such measures. e U.S. government also dened its oceanic bound-
aries and agreed to indemnify foreign ships captured in these waters. Lastly, 
the administration took the bold step of requesting the recall of Citizen Genet, 
whose activities had done so much to undercut the country’s neutral stance. All 
of these decisions were the product of consensus among Washington and his 
cabinet. As the policy’s chief architect, the president approved every document, 
letter, and policy statement that emanated from his administration dealing with 
neutrality. As he steered the United States onto this course, Washington demon-
strated his skills as a political negotiator as well as his commitment to peace.
With the convening of Congress in December 1793, Washington and his ad-
ministration found a valuable constitutional partner that passed laws to expand 
the domestic enforcement of neutrality. His 1795 letter to Pickering summa-
rized these legislative achievements: “the fortications and defenses of several 
harbors,” the building of six naval frigates, and “the erecting and repairing of 
arsenals and magazines.”15 Additionally, Congress passed several embargoes to 
protect American shipping from the British navy’s assaults. Lastly, it codied 
the two neutrality proclamations into the Neutrality Act of 1794, which legally 
banned privateering in American waters and prohibited U.S. citizens from par-
ticipating in foreign conicts. e third branch of the government, the judiciary, 
was slower to dene its constitutional role in the enforcement of neutrality, but 
under the leadership of Chief Justice Jay, the Supreme Court ultimately asserted 
its authority over admiralty cases.
As the assault on neutrality occurred on a global scale as well as in American 
waters, Washington launched diplomatic oensives intended to resolve these 
encroachments. By 1794, envoys could be found in London, Madrid, Lisbon, 
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Algiers, and the Caribbean promoting American neutrality and coming to the 
aid of U.S. ship captains and sailors whose vessels had been captured and con-
demned. Early in the Anglo-French war, some maritime citizens, such as Gideon 
Heneld, sought to prot from French privateering. While the U.S. govern-
ment prohibited Americans from serving on foreign privateers, the administra-
tion successfully negotiated nancial compensation for lost ships and cargoes, 
sending vessels to rescue stranded American sailors. rough these diplomatic 
agreements, the seafaring community came to see the value of the government’s 
involvement in the protection of American shipping.
In September 1796 Washington issued a farewell address to “Friends, and 
Fellow Citizens” in which he summarized the major accomplishments of his 
presidency as well as his concerns for the future. is lengthy message, possess-
ing a bipartisan tinge, was not a speech.16 Instead, it appeared in a Philadelphia 
newspaper, the American Daily Advertiser, on September 19, 1796, as an “open 
letter” to the American people from “an old and aectionate friend.”17 In this 
valedictory, Washington highlighted the themes that had guided his presidency: 
promoting national unity, strengthening republican government, upholding the 
Constitution’s principles, avoiding partisanship, and pursuing American neu-
trality. Washington explained that his 1793 Neutrality Proclamation served as 
the “index to the plan,” then listed the various reasons the United States should 
“steer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world.” First, 
these overseas conicts stemmed from complex alliances and rivalries that had 
nothing to do with the United States. Instead, “such an attachment of a small or 
weak, towards a great and powerful Nation, dooms the former to be the satellite 
of the latter.” Second, foreign entanglements were “one of the baneful foes of 
republican government.” While he urged that the United States “observe good 
faith and justice towards all nations,” he also stressed the importance “in extend-
ing our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as 
possible.”18 As Washington said farewell to the nation, he declared neutrality to 
be the signature issue of his presidency, thus securing his presidential legacy as a 
skilled diplomat and prescient statesman.19
Washington’s accomplishments in promoting and implementing neutrality 
can be seen in the foreign-policy decisions of his successors. Although the neu-
trality policy sent a strong message to the world that the young United States 
intended to be an autonomous and sovereign nation, international challenges 
persisted. John Adams confronted French assaults on U.S. ships during the 
Quasi-War of 1798, while omas Jeerson and James Madison dealt with 
Britain’s continued attacks on American vessels, including the practice of 
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impressment. e Convention of Mortefontaine in 1800 nally disentangled 
the United States from its treaty obligations with France, while a war with Brit-
ain in 1812 would be needed to resolve the longstanding trading problems with 
that nation.20 And despite the large nancial commitments, tensions continued 
with the Algerian pirates until a peace treaty was reached in 1815.21 Amid these 
challenges, each president followed the path established by Washington: defend 
U.S. interests and avoid entanglements in foreign conicts. e continued pur-
suit of American neutrality beyond Washington’s administration demonstrated 
the wisdom and vision of this policy. Its longevity also showed that the partisan 
divide in foreign policy was never as great as it was in domestic aairs.
In hindsight, the neutrality policy seems like a “no-brainer.” Of course the 
young nation should remain aloof from European warfare and not become en-
tangled in conicts that did not concern the United States. Pursuing friendly 
commercial relationships with all nations, regardless of their political associa-
tions, also made sense. e signicance of the Neutrality Proclamation lies in its 
explicitness. rough a written document, the United States announced to its 
citizens and the rest of the world its intention to remain neutral in the current 
European war. is policy gained added strength from Washington’s steadfast 
commitment to its implementation, both at home and abroad. Working with a 
divided cabinet, the president pursued policy compromises designed to ensure 
the successful enforcement of neutrality. With the executive branch leading the 
way in foreign aairs, this policy eventually gained the support of the Constitu-
tion’s other branches, Congress and the judiciary. American neutrality endured 
through the nineteenth century because this approach provided the best path 
for the young nation to participate, grow, and even thrive in the world.
At George Washington’s funeral, Henry Lee, Virginia’s governor and a Rev-
olutionary War veteran, famously and succinctly eulogized the late president as 
“rst in peace, rst in war, and rst in the hearts of the nation.”22 From the bat-
tleeld, Washington had witnessed deadly European rivalries rsthand. ese 
experiences resulted in his deep commitment to American neutrality as presi-
dent, when he pursued peace and established his enduring legacy as a statesman. 
anks to Washington’s unique experiences with war and peace, the United 
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of Algiers, 86, 94.
69. Washington to the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, December 16, 1793, 
PGW-PS, 14:534.
70. See Jefferson, “Report on Morocco and Algiers,” December 14, 1793, 
PGW-PS, 14:535.
71. Barney, Prisoners of Algiers, 99–100.
72. The first three frigates, the United States, the Constitution, and the Constellation, 
were launched in 1797 but were never used in the Mediterranean region. Field, America 
and the Mediterranean World, 36–37, 42.
73. Ford, Joel Barlow, 11; Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 37–38.
74. This agreement included Americans captured in the 1793 attacks. See 
PGW-PS, 16:613n1.
75. Axelrod, American Treaties and Alliances, vi.
76. Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 37–38.
77. Washington to the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, PGW-PS, 
19:221–227.
78. PGW-PS, 19:630n1.
79. Edling, Hercules in the Cradle, 81, 82, 88.
80. Edling, Hercules in the Cradle, 83.
81. White, The Federalists, 217–219.
82. Wood, Empire of Liberty, 245.
83. On the U.S. war with Tripoli, see Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 
49–67. On the War of 1812’s start, see Wood, Empire of Liberty, 659.
Conclusion
1. See Washington to the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, December 8, 
1795, PGW-PS, 19:221–227.
2. Washington to Morris, December 22, 1795, PGW-PS, 19:278–284.
3. Jefferson was the first to resign, leaving in December 1793. Knox followed a year 
later, in 1794, while Hamilton remained until January 1795. Randolph abruptly resigned 
on August 19, 1795. PGW-PS, 14:652, 17:323, 466, 18:563. Randolph was Jefferson’s im-
mediate replacement as secretary of state. Timothy Pickering replaced Knox as secretary 
of war. Oliver Wolcott Jr. became secretary of the Treasury after Hamilton. And finally, 
Pickering moved from the War Department to State after Randolph resigned, with 
James McHenry replacing him at War. See Elkins and McKittrick, Age of Federalism, 
625, 627, 630, 633.
4. Elkins and McKittrick, Age of Federalism, 431.
186 Notes 
5. For a summary of these dispatches, see PGW-PS, 18:482–483n3.
6. See Washington’s questions to Wolcott and Pickering, August 12–18, 1795, and 
Randolph to Washington, August 19, 1795, PGW-PS, 18:538–541n, 563–564n1. See also 
Lindsay M. Chervinsky’s treatment of this episode in The Cabinet, 287–300.
7. After leaving the cabinet, Randolph published a pamphlet, A Vindication of Mr. 
Randolph’s Resignation (Philadelphia, 1795).
8. Ammon, James Monroe, 113, 114, 118.
9. Washington to the U.S. Senate, May 27, 1794, PGW-PS, 16:143–144; Ammon, 
James Monroe, 116.
10. Ammon, James Monroe, 119–120.
11. Ammon, James Monroe, 142–145, 148–149.
12. Washington to Monroe, August 25, 1796, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washing-
ton, 35:190.
13. Washington to the Secretary of State, July 8, 1796, Fitzpatrick, Writings of George 
Washington, 35:127.
14. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney (1746–1825) was the brother of Thomas Pinckney. 
He also enjoyed a distinguished career in American politics and diplomacy. See Wil-
liams, Founding Family, 12, 314, 322.
15. Washington to Pickering, November 20, 1795, PGW-PS, 19:171–172nn2–4.
16. Hamilton was the principal author of this address, although Madison had drafted 
an earlier version in 1792, at the end of Washington’s first term. See Washington to 
Hamilton, August 25, 1796, PAH, 20:307–309. On the 1792 exchange between Wash-
ington and Madison, see PGW-PS, 10:399–403, 475–480. See also Leibiger, Founding 
Friendship, 161, 209–215.
17. Fitzpatrick, Writings of George Washington, 35:214n84, 236.
18. Fitzpatrick, Writings of George Washington, 35:233, 234, 236.
19. Washington retired to his beloved Mount Vernon in the spring of 1797, after John 
Adams’s inauguration as the nation’s second president. From his home, Washington 
wrote, “I am once more seated under my vine and fig tree and hope to spend the remain-
der of my days . . . in peaceful retirement.” He died two and half years later, on December 
14, 1799, at the age of sixty-seven. See Chernow, Washington, 775, 809.
20. Elkins and McKittrick, Age of Federalism, 689.
21. Wood, Empire of Liberty, 242–243, 641–643, 647–648, 696–697.
22. Washington’s funeral was held on December 18, 1799, four days after his death. 
See Chernow, Washington, 809, 811–812.
187
Bibliogr aphy
Abbot, W. W., Dorothy Twohig, Philander D. Chase, Beverly H. Runge, and Fred-
erick Hall Schmidt, eds. e Papers of George Washington, Colonial Series. 10 vols. 
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1983–[95].
Abbot, W. W., Dorothy Twohig, Philander D. Chase, Beverly H. Runge, Beverly S. 
Kirsch, and Debra B. Kessler, eds. e Papers of George Washington, Confederation 
Series. 6 vols. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992–[97].
An Account of the Voyages and Cruizes of Captain Walker, Commander of a Small 
Squadron of Privateers Called the Royal Family. Boston, 1761. 
e Library Com-
pany of Philadelphia, microform. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.
hnpix9&view=2up&seq=8.
Adams, William Howard. Gouverneur Morris: An Independent Life. New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2003.
Allen, David Grayson, et al., eds. Diary of John Quincy Adams. 2 vols. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.
American State Papers: Foreign Relations. Volume 1.
Ammon, Harry. e Genet Mission. New York: W. W. Norton, 1973.
———. James Monroe: e Quest for National Identity. Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1990.
Anderson, Fred. Crucible of War: e Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in Brit-
ish North America, 1754–1766. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000.
Andrews, Kenneth R. Elizabethan Privateering during the Spanish War. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1964.
Arlyck, Kevin. “
e Courts and Foreign Aairs at the Founding.” Brigham Young 
University Law Review 2017 (2017): 1–64.
Axelrod, Alan. American Treaties and Alliances. Washington, DC: Congressional 
Quarterly Press, 2000.
Bailyn, Bernard. Atlantic History: Concept and Contours. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005.
Balogh, Brian. A Government Out of Sight: e Mystery of National Authority in 
Nineteenth-Century America. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Barney, H. G. e Prisoners of Algiers: An Account of the Forgotten American-Algerian 
War, 1785–1797. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966.
Bartoloni-Tuazon, Kathleen. For Fear of an Elective King: George Washington and the 
Presidential Title Controversy of 1789. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014.
188 Bibliography
Beckert, Sven. Empire of Cotton: A Global History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014.
Bemis, Samuel Flagg. Pinckney’s Treaty. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1960.
Berkin, Carol. A Sovereign People: e Crises of the 1790s and the Birth of American 
Nationalism. New York: Basic Books, 2017.
Bevans, Charles I., ed. Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States 
of America, 1776–1949. 13 vols. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Of-
ce, 1968–76.
Bolkhovitinov, Nikolai N. e Beginnings of Russian-American Relations, 1775–1815. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975.
Bowman, Albert Hall. e Struggle for Neutrality: Franco-American Diplomacy during 
the Federalist Era. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1974.
Boyd, Julian P., Charles T. Cullen, John Cantanzariti, Barbara B. Oberg, and James 
P. McClure, eds. e Papers of omas Jeerson. 44 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1950–[2017].
Bradburn, Douglas. e Citizenship Revolution: Politics and the Creation of the Ameri-
can Union. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009.
Bragg, C. L. Crescent Moon over Carolina: William Moultrie and American Liberty. 
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2013.
Branson, Susan. ose Fiery Frenchied Dames: Women and Political Culture in Early 
National Philadelphia. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001.
Brant, Irving. James Madison: Father of the Constitution, 1789–1800. Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1950.
Breen, T. H. George Washington’s Journey: e President Forges a New Nation. New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 2016.
Brewer, John. Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688–1783. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.
Broadside, Beverly, MA, September 17, 1776. Library Company of Philadelphia. Sub-
scription required.
Brown, Charles Brocken. Arthur Mervyn; or, Memoirs of the year 1793. 1799. New 
York: Burt Franklin, 1970.
Brown, Kate Elizabeth. Alexander Hamilton and the Development of American Law. 
Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2017.
Brugger, Robert J., ed. e Papers of James Madison, Secretary of State Series. 11 vols. 
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1986–[2017].
Brunsman, Denver. e Evil Necessity: British Naval Impressment in the 
Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World. Charlottesville: University of Virginia 
Press, 2013.
Bushman, Richard L. e Renement of America: Persons, Houses, Cities. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1992.
Buttereld, L. H., Leonard C. Gaber, and Wendell D. Garrett, eds. e Diary and 
Autobiography of John Adams. 4 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1964.
Bibliography 189 
Calloway, Colin G. e American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Di-
versity in Native American Communities. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995.
———. e Victory with No Name: e Native American Defeat of the First American 
Army. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.
———, ed. e World Turned Upside Down. Boston: Bedford–St. Martin’s, 2016.
Carp, Benjamin L. Rebels Rising: Cities and the American Revolution. New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 2007.
Chamberlain, Muriel E. “Pax Britannica”?: British Foreign Policy, 1789–1914. London: 
Routledge, 1988.
Chapin, Howard M. Privateering in King George’s War, 1739–1748. Providence: E. A. 
Johnson Company, 1928.
Chapin, Howard M. Privateer Ships and Sailors: e First Century of American Colo-
nial Privateering, 1625–1725. Toulon, 1926.
Chase, Philander D., ed. e Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series. 
26 vols. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1985–[2018].
Chernow, Ron. Alexander Hamilton. New York: Penguin Books, 2004.
———. Washington: A Life. New York: Penguin Press, 2010.
Chervinsky, Lindsay M. e Cabinet: George Washington and the Creation of an 
American Institution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020.
Clark, William Bell. George Washington’s Navy: Being an Account of His Excellency’s 
Fleet in New England Waters. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960.
Clauder, Anna C. American Commerce as Aected by the Wars of the French Revolution 
and Napoleon, 1793–1812. Clion, NJ: Augustus M. Kelley, 1932.
Cleves, Rachel Hope. e Reign of Terror in America: Visions of Violence om 
Anti-Jacobinism to Antislavery. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Coggins, Jack. Ships and Seamen of the American Revolution. Harrisburg, PA: Stack-
pole Books, 1969.
Cohen, Sheldon S. Commodore Abraham Whipple of the Continental Navy: Privateer, 
Patriot, Pioneer. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010.
Colley, Linda. Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837. New Haven, CT: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1992.
Combs, Jerald A. e Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding Fathers. Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 1970.
Conroy-Krutz, Emily. Christian Imperialism: Converting the World in the Early 
American Republic. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015.
Cooke, Jacob E. Tench Coxe and the Early Republic. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1978.
Cox, Henry Bartholomew. e Parisian American: Fulwar Skipwith of Virginia. 
Washington, DC: Mount Vernon, 1964.
Crawford, Michael J., ed. e Autobiography of a Yankee Mariner: Christopher Prince 
and the American Revolution. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2002.
190 Bibliography
Cresson, W. P. Francis Dana: A Puritan Diplomat at the Court of Catherine the Great. 
New York: Dial Press, 1930.
Crowhurst, Patrick. e French War on Trade: Privateering, 1793–1815. Southampton, 
UK: Scolar, 1989.
Cunningham, Noble E., Jr. e Presidency of James Monroe. Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 1996.
Dallek, Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
DeConde, Alexander. Entangling Alliance: Politics and Diplomacy under George 
Washington. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1958.
Dierks, Konstantin. “Americans Overseas in the Early American Republic.” Diplomatic 
History 42 (2018): 18–35.
Dougall, Richardson, and Mary Patricia Chapman. United States Chiefs of Mission, 
1778–1973. Washington, DC: Historical Oce, Bureau of Public Aairs, Depart-
ment of State, 1973.
Doyle, William. e Oxford History of the French Revolution. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2002.
Dull, Jonathan R. A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution. New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1985.
Dunn, Susan. Sister Revolutions: French Lightning, American Light. New York: Faber 
and Faber, 1999.
Edler, Friedrich. e Dutch Republic and the American Revolution. New York: 
AMS, 1971.
Edling, Max M. Hercules in the Cradle: War, Money, and the American State, 1783–
1867. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015.
———. A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the 
Making of the American State. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Elkins, Stanley, and Eric McKittrick. e Age of Federalism: e Early American Re-
public, 1788–1800. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Ellis, Joseph J. American Sphinx: e Character of omas Jeerson. New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1997.
Estes, Todd, e Jay Treaty Debate, Public Opinion, and the Evolution of Early Ameri-
can Political Culture. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2006.
Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Harrisburg. Executive Corre-
spondence, 1790–99.
Executive Oce for U.S. Attorneys, Issuing Body. Bicentennial Celebration of the 
United States Attorneys. Washington, DC: Executive Oce of the U.S. Attor-
neys, 1989.
Fanning, Nathaniel. Narrative of the Adventures of an American Navy Ocer, who 
served during part of the American Revolution under the Command of John Paul 
Jones, esq. New York: Printed for Author, 1806.
Bibliography 191 
Faragher, John Mack. A Great and Noble Scheme: e Tragic Story of the Expul-
sion of the French Acadians om eir American Homeland. New York: W. W. 
Norton, 2005.
Fenwick, Charles G. American Neutrality: Trial and Failure. New York: New York 
University Press, 1940.
———. e Neutrality Laws of the United States. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endow-
ment, 1913.
Ferling, John. e Ascent of George Washington: e Hidden Political Genius of an 
American Icon. New York: Bloomsbury, 2009.
———. John Adams: A Life. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1992.
Field, James A. America and the Mediterranean World, 1776–1882. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1969.
Fitzpatrick, John C., ed. e Writings of George Washington. 39 vols. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Oce, 1931–44.
Flexner, James 
omas. George Washington: e Forge of Experience, 1732–1775. Bos-
ton: Little, Brown, 1965.
———. George Washington in the American Revolution, 1775–1783. Boston: Little, 
Brown 1967.
———. George Washington and the New Nation, 1783–1793. Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1970.
Footner, Hulbert. Sailor of Fortune: e Life and Adventures of Commodore Barney, 
U.S.N. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940.
Ford, Arthur L. Joel Barlow. New York: Twayne, 1971.
Freeman, Douglas Southall. George Washington: A Biography. 7 vols. New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1948–57.
Furstenberg, Francois. When the United States Spoke French: Five Refugees Who 
Shaped a Nation. New York: Penguin, 2014.
Garitee, Jerome R. e Republic’s Private Navy: e American Privateering Business as 
Practiced by Baltimore during the War of 1812. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan Univer-
sity Press, 1977.
General Advertiser (Philadelphia), July 30, 1793.
Gilbert, Felix. To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy. Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961.
Gilje, Paul. “Commerce and Conquest in Early American Foreign Relations, 1750–
1850.” Journal of the Early Republic 37 (2017): 735–770.
———. Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights in the War of 1812. New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2013.
———. Liberty on the Wateront: American Maritime Culture in the Age of Revolu-
tion. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2004.
———. To Swear like a Sailor: Maritime Culture in America, 1750–1850. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016.
192 Bibliography
Goebel, Julius, Jr. Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801. Vol. 1 of History of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. New York: Macmillan, 1971.
Gould, Eliga H. Among the Powers of the Earth: e American Revolution and the 
Making of a New World Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012.
Griths, David M. “An American Contribution to the Armed Neutrality of 1780.” 
Russian Review 30 (April 1971): 164–172.
Hancock, David. Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of 
the British Atlantic Community, 1735–1785. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995.
Hanna, Mark G. Pirate Nests and the Rise of the British Empire, 1570–1740. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015.
Harper, John Lamberton. American Machiavelli: Alexander Hamilton and the Origins 
of U.S. Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Harsanyi, Doina Pasca. Lessons om America: Liberal French Nobles in Exile, 1793–
1798. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010.
Head, David. Privateers of the Americas: Spanish American Privateering om the 
United States in the Early Republic. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2015.
Herring, George C. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Hickey, Donald R. e War of 1812: A Forgotten Conict. Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1989.
Hume, Edgar Erskine, ed. General Washington’s Correspondence Concerning the Society 
of Cincinnati. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1941.
Hunt, Gaillard, et al., eds. Letters and Other Writings of James Madison. 4 vols. Phila-
delphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1867.
Hunt, Lynn. Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1984.
Hutchinson, William T., and William M. E. Rachal, eds. e Papers of James Madison. 
17 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962–91.
Hutson, James H. John Adams and the Diplomacy of the American Revolution. Lexing-
ton: University Press of Kentucky, 1980.
Hyneman, Charles S. e First American Neutrality: A Study of the American Under-
standing of Neutral Obligations during the Years 1792 to 1815. Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1934.
Ireland, Robert M. e Legal Career of William Pinkney, 1764–1822. New York: Gar-
land, 1986.
Jackson, Donald, and Dorothy Twohig, eds. e Diaries of George Washington. 6 vols. 
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976–79.
Jackson, Melvin H. Privateers in Charleston, 1793–1796: An Account of the French Pa-
latinate in South Carolina. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1969.
Jameson, John Franklin. Privateering and Piracy in the Colonial Period: Illustrative 
Documents. New York: Macmillan, 1923.
Bibliography 193 
Jarvis, Michael J. In the Eye of All Trade: Bermuda, Bermudians, and the Maritime 
Atlantic World, 1680–1783. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010.
Jessup, Philip C., and Francis C. Deak. Neutrality: Its History, Economics, and Laws. 4 
vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1935–36.
Kaplan, Lawrence S., ed. Colonies into Nation: American Diplomacy, 1763–1801. New 
York: Macmillan, 1972.
Kert, Faye M. Privateering: Patriots and Prots in the War of 1812. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2015.
Ketcham, Ralph, ed. Selected Writings of James Madison. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006.
Knott, Sarah. Sensibility and the American Revolution. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2009.
Koot, Christian. Empire at the Periphery: British Colonists, Anglo-Dutch Trade, and 
the Development of the British Atlantic, 1621–1713. New York: New York University 
Press, 2011.
Kramer, Lloyd. Lafayette in Two Worlds: Public Cultures and Personal Identities in an 
Age of Revolution. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
Kulsrud, Carl J. “Armed Neutralities to 1780.” American Journal of International Law 
29 (July 1935): 423–447.
Kupperman, Karen Ordahl. “International at the Creation: Early Modern Ameri-
can History.” In Rethinking American History in a Global Age, edited by 
omas 
Bender, 91–106. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.
Kurland, Philip B., and Ralph Lerner, eds. e Founders’ Constitution. https://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/.
Labaree, Leonard W., and Whiteld J. Bell Jr., eds. e Papers of Benjamin Franklin. 
43 vols. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959–[2018].
Larson, Edward J. e Return of George Washington, 1783–1789. New York: Harper-
Collins, 2014.
Leibiger, Stuart. Founding Friendship: George Washington, James Madison, and 
the Creation of the American Republic. Charlottesville: University Press of Vir-
ginia, 1999.
Lemisch, Jesse. Jack Tar vs. John Bull: e Role of New York’s Seamen in Precipitating 
the American Revolution. New York: Garland, 1997.
Lengel, Edward G. General George Washington: A Military Life. New York: Random 
House, 2005.
———. Inventing George Washington: America’s Founder, in Myth and Memory. New 
York: Harper, 2011.
Maclay, Edgar Stanton. A History of American Privateers. New York: D. Ap-
pleton, 1899.
Madariaga, Isabel de. Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality of 1780. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1962.
———. Catherine the Great: A Short History. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1990.
194 Bibliography
———. Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1981.
Manela, Erez. “
e United States in the World.” In American History Now, edited by 
Eric Foner and Lisa McGirr, 201–220. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011.
Manseld, Julia. “
e Disease of Commerce: Yellow Fever in the Atlantic World, 
1793–1805.” PhD diss. Stanford University, 2018.
Marcus, Maeva, et al., eds. e Documentary History of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, 1789–1800. 8 vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1985–[2007].
McCoy, Drew R. e Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeersonian America. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980.
McCullough, David. John Adams. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001.
McMahon, Robert J., “Toward a Pluralist Vision: 
e Study of American Foreign Re-
lations as International History and National History.” In Explaining the History of 
American Foreign Relations, edited by Michael J. Hogan and 
omas G. Patterson, 
35–50. 1991. 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
McManemin, John A. Captains of the Privateers during the Revolutionary War. Spring 
Lake, NJ, 1985.
Middlekau, Robert. e Glorious Cause: e American Revolution, 1763–1789. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
Moats, Sandra. Celebrating the Republic: Presidential Ceremony and Popular Sovereignty, 
om Washington to Monroe. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010.
Monteore, Sebag. Prince of Princes: e Life of Potemkin. New York: 
omas Dunne 
Books, 2000.
Moore, John Bassett, ed. International Adjudications: Ancient and Modern. 6 vols. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1929–.
Morgan, William James. “American Privateering in America’s War for Independence, 
1775–1783.” American Neptune 36 (April 1976): 79–87.
Morris, Richard B. e Peacemakers: e Great Powers and American Independence. 
New York: Harper and Row, 1965.
Myers, Jr., Minor. Liberty without Anarchy: A History of the Society of Cincinnati. 
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1983.
Nagel, Paul C. John Quincy Adams: A Public Life, a Private Life. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1997.
Nash, Gary. e Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins 
of the American Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979.
Ne, Stephen C. e Rights and Duties of Neutrals: A General History. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2000.
Newman, Simon P. Parades and Politics of the Street: Festive Culture in the Early 
American Republic. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997.
Novak, William J. “
e Myth of the ‘Weak’ American State.” American Historical 
Review 113 (June 2018): 752–772.
Bibliography 195 
Orren, Michael B. Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the 
Present. New York: W. W. Norton, 2007.
Painter, 
omas. Autobiography of omas Painter, Relating His Experiences during 
the War of Revolution. Privately published, 1910.
Palmer, R. R. e Age of Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and 
America, 1760–1800. 2 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959–64.
Palmer, William P., Henry W. Flournoy, Raleigh E. Colston, and Sherwin McRae, 
eds. Calendar of Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts. 11 vols. Rich-
mond, 1875–93.
Patterson, David S. “
e Department of State: 
e Formative Years, 1775–1800.” Pro-
logue 21 (Winter 1989): 315–328.
Perkins, Bradford. e First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795–1805. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
Perl-Rosenthal, Nathan. Citizen Sailors: Becoming American in the Age of Revolution. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015.
———. “Private Letters and Public Diplomacy: 
e Adams Network and the 
Quasi-War, 1797–1798.” Journal of the Early Republic 31 (Summer 2011): 283–311.
Peters, Ronald M., Jr. e American Speakership: e Oce in Historical Perspective. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990.
Peterson, Merrill D. omas Jeerson and the New Nation: A Biography. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1970.
Petrie, Donald A. e Prize Game: Lawful Looting on the High Seas in the Days of 
Fighting Sail. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999.
Phelps, Glenn A. George Washington and American Constitutionalism. Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1993.
Piggott, Francis, and G. W. T. Omond. Documentary History of the Armed Neutralities, 
1780–1800. London: University Press, 1919.
Pinkney, Helen R. Christopher Gore: Federalist of Massachusetts. Waltham, MA: Gore 
Place Society, 1969.
Pocock, J. G. A. e Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political ought and the 
Atlantic Republican Tradition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.
Poston, Brook. James Monroe: A Republican Champion. Gainesville: University Press 
of Florida, 2019.
Powell, John Harvey. Bring out Your Dead: e Great Plague of Yellow Fever in Phila-
delphia in 1793. New York: Arno, 1970.
Preble, George Henry, and Walter C. Green, eds. Diary of Ezra Green, M.D., Sur-
geon on Board on the Continental Ship of War “Ranger.” Boston: Privately Pub-
lished, 1875.
Prince, Carl E. e Federalists and the Origins of the U.S. Civil Service. New York: 
New York University Press, 1977.
Prince, Carl E., and Mollie Keller. e U.S. Customs Service: A Bicentennial History. 
Washington, DC: Department of Treasury, 1989.
196 Bibliography
Puls, Mark. Henry Knox: Visionary General of the American Revolution. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
Purcell, Sarah. Sealed with Blood: War, Sacrice, and Memory in Revolutionary Amer-
ica. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002.
Randolph, Edmund. A Vindication of Mr. Randolph’s Resignation. Philadelphia, 1795.
Rao, Gautham. National Duties: Custom Houses and the Making of the American State. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016.
———. “
e New Historiography of the Early Federal Government.” William and 
Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 77 (January 2020): 97–128.
Reardon, John J. Edmund Randolph: A Biography. New York: Macmillan, 1974.
Rediker, Marcus. Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, 
and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700–1750. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1987.
Ritcheson, Charles R. Aermath of Revolution: British Policy towards the United 
States, 1783–1795. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1969.
Rosenfeld, Sophia. Common Sense: A Political History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2011.
Rouleau, Brian. With Sails Whitening Every Sea: Mariners and the Making of an 
American Maritime Empire. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014.
Royster, Charles S. A Revolutionary People at War: e Continental Army and Amer-
ica Character, 1775–1783. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979.
Sadosky, Leonard J. Revolutionary Negotiations: Indians, Empires, and Diplomats in 
the Founding of America. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009.
Scharf, J. 
omas. History of the Confederate States Navy om Its Organization to the 
Surrender of the Last Vessel. New York: Gramercy Books, 1996.
Scott, James Brown, ed. e Armed Neutralities of 1780 and 1800: A Collection of O-
cial Documents Preceded by the Views of Representative Publicists. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1918.
———. Prize Cases decided in the United States Supreme Court, 1789–1918. Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1923.
Sears, Louis Martin. George Washington and the French Revolution. Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 1960.
Shankman, Andrew. “Toward a Social History of Federalism: 
e State and Capital-
ism to and from the American Revolution.” Journal of the Early Republic 37 (Win-
ter 2017): 615–653.
Shapiro, Ian, ed. e Federalist Papers. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009.
Shields, David S. Civil Tongues and Polite Letters in British America. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
Sleeper-Smith, Susan. Indigenous Prosperity and American Conquest: Indian Women 
of the Ohio River Valley, 1690–1792. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2018.
Bibliography 197 
Stagg, J. C. A. Mr. Madison’s War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early 
American Republic. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983.
Stahr, Walter. John Jay: Founding Father. New York: Humbledon and London, 2005.
Stark, Francis R. “
e Abolition of Privateering and the Declaration of Paris.” PhD 
diss., Columbia University, 1897.
Starkey, David J. British Privateering Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century. Exeter, 
UK: University of Exeter Press, 1990.
Stinchcombe, William C. e American Revolution and the French Alliance. Syracuse, 
NY: Syracuse University Press, 1969.
———. “John Adams and the Model Treaty.” In e American Revolution and “A Can-
did World,” edited by Lawrence S. Kaplan, 69–84. Kent, OH: Kent State University 
Press, 1977.
Stourzh, Gerald. Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign Policy. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1954.
Swanson, Carl E. Predators and Prizes: American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, 
1739–1748. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991.
Syrett, Harold C., and Jacob E. Cooke, eds. e Papers of Alexander Hamilton. 27 vols. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1961–87.
Taylor, Alan. e Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers, and the Northern Borderlands of 
the American Revolution. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006.
Taylor, Robert J., Mary-Jo Kline, and Gregg L. Lint, eds. e Papers of John Adams. 19 
vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977–2018.

omas, Charles Marion. American Neutrality in 1793: A Study in Cabinet Govern-
ment. New York: Columbia University Press, 1931.
Truxes, 
omas M. Defying Empire: Trading with the Enemy in Colonial New York. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008.
Tuck, Richard. e Rights of War and Peace: Political ought and the International 
Order om Grotius to Kant. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Twohig, Dorothy, ed. e Papers of George Washington, Presidential Series. 20 vols. 
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1987–[2019].
Twohig, Dorothy, Philander D. Chase, Beverly H. Runge, and Frank E. Grizzard Jr., 
eds. e Papers of George Washington, Retirement Series. 4 vols. Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 1998–[99].
Ubbelohde, Carl. e Vice-Admiralty Courts and the American Revolution. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina, 1960.
U.S. Senate. Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States of 
America. Vol. 1. Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, 1828.
Van, Rachel Tamar. “Cents and Sensibilities: Fairness and Free Trade in the Early 19th 
Century.” Diplomatic History 42 (2018): 72–89.
Varg, Paul A. Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers. East Lansing: Michigan State 
University Press, 1963.
198 Bibliography
Vattel, Emer de. e Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the 
Conduct and Aairs of Nations and Sovereigns. Edited by Joseph Chitty. Philadel-
phia: Johnson and Co., Booksellers, 1872.
Vattel, Emer de. e Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the 
Conduct and Aairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with ree Early Essays on the Origin 
and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury. Edited by Béla Kapossy and Richard 
Whatmore. Translated by 
omas Nugent. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008.
Vickers, Daniel. Young Men and the Sea: Yankee Seafarers and the Age of Sail. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005.
Volo, James M. Blue Water Patriots: e American Revolution Aoat. Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 2007.
Waldstreicher, David. In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: e Making of American Nation-
alism, 1776–1820. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
Welch, Richard E., Jr. eodore Sedgwick, Federalist: A Political Portrait. Middletown, 
CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1965.
White, Ashli. Encountering Revolution: Haiti and the Making of the Early Republic. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010.
White, Leonard D. e Federalists: A Study in Administrative History, 1789–1801. New 
York: Free Press, 1948.
———. e Jeersonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1801–1829. New York: 
Free Press, 1951.
Whitridge, Arnold. Rochambeau. New York: Macmillan, 1965.
Williams, Frances Leigh. A Founding Family: e Pinckneys of South Carolina. New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978.
Wilmarth, Arthur E., Jr. “Elusive Foundation: John Marshall, James Wilson, and the 
Problem of Reconciling Popular Sovereignty and Natural Law Jurisprudence in the 
New Federal Republic.” George Washington Law Review 72 (2003): 184–189.
Wilson, Rufus R., ed. Heath’s Memoir of the American War. Freeport, NY: Books for 
Libraries, 1970.
Winslow, Richard E., III. “Wealth and Honor”: Portsmouth during the Golden Age of 
Privateering, 1775–1815. Portsmouth, NH, 1988.
Wood, Gordon S. e Americanization of Benjamin Franklin. New York: Pen-
guin, 2004.
———. Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009.
———. e Radicalism of the American Revolution. New York: Vintage, 1992.
Young, Christopher J. “Connecting the President and the People: Washington’s Neu-
trality, Genet’s Challenge, and Hamilton’s Fight for Public Support.” Journal of the 
Early Republic 31 (Fall 2011): 435–466.
Ziesche, Philipp. Cosmopolitan Patriots: Americans in Paris in the Age of Revolution. 
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010.
The R evolutionary Age
Embracing a broad chronology and geography, this series seeks to publish  
original scholarship on the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary upheavals  
that transformed the Atlantic world between 1750 and 1850.
Ireland and America: Empire, Revolution, and Sovereignty
Patrick Gri
n and Francis D. Cogliano, editors

